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FOREWORD 
y ambition to become a Member of the European Parliament was 
driven, to a large extent, by my enthusiasm for the Single 
European Market. As a commercial executive in a car company, I 
had experienced the day-to-day frustrations of non-tariff barriers and 
technical hurdles. I was outraged by the unproductive and unnecessary 
‘red tape’ that strangled competition and consumer choice. 
Since 2009, I have had the privilege of being Chairman of the 
European Parliament's leading committee on single market issues. I am 
pleased that, with support from across the political spectrum, we have been 
instrumental in re-launching the drive towards a better functioning market. 
The Single Market Act is the biggest political initiative to boost the market 
since 1992. In October 2012, we will be marking the 20th anniversary of the 
first Single Market programme. It is very timely, therefore, to welcome this 
invaluable work of reference and scholarship on the biggest issue still 
facing the single market, the enforcement of the rules creating a truly 
‘barrier-free’ Europe.  
In my experience, too little policy analysis is carried out on single 
market issues. For students of European politics, other topics (such as 
Treaty or Governance issues) always appear to be much more glamorous. 
But a thorough examination of the ‘technology’ of the single market and 
recommendations on the ways to make its ‘mechanisms’ work more 
smoothly and efficiently are surely essential if the potential gains in job 
creation, business start-ups, wealth generation and consumer choice are to 
be realised. 
For many years, Professor Jacques Pelkmans has been a leader in 
research on the single market, and we started to share ideas soon after I 
was elected in 1999. He has continued to be at the forefront of intellectual 
single market advocacy. This book reinforces the case that my Committee 
M
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makes every time we meet – weak enforcement and compliance are the 
biggest obstacles to reaping its full benefits.  
Professor Pelkmans and Anabela Corriera de Brito add an in-depth 
analysis to the case that Parliament makes regularly: formal infringement 
procedures enforced by the Court of Justice of the European Union are time 
consuming, cumbersome and expensive. The focus must shift to non-
legislative instruments, by better cooperation between administrations and 
by empowering affected stakeholders (including consumers, citizens, 
enterprises and public authorities) to challenge administrations where their 
rights are being infringed. Parliament has strongly supported SOLVIT, and 
just approved an enhancement of the Internal Market Information system, 
both instruments that are strongly endorsed by this book.  
We are also deeply engaged in our examination of public 
procurement reforms, which we hope will deliver a framework that 
encourages competition and delivers better outcomes for citizens in the 
delivery of modern and more effective public services. 
I hope that this book will command a wide audience, and stimulate 
more practical and effective enforcement tools that will unshackle the full 
potential of the single market. 
Malcolm Harbour 
MEP and Chairman of the Internal Market and Consumer Protection 
Committee in the European Parliament 
Brussels, September 2012 
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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 
nforcement of and compliance with EU law, and in particular in the 
single market, are not only legally necessary but also of economic 
importance for business, consumers and the European economy at 
large. Only with reliable, permanent and effective enforcement will all the 
potential gains from the single market be fully reaped.  
The present CEPS study provides an overview of classical 
infringement approaches and a range of new EU enforcement methods 
employed in the single market. As far as we know, no such wide-ranging 
study exists. Every effort was made, where possible, to keep the text 
accessible (and non-legalistic). We provide extensive empirical analysis and 
trends of practically all tools that are currently employed.  
A broader, strategic view of EU enforcement distinguishes five 
critical aspects: i) good detection of bad implementation, a lack of 
implementation or bad or non-application; ii) formal infringement 
procedures (the classical route); iii) pre-infringement initiatives (ensuring 
that no infringement procedure will be necessary); iv) preventive initiatives 
and v) reduction of transaction and information costs when exploiting the 
single market rights or laws. The study pays ample attention to the first 
four.  
Central to modern enforcement is the fact that the classical route to 
the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU) is costly and takes a lot 
of time. It is rarely suitable for European business confronted with 
suspected enforcement problems, let alone consumers. Of course, formal 
infringement procedures must always remain available for genuine issues 
of interpretation or, more generally, for the credibility of the system. But 
they will never yield a proper functioning single market in and by 
themselves and therefore have to be complemented by a host of other 
measures and initiatives. 
E
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Amongst the more important new instruments, the pre-infringement 
ones like SOLVIT and EU-Pilot have truly made a difference. SOLVIT is 
free of charge, easy to access (on-line) and has achieved an impressive 
record in terms of speed in handling cases (on average within 10 weeks) 
and successful resolution (around 90% of the cases). EU Pilot is a relatively 
informal mechanism operating between member states and the European 
Commission with a view to minimising infringement cases and doing this 
rapidly. Initiated only in 2008, it has quickly become quite effective.  
At least as important, if not more so, are the preventive approaches, 
including e.g. the on-line inter-member state Internal Market Information 
(IMI) communication system between officials at national and regional 
level, which reduces transaction costs enormously, while enhancing trust 
between administrations and greatly increasing speed in many cases. The 
steady (selective) shift from directives to regulations for the internal market 
has also pre-empted numerous implementation problems, and the 
Directive 98/34 procedures have worked remarkably well in preventing 
new technical barriers from arising in the single market.  
Our study leads to a series of recommendations, of which the more 
important ones include: 
 Despite the recent more effective enforcement in the single market, it 
would be a mistake to hold that the enforcement issue is ‘solved’, far 
from it. 
 A successful EU enforcement strategy should not primarily be legal 
in nature, but pay explicit attention to factors such as the right 
incentives (or the absence of disincentives) for complainants, speed of 
resolution, resources (e.g. for SOLVIT) and the benefit/cost ratio of 
detection and resolution mechanisms. 
 Member states’ active and willing cooperation is and will remain the 
key to effective enforcement. 
 Success stories include SOLVIT, EU Pilot, the Internal Market 
Scoreboard, the mutual recognition Regulation 764/2008 and 
preventing new technical barriers via the Directive 98/34 procedure. 
 Among all types of EU single market legislation, the problems with 
public procurement are undoubtedly the harder ones. The potential 
market is huge: there is still an enormous potential of cross-border 
competition for contracts and the economic welfare gains can be very 
substantial. The European Commission’s proposals of December 2011 
should be of some help. There should be more harmonisation, 
including in the national review and remedies systems. 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
roper enforcement of EU law in the single market is as crucial as 
enacting the EU laws in the first place. In business circles and, at 
times, amongst consumers, there are lingering doubts about the 
effectiveness of enforcement of single market laws, including case law of 
the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU). These doubts cause 
frustration, higher costs (than necessary under EU law) and missed 
opportunities for European business, as well as reduced confidence 
amongst consumers in selected goods and services. Such frustrations or 
anxieties may also play a role in the temporary provision of cross-border 
services (by ‘posted workers’) or with specific forms of establishment in 
some services sectors. The result is that the single market does not function 
properly.  
However, the value-added of the single market has been, right from 
the beginning of the EU in 1958, precisely its potential to generate economic 
growth, in addition to what a single EU country could ever achieve alone, 
through ‘ever-deeper market integration’ over a large economic space. 
Nowadays, even more than ever before in 55 years of EU history, 
companies are keen to exploit the manifold single market opportunities as 
much as possible as a rare source of growth in times of shrinking demand 
and an austere fiscal stance by almost all EU governments. Apart from 
breaking down or otherwise overcoming barriers to market access by 
means of the Single Market Act, it is also important to maximise the 
effectiveness of free movement in the single market, to encourage 
unhindered establishment in other EU countries and to strengthen the 
enforcement of EU law.  
This study is an attempt to identify existing ‘enforcement barriers’, to 
survey the entire spectrum of efforts to improve enforcement or to pre-
empt infringement in the first place as well as to provide and rework recent 
empirical data facilitating the development of an economic assessment of 
internal market enforcement efforts and their potential.  
P
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Chapter 2 will define and ‘confine’ the notion of ‘enforcement 
barriers’ in the broader context of ‘enforcement failures’, followed by a 
brief note on a ‘typology’ of enforcement barriers (chapter 3). Chapter 4 
surveys the spectrum of EU enforcement efforts consisting of five areas of 
activity at EU and member state level: i) detection of (possible) 
infringements of EU law, ii) pre-infringement procedure activities, iii) 
formal infringement procedures, iv) preventive measures and v) measures 
reducing transaction and information costs (mostly) for business. Chapters 
5 through 8 consist of charting four areas of enforcement activity in some 
detail (‘detection’ will not be elaborated, except very briefly in chapter 4).  
We have made an effort to employ non-legalistic language wherever 
possible, hopefully rendering the text more accessible to business persons 
and consumers. However, since our assignment also specified the need to 
incorporate a legal analysis, there will also be sections with a more 
elaborate legal character, in particular where it matters most, namely, for 
formal infringement procedures (chapter 6). Throughout this report, we 
have inserted a considerable amount of relevant empirical data. It should 
be realised there are data limitations as well as difficulties about the exact 
meaning of some of the data concerned with what business perceives as 
‘barriers’. We also will suggest in chapter 10 a number of concrete policy 
recommendations addressed to both the EU and the member state levels 
with a view to further facilitating the exploitation of the single market, in 
particular for goods. 
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2. DEFINING AND CONFINING 
‘ENFORCEMENT BARRIERS’ 
2.1 About ‘barriers’ and enforcement of single market law 
When business wishes to engage in cross-border economic activities inside 
the single market, it may perceive or discern all kinds of ‘barriers’. 
European business clearly remains suspicious or sceptical about the legal 
removal of barriers via EU laws as well as about enforcement of the four 
free movements and the right of establishment. More often than not, there 
is an attitude bordering on ‘disbelief’ in the effectiveness of complaining 
about perceived ‘barriers’. Even recently, the European Business Test Panel 
(EBTP)1 found that: 
i) 29% of those doing cross-border intra-EU business are of the view 
that public authorities are not open to foreign business and are not 
responsive to their needs. 
ii) 38% believe public authorities are not accessible and information 
regarding cross-border business is not transparent. 
iii) 55% encounter a high level of administrative burdens. 
iv) 39% think there is discrimination between national and foreign 
business.2 
                                                   
1 European Commission Business Test Panel (2011), “Help us identify business 
obstacles in the Internal Market” (http://ec.europa.eu/yourvoice/ebtp/ 
consultations/2011/obstacles/index_en.htm). 
2 The EBTP has developed a large network of businesses in touch with DG MARKT 
of the European Commission via occasional on-line consultations on various EU 
topics. For the present purpose, 440 companies responded. These were selected to 
ensure that all 27 EU countries were covered and that all business sizes and a wide 
range of sectors were represented.  
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This scepticism is not always based on sound knowledge of or even 
elementary insights into EU enforcement at national and EU level. Most 
businesses, except for the largest ones, simply do not take or have time for 
such ‘non-productive’ efforts, the effect of which is exactly to reinforce the 
sceptical view in business circles where many other colleagues tend to 
maintain similar, but untested, perspectives. This contribution aims to 
sketch the wide and gradually more effective landscape of enforcement 
actions at national and EU levels (and, indeed, jointly) and concentrate on 
facts, empirical measurement and qualitative evidence where relevant. The 
presumably overly sceptical perceptions in business circles will thus not be 
addressed, but this does not mean that they do not matter. They do matter, 
if only because a better appreciation amongst businesses of the many 
possibilities for enforcing EU law in the single market, most of them not 
involving any financial costs to companies, would lead to a much larger 
stream of complaints or notifications, in turn eventually generating a better 
functioning of the single market for businesses and consumers alike. 
For entrepreneurs and managers, a ‘barrier’ to cross-border activities 
could be any legal or bureaucratic restriction or, for that matter ‘illegal’ 
restriction (under EU law), that hinders, renders more costly or throttles 
their business plans. Of course, business understands that some of these 
costs or restrictions may be justified (under EU law) and therefore merely 
have to be incorporated in their cross-border strategies and calculations. 
Ideally, European business would simply like to be informed in time and 
deal with these obligations as part of their preparations for cross-border 
business. In this ideal scenario, public requirements are precisely known 
and information is relevant and tailor-made to their business. Thus, in the 
eyes of business, a ‘barrier’ would be easy to recognise and it should be 
plain and basically costless to separate the ‘justified’ barriers (justified in 
the EU public interest) from the ones that are ‘illegal’ or, in any event, 
overly cumbersome, onerous and seemingly hard to justify.  
In the EU of 2012, we do not live in such an ideal scenario and, 
indeed, we might never. It takes good and experienced (EU and national) 
market institutions and considerable administrative, networking and 
judicial efforts as well as agile and professional administrations that are 
open and helpful to business (and consumers when relevant) in order to 
minimise the presence of unjustified ‘barriers’ and their costs. In this study, 
the status quo of EU law and case law (the acquis communautaire) is taken as 
a given. Given the acquis, the question asked is whether it can be made to 
work for the proper functioning of the single market in a static as well as a 
dynamic sense. This requires enforcement: for the present purposes, the term 
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‘enforcement’ comprises all activities, public and private, at EU and 
member state level, to ensure the proper transposition of EU law into 
national law, proper implementation and the best possible application of 
EU law governing the single market everywhere in the Union – and the 
European Economic Area (EEA). 
It should be realised that good enforcement cannot be taken for 
granted, for the simple reason that it is demanding. There is a well-
developed literature in law, political science and public administration 
providing many reasons why enforcement may fail, be weak, remain 
underdeveloped or is selective.3 Without pretending to provide a survey of 
this literature, we just consider reasons such as the bad ‘fit’ in national 
regulation as it existed before, the inherent problems of a certain EU 
regulation or directive (some EU laws are internally inconsistent or can be 
characterised as ‘bad’ regulation), capacity and interpretation issues in a 
national administration, the neglect of European standards linked to the 
relevant directive(s) and a lack of specialised expertise for highly technical 
directives (not least, their technical annexes or e.g. type-approval issues). 
The ‘gold-plating’ of directives in national law causing the requirements for 
business to be more onerous than justified by EU law also contributes to 
increased legal heterogeneity and uncertainty. Other times, the lack of or 
bad enforcement of EU law is connected with heavy-handed bureaucratic 
traditions (irrespective of what EU law really requires), domestic political 
frictions about some EU law and the lack of political legitimacy on a 
specific directive in domestic politics (rare, but disturbing when it does 
appear).  
This list is far from exhaustive. Also note that it does not even include 
the motive of a ‘protectionist’ government. Broadly speaking, by now, 
member states are accustomed to EU law and know that intra-EU 
protectionism, even when covert, is neither correct nor easy to achieve, 
given enforcement. Today’s acceptance of the rigour of the internal market 
is greater than ever before and this is a significant, although ‘invisible’ 
accomplishment. Nevertheless, there is always a temptation for some 
governments to be protectionist at the margin (especially before elections) 
or in the form of creating bureaucratic nuisance.  
                                                   
3 Prominent examples from this literature include Siedentopf & Ziller (1988), 
Boerzel (2001 and 2002), Egan (2011), Falkner & Treib (2008), Guimaraes et al. 
(2010) and Mastenbroek (2005). 
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Business in Europe is entitled to benefit from good enforcement. The 
profound and lasting incentives of doing business in a large single market 
with many business customers and 500 million high-income consumers 
should only be mitigated by fully justified regulation, which is proportional 
(i.e. least-cost), fit-for-purpose and enforced or executed with the least-
possible bureaucratic hindrances. Business would expect a high degree of 
transparency and predictability, so that it can anticipate or address 
whatever costs or quality adjustments or marketing questions such 
regulation and execution of rules might imply. In other words, no more 
costs than necessary, no unreasonable delays and no ‘surprises’ due to 
arbitrary discretion on the part of national administrations. Given currently 
prevailing EU regulation (and other relevant EU policies such as 
competition policy), the ideal single market should have no ‘barriers’ 
unless they are justified, least-cost, transparent and predictable. Surely, 
European business can live with such ‘barriers’ and will integrate them into 
their business plans together with numerous other business aspects of 
producing or marketing ‘elsewhere’.  
Would this ideal scenario mean that business would no longer 
complain about ‘barriers’ in the single market? The answer is: no, for two 
reasons: ‘incompleteness’ of the single market and ‘national regulatory 
autonomy’. First, even in the ideal scenario, some ‘barriers’ will remain 
simply because member states have not yet tackled them, for reasons of 
lack of consensus (e.g. GMOs are the archetypical example) or because 
common minimum regulation has not received priority (e.g. private 
security services, after having been removed from the draft services 
Directive) or because EU regulation (and, sometimes, supervision) has 
addressed barriers but in an incomplete manner (e.g. even far-reaching 
financial services regulation does not yet cover mortgages in such a way as 
to arrive at a single market, not even in the eurozone where exchange rate 
risks are zero).  
Second, member states retain regulatory autonomy in a range of 
issues or domains and they tend to jealously guard this autonomy for 
domestic political legitimacy reasons. The upshot is that, if business 
opportunities in domain X are partly or wholly governed by this national 
regulatory autonomy, companies are likely to encounter ‘regulatory 
heterogeneity’ amongst the 27 EU countries. In many instances, the 
differences in such national regulatory regimes do not reflect deeply-felt 
‘preferences’ (like with GMOs) – that is, ‘diversity’, which ought to be 
respected in a union like the EU – but rather are merely the result of 
fragmented decision-making without any pressure or discipline to arrive at 
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identical or even equivalent outcomes throughout the Union. This residual 
regulatory heterogeneity is costly to business and ultimately to customers 
and consumers, but it can only be reduced on a voluntary basis.  
In this respect, the continuous European standardisation forms one 
route to achieve a gradual, almost invisible reduction of such heterogeneity 
costs, since some 18,000-plus of the 22,000 European standards are not 
connected to EU regulation, but amount to purely voluntary agreements to 
smoothen and improve the working of markets in Europe (and beyond 
perhaps). Such European standards automatically imply that national 
standards with the same purpose must be removed or withdrawn, which 
contributes to greater similarity in the functioning of (national) markets. 
Unfortunately, there are no other established paths to minimise regulatory 
heterogeneity, and many national constituencies may not even be 
interested to ‘Europeanise’ their rules voluntarily. 
2.2 Enforcement failures: Barriers and distortions 
This report focuses solely on enforcement barriers. In light of the above, we 
can now define more precisely what such barriers do and do not entail. 
Enforcement barriers take current EU law as a given. Thus, enforcement 
barriers are not about lingering obstacles to free movement or 
establishment, which have not been harmonised (hence, causing blockages 
or hindrances) and are not about higher costs due to national regulatory 
heterogeneity, even though business might perceive these as barriers to 
market access. Given the status quo in terms of EU law, enforcement barriers 
are strictly and only about bad or non-implementation or bad or non-
application or bad or non-enforcement of EU law. In theory, the European 
Commission itself could perhaps fail to fulfil its crucial role as ‘guardian of 
the treaties’ and so generate enforcement barriers, but in actual practice this 
is so far-fetched, most of the time, that we shall ignore it. Enforcement 
barriers are, in reality, about failures of member states to properly apply and 
enforce EU law, including notably the single market acquis. Member states 
have several roles in the EU system, such as ratifying (or not) amendments 
to the treaties and agreeing (in Council) about EU legislation, but they are 
also ‘agents’ of the Union in ensuring that EU law is properly applied and 
enforced. Indeed, Art. 4 TEU and Art. 291, TFEU make this very clear.4  
                                                   
4 Art. 4 TEU states that member states “shall take any appropriate measure, general 
or particular, to ensure fulfilment of the obligations arising out of the Treaties or 
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It follows that European business can count on the proper 
implementation of EU law into domestic law and, subsequently, its 
enforcement. If and when a member state fails to do this or does it 
inadequately, enforcement barriers will arise. When goods, services, 
workers, independents and securities move over intra-EU borders, local 
laws should, insofar as EU rules (and CJEU case law) are concerned, be 
identical or equivalent with respect to objectives and relevant instruments, 
whilst no provisions inconsistent with such laws or frustrating their explicit 
intent should remain on the books. Failure to ensure this can create 
difficulties for European business on the export side (via free movement), 
on the establishment side (for independents and for foreign direct 
investment), but also on the import side (consider, for example, the case of 
a compliant good – say, a component like a pressure vessel – which is seen 
by national authorities as not compliant with local law, but only because 
the country is late or incorrect in implementation of EU rules, and which is 
needed in the value-chain for producing final goods domestically and/or 
for exports). 
In short, enforcement barriers generate unjustified costs or 
hindrances or uncertainty for cross-border business and, in so doing, 
undermine the very purpose of the single market. Besides this direct effect, 
there are indirect consequences such as a reduction of competitive 
pressures in the relevant national market, thereby mitigating one of the 
sources of longer-term economic growth arising from the internal market. 
For consumers it is possibly harmful, too, since, as long as enforcement 
failures continue, they might be deprived from benefiting from greater 
choice between variants of goods and services and/or cheaper offerings 
from elsewhere in the EU, or, perhaps be exposed to goods or services with 
a higher risk than agreed by the EU legislature. 
The following illustration might clarify this rather general discussion. 
In the internal market for goods, a very large part of the EU regulatory 
acquis has to do with technical directives or regulations. Enforcement 
barriers would arise from non-enforcement/non-implementation/bad 
                                                                                                                                 
resulting from the acts of the institutions of the Union”. In addition, member states 
shall facilitate the achievement of the Union’s tasks and refrain from any measure 
that could jeopardise the attainment of the Union’s objectives. Also, “the Union 
and the member states shall…assist each other in carrying out tasks which flow 
from the Treaties”. Art. 291/1, TFEU says that member states “shall adopt all 
measures of national law necessary to implement legally binding Union acts”.  
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application of EU directives or regulations, but – possibly – also from 
imposing non-compliant standards (directly or via insurance contracts) 
and/or from inappropriate testing, certification or even accreditation. 
However, there is one other possibility that is not, strictly speaking, an 
‘enforcement barrier’. Even when free movement is not at issue in any way 
and access is not more costly than expected, the internal market may suffer 
from a distortion. In the case of technical regulation, one can think of market 
surveillance which is one of several ways to enforce EU law in a member 
state. If market surveillance is weak or absent, free movement is not 
hindered but competitive goods may come into the market that are not ‘EU 
law-compliant’ – often, cheaper by virtue of by-passing costly safety or 
environmental provisions in EU law – and hence imply a competitive 
disadvantage for EU law-compliant goods. A distortion of this kind is 
surely due to an enforcement failure, yet without in itself raising costs or 
hindrances in cross-border activities. See Figure 1 for a summary. 
Figure 1. Enforcement failures: Barriers and distortions 
  
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Indeed, the proper functioning of the internal market is not only 
about (having no ‘barriers’ to) free movement and establishment, but also 
about the avoidance of distortions (at least, as far as the EU has 
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case at hand, unequal conditions caused by a failure to apply EU law 
improperly. This study does not deal with market surveillance by the 
member states, since it is strictly speaking not a barrier.5  
The right-hand box in Figure 1 also refers to distortive disparities of 
national regulation or administrative handling as mentioned in Arts 116 
and 117, TFEU. Thus, if regulatory heterogeneity between member states 
using their regulatory autonomy is regarded by the Commission as 
“distorting competition in the internal market”, the EU legislature can 
intervene with a conciliation procedure or, as a fallback power, a directive 
eliminating the distortion. These articles are rarely used for reasons of 
subsidiarity (not too easily overruling national regulatory autonomy) and 
the difficulty of operationalising the generic economic term ‘distortion’. In 
other words, there is large discretion for regulatory heterogeneity 
generated by member states and only a residual EU competence to 
intervene in extreme cases. Except in special cases, European business will 
have to live with (minor, yet irritating) distortions as a result of lingering 
regulatory heterogeneity in the single market. 
 
                                                   
5 Depending on the sector, consumers and/or businesses have called attention to 
the inadequacies of national market surveillance. Examples include toys, pressure 
equipment, cosmetic products and motor vehicles (which are even ‘type-approval’ 
in principle). Under the market surveillance Regulation No. (EC) 765/2008, 
member states must allocate ‘sufficient resources’ to market surveillance. 
According to Orgalime, the European Engineering Industries Association, this is 
far from being the case. For more information, see http://ec.europa.eu/ 
enterprise/sectors/mechanical/machinery/market-surveillance/index_en.htm  
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3. TYPOLOGY OF EU ENFORCEMENT 
BARRIERS 
n this chapter, we ask the question whether a typology of enforcement 
barriers can be developed, before we go on to survey the entire 
landscape of EU enforcement in chapter 4, and its elaboration, step by 
step, in the subsequent chapters. The use of a typology may be found in a 
more aggregated view of the problem than an elaborate panoramic 
perspective, which we hope to offer in this study. In other words, it might 
be helpful for EU and national policy-makers as well as economists 
interested in attempting to calculate estimates per type (given the different 
properties of each type and the derived effects in markets).  
Nevertheless, as this study will once again confirm, enforcement in 
the EU internal market is a complicated domain, with considerable 
sophistication and much institutional and legal subtlety. It is also, by 
definition, a profound issue of the EU’s two-level government system. 
These fundamentals render this area quite resistant to generalisations, 
which are a prerequisite for any typology to be useful. ‘The’ EU internal 
market consists of five distinct market types: goods, services, labour, capital 
and codified technology (like patents). It is problematic to transfer a 
typology developed for goods markets to any one of the other four 
markets, or, indeed, the other way around. The present study is mostly 
focused on goods. Barriers in e.g. the internal market for services, and the 
enforcement barriers as a sequel, are both quite different and considerably 
harder to classify, and possibly more numerous as well.6 But even in goods, 
the variety of remaining barriers in the EU internal market is still large and 
enforcement of EU rules and principles is far from simple or uniform. 
                                                   
6 See for example the well-known Commission survey, “The state of the internal 
market for services”, COM(2002) 441 of 30 July 2002, where no less than 90 (!) types 
of barriers were identified. The reader is also referred to Mustilli & Pelkmans 
(2012) on the identification of barriers in the EU internal market for services, in the 
framework of the FP7 project SERVICEGAP.  
I
12  TYPOLOGY OF EU ENFORCEMENT BARRIERS 
Later in this study, we shall provide detailed empirical evidence on 
(enforcement) barriers or failures, drawing on several sources. First, we 
report on the on-line problem-solving network called SOLVIT.7 Secondly, 
we provide a comprehensive assessment of member states’ notifications 
under Directive 98/34 (on any technical regulation at national level, 
published in summary form on the TRIS website,8 maintained by DG 
Enterprise and Industry of the European Commission. And finally, we 
explore recent case law where relevant trends in CJEU infringement cases, 
preceded by the Commission’s efforts to realise compliance without going 
to the CJEU. We shall demonstrate that these efforts to overcome or remove 
‘enforcement barriers’ are quite different in nature (e.g. some are 
‘preventive’, other ex-post). It may well be possible to derive a useful 
typology from all these enforcement efforts in the landscape to be sketched.  
We will confine our discussion to a simple typology, mainly as an 
introduction to the reader and a warning about a few suggestions 
sometimes made in the EU debates.  
Enforcement barriers could best be regarded as barriers to (intra-EU) 
market access that have not been addressed effectively by EU enforcement 
mechanisms although they should have been. Therefore, enforcement 
barriers are a direct consequence of the acquis communautaire, hence, what 
has already been accomplished in the EU internal market. Enforcement 
barriers exclude lingering barriers that are the result of a failure at EU level 
to harmonise or a lack of Commission initiatives to this effect, or 
derogations in the treaty about a few remaining areas of national 
regulatory competences (which leave member states ‘free’ to act on their 
own). For European business or consumers, such fine distinctions will often 
be far removed from their concerns: usually, for them, these instances are 
barriers, no matter what labels are attached to them.  
                                                   
7 Created in July 2002, the SOLVIT network allows EU member states to work 
together to solve problems caused by the misapplication of internal market law by 
public authorities without taking recourse to legal proceedings. SOLVIT centres 
handle complaints from both citizens and businesses. Each EU member state (as 
well as Norway, Iceland and Liechtenstein) has its own SOLVIT centre. Their 
services are free of charge and aim to solve problems within ten weeks. For more 
information, see the SOLVIT website of the European Commission, which 
coordinates the network (http://ec.europa.eu/solvit/site/index_en.htm). 
8 TRIS stands for Technical Regulations Information Systems. For more 
information, see http://ec.europa.eu/enterprise/tris/index_en.htm 
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In terms of public actors, it might be useful to distinguish ‘legislative’ 
enforcement barriers (in which the legislator in each member state is to be 
addressed) from ‘administrative’ barriers. In the latter, the national law 
itself is not the problem, but rather it is the practical, administrative 
execution (and the agencies, bodies or administrative units in the national 
governments) that is in need of correction or discipline. Legislative barriers 
include late or incorrect transposition of EU directives, national technical 
requirements in laws and decrees causing barriers (despite mutual 
recognition) and the question of national gold-plating of EU directives. 
Insofar as business is internationalised in European if not world-wide 
value-chains, the goods markets may also be affected (negatively) by higher 
costs originating from (too) restrictive service regulation, since these are 
usually closely connected inside value-chains. The so-called ‘knock-on’ 
effects of restrictive service regulation for manufacturing industries and 
their trade can be quite high.9 They can surely be regarded as barriers, and 
hence bad enforcement in the internal market for services also hinders the 
proper functioning of the internal goods market.  
Administrative barriers include the incorrect application of EU 
directives, conformity assessment barriers and enforcement issues in (intra-
EU) public procurement, especially non-publication (when above the value 
thresholds in EU law).  
Gold-plating 
Our study goes at length into the first two instances of legislative barriers. 
The following two barriers call for a comment, however. First, what exactly 
is ‘gold-plating’ and when is it a barrier? The practical problem of gold-
plating is that it is a much-used term in the EU circuit, but very little 
rigorous analysis has been undertaken. The broad idea is that member 
states ‘use’ the occasion of the duty to implement a directive in such a way 
that either other or additional requirements (preferred in that country but 
not harmonised in Brussels) are added in the national law, or that the 
transposition is combined with revisions of related legislation that have 
                                                   
9 See Conway & Nicoletti (2006, Figure 23) for this ‘knock-on’ effect for EU15 
countries and some other OECD countries in 2003 (ranging from a factor of 0.1 up 
to 0.35) and Arnold et al. (2011, p. 104) for the knock-on effect on ICT-using and 
non-ICT-using sectors in 2003 (ranging from 0.08 to 0.27 for ICT-using sectors). The 
latter distinction is motivated by the growth restraints caused by knock-on effects, 
shown to have been most damaging in the ICT-using sectors. 
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nothing to do with the directive at stake (but one cannot ‘see’ that from the 
text). Gold-plating has received a bad name because extra national 
requirements or too stringent formulations, not necessary for the directive 
to be implemented, are – more often than not – associated in business 
circles, the press or in populist political parties with ‘Brussels’, portrayed as 
“again” adding to the regulatory burden or imposing “silly” demands. It is 
exceedingly hard to find out, case by case in each member state, whether 
these extras are due to the EU decisions (with the relevant country 
explicitly involved, by the way), to the member state itself when 
implementing the regulation or to the member state itself but for reasons 
beyond the scope of EU competences. 
Therefore, one has to be careful in equating gold-plating with 
enforcement barriers. One can safely associate gold-plating with problems 
of market access for business from other member states (and most likely for 
local business as well), but is it an enforcement failure or barrier? A priori, 
one cannot tell because the ‘extra’ provisions ‘around’ the requirements of 
the relevant directive may well be legitimate and legal under national 
regulatory autonomy. Thus, whilst it may increase ‘regulatory 
heterogeneity’ (and this might be costly for business),10 there is no lack of 
enforcement. 
So, gold-plating necessitates a careful study of each and every case, 
and, in many instances, enforcement might not be the issue. The only 
authoritative study on gold-plating, the UK Davidson Review (Davidson, 
2006, p. 4), expresses a similar view: 
The review found that properly assessing whether a particular piece 
of European legislation has in fact been over-implemented and 
whether that over-implementation is justified is not 
straightforward. The assessment requires careful research into the 
legislation and the policy reasons behind the UK’s implementation, 
as well as consideration of how the legislation is being enforced in 
practice and the impacts it has on those being regulated. 
It is also interesting to examine how gold-plating is defined. The 
Review’s wording is: “when implementation goes beyond the minimum 
necessary to comply” in four ways: extending the scope, not taking full 
advantage of derogations, employing sanctions or e.g. the burden of proof 
                                                   
10 See the seminal works by Kox & Lejour (2006) with respect to the Services 
Directive, and Nordås & Kox (2009) for an extension with respect to the costs of 
heterogeneity. These costs can be quite high. 
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beyond the minimum needed or too early implementation (Davidson, 2006, 
p. 5). Note that the last one is dubious, to say the least, and even the second 
one is problematic, since it assumes that EU law is somehow (too?) costly 
and is not a better arrangement for market functioning. Indeed, in some 
cases, derogations might be distortive (but were accepted as the price of 
compromise in EU decision-making between 27 countries), and they almost 
always cause more heterogeneity. 
Technical requirements 
The ‘barrier’ of technical requirements also calls for a precise statement. 
Recently, the EU regime for mutual recognition (until that moment, based 
on CJEU case law) has decisively changed with Regulation 764/2008.11 
First, in principle, member states must have a single contact point for free 
information for business and reference to the competent authorities on any 
such laws (thus, spending resources should now be minimised). Second, if 
mutual recognition is incorrectly applied, the burden-of-proof is now on 
the member state, with considerable protection of the company wanting 
market access for its good. The expected effect of this reversal is that 
incorrect application of mutual recognition has been made rather difficult. 
Third, if technical requirements are justified, e.g. by health reasons, one 
should normally expect it to be under EU regulation already. If not, it 
would fall in a relatively limited category of (yet) unresolved lingering 
barriers to intra-EU market access, which can be costly, but it does not 
constitute an enforcement barrier (because EU law does not yet apply).  
Under administrative barriers, we shall treat the first one at length in 
the rest of the study. The second one (under the label ‘conformity 
assessment’) might here and there still exist, but one should take into 
account that the 2008 so-called ‘New Legislative Framework’ has addressed 
these barriers very carefully indeed with Regulation EC/765/2008 and 
Decision 768/2008, and their subsequent application to the 2009 revised toy 
Directive as well as nine other new approach directives.12  
                                                   
11 Regulation EC/764/2008 of 9 July 2008 laying down procedures relating to the 
application of certain technical rules to products lawfully marketed in another 
member state, OJEC L 218 of 13 August 2008. 
12 Reg. 765/2008 of 9 July 2008 setting out the requirements for accreditation and 
market surveillance relating to the marketing of products, OJEC L 218 of 13 August 
2008; Decision 768/2008 on a common framework for the marketing of products, 
OJEC L 218 of 13 August 2008. 
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4. THE LANDSCAPE OF EU ENFORCEMENT 
EFFORTS 
ot only has the EU strict treaty articles on the member states’ 
duties of enforcement, the machinery to realise such enforcement 
and to correct bad (national) enforcement has expanded 
considerably over time. The time has long passed when enforcement was 
the exclusive domain of lawyers, even if the ultimate ‘hard core’ powers of 
the EU consist of recourse to the CJEU (with fines, in extreme instances). 
Figure 2 shows the entire landscape of enforcement of single market law. 
Three of the five types of enforcement efforts have been available since the 
outset of the European Economic Community (EEC): detection (via 
monitoring and complaints), pre-infringement initiatives and formal 
infringement procedures. As we shall see in the following sections, 
however, the scope of efforts in the former two has widened appreciably 
over time. 
Figure 2. Enforcement of single market law 
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More recently, emphasis has been given to effective prevention in a 
number of ways. Lowering the transaction and information costs of 
business (and sometimes consumers) associated with perceived or actual 
‘barriers’ to intra-EU market access has also become far more important. 
These two types of efforts are not always clearly distinct – there can be 
some overlap for a few activities. The overall conclusion suggested strongly 
by Figure 2 is that complaints about insufficient or ineffective enforcement 
have been around for decades and that the EU level as well as member 
states have responded (with some delays, to be sure) with more, and more 
differentiated, efforts. The reader will notice in the following sections that 
especially the preventive measures have expanded enormously, closely 
followed by much greater intensity of pre-infringement efforts, with the aim 
of pre-empting enforcement barriers or nipping them in the bud at low 
costs when detected.  
Detection of incorrect implementation (transposition) and/or bad 
enforcement of single market law in the member states used to be the 
exclusive activity of the European Commission, surrounded by 
confidentiality on the EU/member states’ interface. This was a 
consequence of the original emphasis on formal infringement efforts as 
spelled out in the treaty. Of course, even in the formal approach, the treaty 
encourages (after detection) informal interaction between the Commission 
and the member states with a view to resolving the problem immediately 
without further proceedings. As Figure 14 shows (Chapter 6), no less than 
70% of detections are solved this way! Nowadays, however, detection and 
pre-infringement efforts have become ever more closely related and the 
initial secrecy has largely disappeared. The idea behind that is probably 
that timely and effective detection is in the common interest of all economic 
agents in the single market. Indeed, detection is, more often than not, the 
result of private agents encountering doubtful or plainly illegal provisions 
or hindrances, so that public encouragement of filing complaints and 
regular publicity as well as accessible mechanisms to report are raising the 
effectiveness of enforcement. Thus, the Petitions Committee of the 
European Parliament may bring up cases reported to them and some of the 
pre-infringement mechanisms (such as SOLVIT, package meetings, 
networks of officials, scoreboards – see chapter 5) may also be supportive 
of the detection function.  
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5. PRE-INFRINGEMENT INITIATIVES 
he actual implementation of internal market law is still facing major 
challenges, such as considerable delays in transposing directives into 
national law13 or an increased number of complaints from citizens 
and enterprises concerning the violation of their rights granted by EU law.  
The European Commission, as ‘guardian of the treaties’, shall oversee 
the application of EU law under the control of the CJEU (Art. 17 (1) TFEU). 
In carrying out this mission and given slow legal procedures, the 
Commission continuously developed new ways to enhance the 
implementation and enforcement of EU law. Of course, the classical legal 
enforcement in the treaty remains the hard-core instrument in the EU. 
However, much effort during recent decades has been invested in working 
around it or finding complementary ways of realising greater effectiveness. 
This is good policy because the drawbacks of formal infringement 
procedures are considerable. And, even more important, it does not result 
in a degree of effectiveness that European business (or, indeed, customers 
and consumers!) nowadays is impressed by. One must keep this method 
and the powers at Commission/CJEU level as a hard fall-back option, but 
much more is necessary if one wants the single market to function 
                                                   
13 See Internal Market Scoreboard No. 23, of September 2011. It shows that, for the 
first time since 2007, member states have exceeded the 1% transposition deficit 
(note that this 1% target is a reduction from the earlier 1½% target). For the 
notifications of directives with a transposition deadline of 30 April 2011, notified 
by 10 May 2011, the average transposition deficit was 1.2%. The percentage of 
incorrectly transposed directives in July 2011 was 0.8%, which is above the 0.5% 
target recently proposed in the Single Market Act of 13 April 2011. For the latter, 
see Commission Communication, “Single Market Act: Twelve levers to boost 
growth and strengthen confidence – ‘Working together to create new growth’”, 
COM (2011) 206, 14 April 2011. 
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properly. Much greater emphasis has been given to a range of pre-
infringement initiatives, that is, once a complaint arises and is picked up by 
the Commission (as the guardian of the treaties), there are many ways to 
arrive at a solution before one ends up in Luxembourg at the CJEU.  
The pre-infringement landscape is wide, ranging from the informal 
and formal steps of the earlier stages of the infringement procedure 
(discussed as part of infringement procedures, see chapter 6), to so-called 
‘package meetings’ with member states, to setting up specialised networks 
of national civil servants dealing with specific EU legislation helping with 
interpretation issues of complex directives (e.g. the machine Directive or 
type-approval questions or of national banking supervision exceptions to 
EU rules). A new variant of these pre-infringement efforts consists of 
several informal approaches, which help to reduce the lack of compliance 
by member states, such as the SOLVIT network, but also the regular 
publication of the Internal Market Scoreboard with records of each member 
state in (late) implementation of EU legislation, which, in turn, creates 
Commission and inter-member state peer pressures to improve the scores.14 
Of these many efforts, we shall elaborate on the SOLVIT network, the 
European Consumer Centres Network (ECC-Net) and two Scoreboards 
(one on the internal market and one on consumer issues) in chapters 5 and 
6 (sections 5.1, 5.2 and 6.2.1.2).  
These ‘soft’ and flexible instruments, providing a less intrusive and 
often not so legalistic way to ensure the observance of EU legislation, have 
a practical influence transcending their informal character. Moreover, the 
member states have become central to greater effectiveness in this respect. 
Hence, both the pre-infringement and the preventive approaches rely more 
and more, although not exclusively, on the active cooperation of member 
states, as a group, or between the member states and the Commission, in 
sharp contrast to formal infringement procedures where “the” EU (via the 
Commission) opposes a member state in a legal proceeding. 
                                                   
14 Note that these pressures are augmented by CJEU case law making an EU 
country liable, with possible damages to be paid to e.g. business, in national 
lawsuits for non-implementation.  
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5.1 The SOLVIT network 
5.1.1 Background and functioning of the SOLVIT network 
One of the ways in which the Commission has tried to solve problems that 
arise for citizens and businesses from the misapplication of internal market 
law is the creation of SOLVIT. 
Set up in 2002, by European Commission Communication on 
Effective Problem Solving in the Internal Market (SOLVIT),15 SOLVIT is an 
online network for settling cross-border disputes informally over the 
incorrect and inaccurate application of the single market rules arising 
between citizens or businesses and public administrations across EU 
member states, to the extent that such disputes are not subject to legal 
proceedings at national or EU level. SOLVIT is meant as an informal 
alternative to other problem-solving mechanisms, such as national court 
procedures, formal complaints to the European Commission and petitions.  
The system is based on mutual cooperation16 and online techniques 
that allow for a decisional procedure, which are easily accessible, free of 
charge, and offer a quick solution to the internal market problems.  
                                                   
15 In fact, an earlier version of SOLVIT had existed since 1997, following the 
Commission Communication Action Plan for the Single Market, in accordance 
with the 1996 Council Resolution on cooperation between administrations for the 
enforcement of legislation on the internal market. However, this problem-solving 
network did not work effectively and in 2001, the Commission proposed a newer 
version, effective as of 2002. The new system is based on the pre-existing 
cooperation network, on an online database connecting the centres and principles 
for centres to follow when dealing with the cases (which are set out in the 
Recommendation of the Commission on principles for using SOLVIT – the Internal 
Market Problem Solving Network). See Communication from the Commission to 
the Council, the European Parliament, the Economic and Social Committee and the 
Committee of the Regions – “Effective Problem Solving in the Internal Market 
(SOLVIT)”, COM(2001)702 final; European Commission Recommendation of 7 
December 2001 on principles for using SOLVIT – The Internal Market Problem 
Solving Network, OJ L 33; European Commission Communication “Action Plan for 
the single market”, of 4 June 1997, CSE (97) I final and Council Resolution of 8 July 
1996 on “Cooperation between administrations for the enforcement of legislation 
on the internal market”, 96/C 224/02. 
16 The system is drawn up on the principle of mutual cooperation at three different 
levels: at cross-border level between the two centres involved in the decision 
procedure (the so-called ‘home’ centre and the ‘lead’ centre); at national level 
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There is a national SOLVIT centre in every EU member state as well 
as Iceland, Liechtenstein and Norway, which is part of the member states’ 
national administration (most centres are either based in the Ministry of 
Foreign Affairs or the Ministry of Economic Affairs) and is subject to the 
law of the member states. SOLVIT centres cooperate directly with each 
other via an online database. The Commission is generally not directly 
involved in this alternative informal dispute settlement system. However, 
the Commission coordinates the network; provides, manages and controls 
the database (which connects the national SOLVIT Centres); and, when 
needed, helps speed up the resolution of problems. The Commission is also 
responsible for ensuring that “all proposed solutions should be in full 
conformity with Community law”.17 In 2004, the Commission published a 
Staff Working Document aimed at setting out in operational terms the 
approach to exercise its activity.18 DG Internal Market should organise 
periodic evaluations of the SOLVIT network including the range of 
solutions implemented, in particular to address evident problems. 
Moreover, the Commission always retains its prerogative to start an 
infringement proceeding, under Art. 258 TFEU, whenever this is necessary. 
At same time, SOLVIT is an online alternative dispute resolution 
mechanism (ODR)19 and a cooperation network between national 
administrations, which contributes to improving the implementation 
capacity of EU law at national level and hence fosters the correct 
application of EU law. In fact, evaluation shows that SOLVIT centres 
contribute to a “cultural change” in their own national civil service.20 
                                                                                                                                 
(between the lead centre and the national administration, which allegedly acted in 
breach of EU law) and at European level (between the centres and the European 
Commission).  
17 European Commission Recommendation on “Principles for using SOLVIT – the 
Internal Market Problem Solving Network”, C(2001)390, 7 December 2001. 
18 See European Commission Staff Working Document “Setting out the approach 
for assessing the conformity of solutions proposed by SOLVIT network with 
Community Law”, (2004), 17 September 2004, SEC(2004)1159. 
19 In contrast to the infringement procedures as defined under Arts 258 and 260 
TFEU, SOLVIT is an alternative, complementary out-of-court dispute settlement 
mechanism.  
20 See European Commission Evaluation of SOLVIT, Final Report, November 2011. 
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Today, SOLVIT handles around 1,300 cases a year (in 2011, SOLVIT 
received a total of 3,154 cases, of which 1,306 fell within its mandate) and 
manages to find solutions for over 89% of its clients, with an average 
turnaround time of 70 days.21 
In practice, SOLVIT works as follows. When a citizen or a business 
has a complaint concerning the application of internal market rules by the 
public authorities of another member state, he can lodge this complaint at 
the SOLVIT centre in his own country (the so-called ‘home’ centre).22 
SOLVIT centres in principle only act following the initiative of a citizen or 
business confronted with a problem, but they can also take the initiative of 
identifying and contacting citizens or businesses directly to solve their 
problem. According to the European Commission, these initiatives should 
be encouraged and SOLVIT centres should be able to mark their ‘own 
initiative’ cases as such in the SOLVIT database.23 It is also possible that the 
Commission relays a complaint it has received through other channels to 
the SOLVIT centre, if it believes the problem could be solved in a 
satisfactory manner without its own involvement. Out of the 4,035 cases 
entered into CHAP (the Commission’s complaints handling system) in 
2010, 22 cases were referred on to SOLVIT.24 
The home centre, after receiving the complaint, has to make a 
preliminary assessment in order to verify whether the case falls under the 
scope of the SOLVIT system or whether it could be better resolved by other 
means or legal proceedings would be more appropriate. It has to verify 
whether the problem has a cross-border dimension, involves the 
application of internal market rules and is concerned with a dispute 
between a citizen or business and a national public administration.25  
                                                   
21 See European Commission, “Making the Single Market deliver, Annual 
governance check-up 2011”, 2012. 
22 The applicant does not need to meet any particular requirements and the case 
can be submitted to his home centre in his own language. 
23 European Commission, DG Internal Market and Services, Working Paper, 
“Reinforcing effective problem-solving in the Single Market: Unlocking SOLVIT’s 
full potential at the occasion of its 10th anniversary”, 2012. 
24 Ibid. 
25 The SOLVIT system offers help in cases concerning problems of a cross-border 
nature involving a public authority, but not B2B (business to business) or B2C 
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It should be noted that one of the main problems faced by the 
SOLVIT system since its creation is the number of cases landing on 
SOLVIT’s desk that fall outside its mandate. In response to submissions 
outside its remit, SOLVIT centres either helped to solve the problem 
informally, explored other problem-solving possibilities or pointed citizens 
and businesses in the right direction. A positive development in 2011 was 
precisely the lower percentage of cases referred to SOLVIT that fell outside 
its remit (see Figure 3 below).26 
Figure 3. Total number of cases submitted to SOLVIT and to the ‘Your Europe 
Advice’ (YEA) portal, 2003-11 
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Source: Redrawn from European Commission, “Making the Single Market deliver: 
Annual governance check-up 2011”, Brussels, 2011, p. 25. 
If the claim is found to be well founded and is not already the subject 
of a legal proceeding,27 the home centre forwards the case to the centre of 
                                                                                                                                 
(business to consumer) disputes or disputes where judicial procedures are already 
underway. 
26 This development is probably linked to the rise in requests dealt with by the 
‘Your Europe Advice’ (YEA) portal, an EU advice service for the public, currently 
provided by legal experts from the European Citizen Action Service (ECAS) 
operating under contract with the European Commission. It consists of a team of 
lawyers who cover all EU official languages and are familiar both with EU law and 
national laws in all EU countries. YEA cooperates closely with SOLVIT and a 
common online form directs questions to most appropriate service. 
27 In accordance with the 2001 Recommendation on the principles for using 
SOLVIT, the home centre cannot enter the case in the database if it is already the 
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the member state in which the cross-border problem occurred (the so-called 
‘lead’ centre) by entering it into the database and making all the relevant 
information available. The lead centre verifies whether there has been a 
breach of the EU law. If the case is accepted28 (deadline: one week), the two 
SOLVIT centres will work together in solving the problem within a target 
deadline of 10 weeks. Given this short deadline, the SOLVIT centres are 
allowed to refuse cases that require a change in national law or other 
implementing provisions (the so-called ‘SOLVIT-Plus’ cases),29 since these 
would be too difficult to handle via informal means within 10 weeks. 
However, many centres accept some of these cases and are able to offer 
more structural solutions and not only solve the individual case at hand. 
Within this period of time, the lead centre will seek the necessary 
evidence and legal advice to solve the case, contact the public 
administration that allegedly violated the single market legislation and try 
to negotiate a proposed solution to the problem with the public authority. 
The proposed solution by the lead centre is not binding on the 
administration (or the complainant). The final decision is taken by the 
national administration. When a solution is found, the lead and the home 
centres should confirm their agreement and inform the complainant. 
Furthermore, the complainant does not have to accept the proposed 
solution. However, the final solution can only be challenged by the 
complainant through a more time-consuming legal action.30 
5.1.2 Performance of the SOLVIT Network in 2011  
During the SOLVIT network’s first eight years of existence (2003-09), the 
volume of cases rose continuously. Beginning with less than 200 (2003), 300 
(2004), 400 (2005-06) leading up to more than 1,000 cases in 2008 and with 
1,540 cases reported in 2009. After 2009, the number of cases remained 
stable with only a few fluctuations (Figure 3). 
                                                                                                                                 
subject of legal proceedings. Moreover, if an applicant decides, at any stage, to 
initiate legal proceedings, the case should be removed from the database. 
28 If the lead centre dismisses the case, it has to indicate the reasons for the 
rejection. 
29 SOLVIT Plus cases are discussed in section 5.1.5. 
30 Commission Staff Working Document, “Setting out the approach for assessing 
the conformity of solutions proposed by SOLVIT network with Community law”, 
SEC (2004) 1159, Brussels 17 September 2004. 
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In 2011, SOLVIT handled a total of 3,154 cases, of which 1,306 fell 
within its mandate. Compared with 2010, the total number of cases 
submitted to SOLVIT was slightly lower (in 2010, SOLVIT handled 3,800 
cases, of which 1,363 fell within its competence).31  
One of the biggest problems with the SOLVIT system since it was set 
up is the amount of cases submitted to the centres that are outside their 
competence. The overwhelming majority of such cases concern requests for 
information and advice. SOLVIT usually directs these cases to more 
relevant sources of help, e.g. ‘Your Europe Advice (YEA), EURES 
(European Enterprise Network) and the European Consumer Centres. 
However, it is undeniable that the large number of non-SOLVIT cases dealt 
with by the network is an obstacle to its effectiveness, especially since 
centres generally remain understaffed. Indeed, this adds significantly to 
SOLVIT’s workload, since all of these cases need to be examined in order to 
determine whether they should be handled by SOLVIT, and, if not, they are 
then forwarded to a more appropriate address. In order to solve this 
problem, the Commission, in 2008, published an Action Plan to help 
citizens and businesses better understand and make use of their rights in 
the EU,32 containing a plan for streamlining a whole range of existing 
information and assistance services, including SOLVIT, which should bring 
about better filtering of cases at the point of entry. The action plan includes 
the setting up of a ‘single contact point’, where citizens will be referred to 
the entity that may best serve them. 
As a result of the Single Market Assistance Services (SMAS), action 
plan, the Commission has completely revamped the ‘Your Europe’ portal 
and is committed to further developing and promoting it. The new ‘Your 
Europe’ offers user-friendly information about EU rights and helps people 
find further advice and help when needed. Moreover, via intelligent on-
online forms, ‘Your Europe’ immediately refers people asking for more 
advice or help to the right service. Despite or because of these 
improvements, the number of visits to the ‘Your Europe’ website is 
growing exponentially. In addition, it appears that SOLVIT centres are 
                                                   
31 The drop in the number of cases can be attributed to the decrease of certain types 
of residence cases in the UK, which had produced a large number of similar 
complaints in 2009-10. 
32 See Commission Staff Working Paper, “Action plan on an integrated approach 
for providing Single Market Assistance Services to citizens and businesses”, 
SEC(2008)188, of 8 May 2008.  
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receiving fewer requests for information and advice, which might well be 
due to a more effective common intake form. Furthermore, Europe Direct is 
also further developing its capacity to filter requests, so that they reach the 
right service, and to facilitate an easy transfer between the systems. On the 
other hand, the filter system should also lead to an increase in cases where 
SOLVIT can provide real help, but where citizens and businesses currently 
have difficulties finding their way to SOLVIT. A positive development in 
2011 was precisely the reduced percentage of cases referred to SOLVIT that 
fell outside its remit (Figure 3).  
The levels of resolution rates remained high and stable at 89% 
(compared to 90% in 2010) (see Figure 4). 
Figure 4. Resolution rates of the SOLVIT cases during SOLVIT’s mandate, 
2003-11 
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Source: Redrawn from European Commission, “Making the Single Market deliver: 
Annual governance check-up 2011”, 2011, p. 26. 
It should be noted that resolved cases often not only solve the 
problems encountered by an individual citizen or business, but also 
generate changes in attitude, work practices or legal rules that benefit a 
larger number of people who would otherwise have encountered the same 
problem.33 On the other hand, unresolved cases are ‘useful’ as well, since 
                                                   
33 This could be illustrated by a large number of cases dealt with SOLVIT Ireland in 
the social security area. As result of its involvement, the competent Irish authorities 
have put in place procedures to allow for a more efficient handling of social 
security complaints and thus removed the backlog that had existed. As a 
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they point to particular problems that need to be addressed to improve the 
functioning of the single market.34 
The member states that submitted and received the largest number of 
cases in 2011 are France, Spain, Germany and Italy. In 2011 we observe an 
increase in the number of cases submitted and received in Germany, 
Austria, France, Denmark and Luxembourg. The number of cases received 
by Ireland decreased substantially due to the reduction of social security 
cases, since the underlying problem was resolved by the Irish authorities 
(see Figure 5 below). 
Figure 5. Number of cases submitted to and received by the national SOLVIT 
centres, 2010-11 
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Source: Redrawn from European Commission, “Making the Single Market deliver: 
Annual governance check-up 2011”, 2011, p. 27. 
                                                                                                                                 
consequence, the number of complaints in this area dropped significantly. Another 
example occurred in Portugal, where following the intervention of SOLVIT 
Portugal, a local authority no longer requires a medical assistance card for British 
citizens residing in Portugal to be renewed on an annual basis, an administrative 
practice that was not in line with EU law. 
34 An example is found in the large number of cases concerning VAT 
reimbursement in Luxembourg, because of the introduction of an electronic 
reimbursement system. The unresolved cases were brought to the ministers’ 
attention and were subsequently addressed. The same happened with the 
unresolved cases concerning the recognition of the professional qualifications of 
Romanian nurses in Spain. 
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SOLVIT intervention is particularly significant in specific areas of the 
internal market, where quick and/or cost-effective solutions are needed. In 
2011, as in 2010, social security issues related to migrants generated the 
largest number of cases (39% in 2011, 34% in 2010). The proportion of cases 
concerning the recognition of professional qualifications remained at 
around 15%. The number of cases concerning residence permits decreased 
to 12% (from 23% in 2010).35 Problems also occurred in relation to the free 
movement of services and goods, taxation and motor vehicles registration 
and driving licenses. Cases involving the free movement of goods and 
services remained at 8%, while the number of taxation cases increased from 
5% to 9% in relation to the last period (see Figure 6 below). 
Figure 6. 2011 SOLVIT cases by area 
 
                                                   
35 This is mainly because the number of residence permit cases received by the UK 
SOLVIT centre fell from 419 in 2009, to 185 in 2010 and 37 in 2011.  
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A closer look at the cases handled by SOLVIT in the area of social 
security shows that the vast majority of them involve cross-border 
problems related to recognition of basic pension rights acquired in other 
EU countries, payment of family allowances, coverage of medical treatment 
and payment of other social benefits. 
One of the main challenges to the SOLVIT network is how to enhance 
its capacity for dealing with social security cases, by strengthening 
synergies between SOLVIT and the Administrative Commission for the 
Coordination of the Social Security Schemes.36 The Administrative 
Commission for the Coordination of Social Security Schemes (Admin 
Comm) is a specialised body composed of social security experts within 
national administrations. Its objective is to clarify EU regulations and 
administrative practices relating to social security issues as well as clarify 
questions of interpretation.37 The Administrative Commission only deals 
with complaints received via the Commission, but citizens, workers and 
business can contact SOLVIT centres directly when they face cross-border 
problems related to social security issues. Experience has shown that, in 
some cases, the SOLVIT centres don’t have the necessary legal expertise to 
deal with such cases, in particular given the fact that, in the area of social 
security, EU law only coordinates (not harmonises) national rules. 
Moreover, when SOLVIT centres ask for legal advice from the 
Administrative Commission, it frequently fails to meet SOLVIT deadlines 
due to the complexity of the cases and the fact that its timeframes are less 
strict than those of SOLVIT. On the other hand, individuals of the 
Administrative Commission often receive complaints about cross-border 
problems related to the application of social security rules, but they do not 
have effective tools for dealing with such complaints. Therefore, increasing 
the synergies and the cooperation between SOLVIT and the Administrative 
Commission in the future will help to achieve more effective results when 
handling social security complaints. The European Commission plans to 
send the complaints in the area of social security to SOLVIT and, at same 
time, ensure that SOLVIT can rely more systematically on legal advice from 
the Administrative Commission. 
                                                   
36 Regulation (EC) No 883/2004, of 29 April 2004, on the coordination of the social 
security system. 
37 The Administrative Commission also supports coordination of social security 
schemes, promotes dialogue, reconciliation and the exchange of best practices, 
collects statistics and reviews coordination provisions. 
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Recognition of professional qualifications38 is one of the other main 
areas in which SOLVIT cases occurred. In the period 2010-11, a total of 408 
opened and closed cases were registered in this field, of which 53 were 
unresolved and 355 were resolved. These cases include the unjustified 
refusal to recognise certain qualifications, the failure to offer the possibility 
to compensate for differences in qualifications and the passing of legal 
deadlines for processing requests for recognition.  
Various SOLVIT cases involved the correct application of Art. 34 
TFEU on the free movement of goods and of the mutual recognition 
principle, by facilitating market access of products legally produced or sold 
in other EU member states. 
At times, intervention by the SOLVIT centres has exceeded the ambit 
outlined in the SOLVIT background documents.39 SOLVIT is aimed at 
resolving individual cross-border problems caused by decisional obstacles 
due to a public administration’s incorrect application of European internal 
market rules, when, because of the particular nature of the situation, the 
recourse to a national court would (or could) be ineffective, take too long or 
be too expensive. This means, firstly, that SOLVIT’s scope is limited to the 
problems encountered by citizens and business related to the application of 
internal market rules. Secondly, SOLVIT’s centres should only handle cases 
                                                   
38 On 19 December 2011, the European Commission presented a proposal for a 
revision of Directive 2005/36/EC on the recognition of professional qualifications. 
The objective of the proposal is to facilitate the speedy recognition of professional 
qualifications to support the mobility of professionals across the single market. To 
this end, the Commission has proposed the introduction of an electronic European 
Professional Card, which will be implemented through the existing Internal 
Market Information system (IMI). An alert mechanism to identify health 
professionals guilty of malpractice is also proposed. The proposal will modernise 
the harmonised minimum training requirements for certain professions benefiting 
from automatic recognition (in particular doctors, nurses, midwives and 
architects). It will also offer the possibility to extend automatic recognition to new 
professions through the concepts of ‘common training framework’ and ‘common 
training test’. Furthermore, it will simplify access to information on recognition of 
qualifications by extending the scope of the Points of Single Contact introduced by 
the Services Directive. For more details, see http://ec.europa.eu/internal_market/ 
qualifications/policy_developments/index_en.htm  
39 Recommendation on principles for using SOLVIT – The Internal Market 
Problem-Solving Network and Communication from the Commission, Effective 
Problem-Solving in the Internal Market (SOLVIT). 
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where breaches of EU law are caused by a public authority, not by a private 
party.40 Thirdly, SOLVIT only deals with cross-border problems; pure 
domestic problems are excluded from its scope of operation. SOLVIT 
centres have to dismiss cases that do not fit this description, and, in 
particular, they should not deal with cases where the individual problems 
are ultimately caused by a national regulatory barrier.  
In practice, however, SOLVIT’s mandate has given rise to differences 
in interpretation and led to different approaches among the national 
SOLVIT centres when it comes to deciding whether a case should be taken 
up by SOLVIT or not.41 Aware of this problem and in order to ensure a 
coherent approach through the European Union, the Commission, in its 
document on “Reinforcing effective problem-solving in the internal 
market”,42 has stressed the necessity to clarify SOLVIT’s mandate. 
Moreover, the Commission considers that, at present, there is no need to 
further extend SOLVIT’s scope. Rather, the focus should be on ensuring 
that all cases falling within SOLVIT’s mandate reach SOLVIT effectively. 
As mentioned above, once the case is introduced to the SOLVIT 
database and accepted by the lead centre, the latter has to try to find a 
solution for the case within the SOLVIT deadline of ten weeks. In 2011, 67% 
of the cases were solved within this deadline. However, the average case-
handling time was 70 days, four days more than in 2010. Some countries 
managed to improve their performance (e.g. the UK and Poland), but 
Austria took significantly more time to handle cases.43 
                                                   
40 The Commission services consider that the concept of public authority should be 
interpreted broadly in order to cover all levels of public administration (national, 
regional and local authorities) as well as competent authorities (e.g. professional 
organisations in charge of recognising professional qualifications) and bodies 
controlled by the state (e.g. universities). 
41 To be more specific, SOLVIT centres have decided cases even when the situation 
was not ‘cross-border’ or cases where the entity that allegedly acted in breach of 
EU law could not be considered a ‘public authority’ in accordance with national 
legislation.  
42 See European Commission Working Document, DG Internal Market and 
Services, “Reinforcing effective problem-solving in the Single Market: Unlocking 
SOLVIT’s full potential on the occasion of its 10th anniversary”, 2012. 
43 According to Austria’s SOLVIT centre, it was due to an increase in the number of 
cases in relation to the previous year and to the closure of some very old cases, 
especially concerning Slovakian workers working in Austria. 
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Among the weaknesses of the SOLVIT network are its scarce 
resources and limited legal expertise enabling the centres to carry out their 
tasks in a satisfactory way and to deliver independent legal analysis of the 
cases. Ensuring an adequate level of staffing and legal expertise is even 
more pressing if we take into account the increasing variety of cases that 
SOLVIT is asked to address. Although staffing in some SOLVIT centres 
improved in 2011, the overall staffing levels of the centres remain 
problematic. In addition, in almost all SOLVIT centres, the staff members 
have other responsibilities as well, which sometimes take priority over 
SOLVIT tasks. Currently only 14 SOLVIT centres are adequately staffed.44 
The centres in France, Germany and the UK in particular face a lack of 
experienced staff in light of the high caseload. In order to solve this 
problem, the Commission services are consider proposing, together with 
the member states, minimum staffing requirements.  
Since 2009, the Commission also has given SOLVIT centres the 
possibility to request legal advice from the lawyers working in ‘Your 
Europe’ and an increased number of SOLVIT centres used this option 
during 2011. In future, the Commission will also continue to provide 
informal legal advice (through a help desk placed in DG MARKT, but with 
SOLVIT contact points in other DGs), within a targeted time of two weeks 
maximum, as well as organise regular legal training sessions and meetings 
between SOLVIT staff and Commission policy officers.45 SOLVIT centres 
are also encouraged by the Commission to build their own networks with 
the national administration in order to obtain specialised legal advice. 
Furthermore, when the informal legal advice provided by the Commission 
does not lead to satisfactory results (because the national authority refuses 
to comply with EU law) or when the issue in question is too complex to be 
clarified by informal legal advice within the two-week deadline, the 
Commission could advise the SOLVIT centres to close the case as 
unresolved and, when appropriate, decide to pursue the case in EU Pilot 
(for ‘EU Pilot’, see chapter 6, section 6.2.2.2).  
                                                   
44 Namely, Austria, Bulgaria, Estonia, Italy, Latvia, Malta, Poland, Portugal, 
Romania, Slovakia, Slovenia, Spain, Sweden and Liechtenstein. See European 
Commission, “Making the Single Market deliver: Annual governance check-up 
2011”, 2011.  
45 During 2011, two workshops and two training sessions were organised and a 
large number of SOLVIT centres also participated in the Single Market Forum in 
Krakow in October 2011. 
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5.1.3 An overview of the SOLVIT business cases 
Attracting business cases in SOLVIT remains a key priority for the 
Commission, as the number of business cases has remained relatively 
stable and low in comparison to the increased number of citizen cases since 
the network was set up (Figure 7).46 In 2010, 167 businesses cases were 
recorded out of a total number of 1363 cases (Figure 7 below).  
Figure 7. Number of business cases requesting support from SOLVIT, 2007-10 
 
Source: European Commission, DG Internal Market and Services, Evaluation of 
SOLVIT, Final Report, November 2011. 
In order to promote the use of SOLVIT by businesses, in 2009 the 
European Commission produced a Strategy Paper to guide SOLVIT centres 
on how they could develop activities in a coherent way to increase the 
awareness of businesses about SOLVIT.47 Some SOLVIT centres are 
                                                   
46 The share of business cases handled by SOLVIT each year in the period 2003 to 
2010 in relation to the total number of cases was: 33% (2003), 34% (2004), 29% 
(2005), 31% (2006), 18% (2007), 14% (2008), 11% (2009) and 12% (2010). 
47 See European Commission (2009) Strategy Paper, “Increasing awareness about 
SOLVIT among businesses users”, 2009. The Strategy Paper was built on the 
results of the European Businesses Test Panel, which found that 80% of businesses 
that had not previously heard of SOLVIT would be willing to use it if they required 
such services. The document seeks a comprehensive approach to delivering 
awareness-raising activities, developing a more effective web presence, 
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developing various forms of promoting their activities among business so 
as to attract more business cases.48 Although a number of effective means 
have been developed by some SOLVIT centres to promote their activities 
towards business, many centres have not fully mainstreamed an approach 
to the extent envisaged by the Strategy Paper. This may be due to a lack of 
resources to develop an appropriate strategy and implement activities and 
then to deal with the potential increase in case load. However, it should 
also be noted that public awareness campaigns sometimes have a negative 
side effect by bringing in non-SOLVIT business cases. 
On other hand, we must keep in mind that the SOLVIT network is 
not always an appropriate or/and attractive problem-solving system to 
address cross-border business problems arising from the incorrect or 
inaccurate application of the single market rules. Indeed, sometimes it is 
difficult for SOLVIT to deal with business cases, for various reasons: 
 Given that considerable sums of money or compensation are often 
sought by companies, they may prefer to employ their own lawyers 
using formal channels offering more leverage. 
 Business cases are often seen as complex (often involving 
harmonisation or technical market access issues). 
 National administrations may choose to ignore informal legal advice 
which puts businesses off. 
 As SOLVIT is a governmental organisation, businesses may wrongly 
believe that it is not an independent network and this may lead some 
companies to feel uncomfortable with SOLVIT if they require support 
in areas such as taxation. 
We observe that the low number of business SOLVIT cases is not only 
due to a lack of awareness within the business community, but also, to 
some extent, to SOLVIT being a network for settling cross-border disputes 
                                                                                                                                 
partnerships with umbrella business organisations and cooperation with 
institutional partners as well as delivering quick and effective services for business.  
48 For instance, Sweden has been notably successful in targeting advertising at 
businesses through various means including website links, awareness booklets 
with examples of successful SOLVIT outcomes and organising seminars with 
stakeholders. Other SOLVIT centres have been promoting SOLVIT among 
businesses by placing advertisements in business newspapers (Germany), 
developing relations with chambers of commerce (Poland) and promoting public 
transport advertisement campaigns (Czech Republic).  
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informally and for free. After all, these properties are more likely to attract 
citizen and SME cases. For that reason, the European Commission is 
attempting to enhance the level of awareness of SOLVIT among SMEs. 
Strengthening relations with the European Enterprise Network should 
improve the awareness of SOLVIT among SMEs and help to attract more 
cases. In effect, in 2011, we could observe an increase in business cases 
(Figure 8), but the number remains low compared with the number of 
citizen cases (214 closed business cases were recorded). 
Figure 8. Closed SOLVIT business cases by area, 2011 
 
Source: Data made available to the authors by the European Commission. 
Taxation (41% or 87 cases), followed by problems in the area of free 
movement of goods (21% or 44 cases) and services (12% or 25 cases) clearly 
remain the key issues when doing cross-border business within the internal 
market (Figure 8). 
From the 87 taxation cases concluded by SOLVIT in 2011, 73 were 
closed as solved, 13 as unresolved and one case was rejected (Figure 9). A 
closer look at the taxation business cases indicates that the vast majority of 
the cases involve cross-border problems related with value-added tax 
(VAT) reimbursement. In particular, they involve situations where the 
application for refunding the VAT charged must be submitted to the local 
authorities of another member state where the company is not established. 
Notably it is about delays on the reimbursement of the VAT to companies 
that imported goods or exported goods and services from that member 
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state. The rules governing VAT refunds to taxable persons not established 
in the member state of refund are laid down by Directive 2008/9/EC.49 In a 
large majority of the cases, the case was successfully solved after the 
intervention of the SOLVIT centres, and the VAT was refunded to the 
companies.  
Figure 9. Outcome of taxation-related business cases handled by SOLVIT, 2011 
 
Note: A total of 87 cases were submitted in 2011. 
Source: Data made available to the authors by the European Commission. 
The free movement of goods is the second main policy area in which 
SOLVIT handled business cases. Out of a total of 44 cases in this field in 
2011, 36 were solved, six were unresolved and two were rejected (Figure 10 
below). 
                                                   
49 See Directive 2008/9/EC of 12 September 2008, laying down detailed rules for 
the value added tax, provided for in Directive 2006/112/EC, to taxable persons not 
established in the member state of refund but established in another member state. 
According to Art. 19 (2) of Directive 2008/9/EC, the member state of refund shall 
notify the applicant of its decision to approve or refuse the refund application 
within four months of its receipt. If the refund application is approved, the refund 
VAT shall be paid at the latest within 10 working days of the expiry deadline 
referred to in Art. 19 (2) (four months). If the member state of refund considers that 
it does not have all the relevant information, according to Art. 20 of Directive 
2008/9/EC, it may request additional information within the four-month period 
referred to in Art. 19 (2). 
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Figure 10. Outcome of business cases in the area of free movement of goods handled 
by SOLVIT, 2011 
 
Note: A total of 44 cases were submitted in 2011. 
Source: Data made available to the authors by the European Commission. 
A large share of the cases (23) is related to the refusal by the authority 
in a member state to allow entry of a product that is not EU-regulated (non-
harmonised area) or is only partially regulated at EU level (see Table 1). 
The reasons for the refusal of market access include the existence of 
different national standards, no notification of national technical standards 
to the European Commission according to the procedure laid down in 
Directive 98/34/EC, the imposition of national standards that are 
complementary to existing European standards and/or the imposition of 
different or extra testing and certification requirements. Some cases also 
involve national technical regulations that had been correctly notified to the 
European Commission, according to the 98/34/EC procedure and never 
received any kind of objection from the European Commission or the 
member states. 
These cases clearly involve the correct application of Arts 34 and 36 
TFEU and the principle of mutual recognition. Since free movement of 
goods is directly applicable to all member states, member states are obliged 
to accept products lawfully marketed in another member state and that are 
not subject to Union harmonisation (Art. 34 TFEU), unless very specific 
conditions are met (Art. 36 TFEU). This means that certain national 
technical barriers may be justified, while others may not. 
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Table 1. Number of SOLVIT closed business cases by sector and area (2011) – Free 
movement of goods 
Products Non-harmonised area* Harmonised area Total  
Food 4 4 8 
Fertilisers 3 1 4 
Other products 8 4 12 
Medicinal product 1 2 3 
Motor vehicles 4 4 8 
Pressure equipment 1 1 2 
Pyrotechnic articles 1 0 1 
Construction 1 2 3 
Toys 0 2 2 
Total 23 20 4350 
* We have included in the non-harmonised area all the cases referring to products that 
are partially regulated at EU level, but the aspect that was at the origin of the complaint 
falls outside the scope of the directive. This is the case, for example, of some SOLVIT 
cases related to components, systems and parts of motor vehicles, pressure equipment, 
pyrotechnic articles and some foodstuffs. Moreover, it should be noted that it is not 
always easy to classify the product as being harmonised or non-harmonised at EU 
level, because sometimes the case description is formulated in an imprecise or unclear 
way by the Lead/Home Centre. For that reason, the table above should be read with 
caution. 
Source: Data made available to the authors by the European Commission. 
Moreover, according to the principle of mutual recognition, a product 
lawfully marketed in one member state and not subject to Union 
harmonisation or falling outside the scope of a directive of harmonised EU 
legislation, should be allowed to be marketed in any other member state, 
even when the product does not fully comply with the technical rules of the 
member state of destination. A member state can only refuse the marketing 
of a product if it can show that this is strictly necessary for the protection 
of, for example, public safety, health or environment and it must also 
                                                   
50 One of the rejected cases is not included, because the product is not identified in 
the SOLVIT database. 
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demonstrate that its measure is the least trade-restrictive one.51 
Furthermore, to make the mutual recognition principle fully operational, 
the European Parliament and the Council adopted Regulation (EC) No 
764/2008,52 which establishes rules and procedures that should be followed 
by the national authorities when they intend to take restrictive measures 
which could hinder the free movement of a product lawfully marketed in 
another member state, and are not covered by harmonised rules at EU 
level. In particular, the Regulation concentrates on the burden of proof to 
the member states of importation. It thereby protects the company seeking 
market access by setting out the strict procedural requirements for denying 
mutual recognition and applying to administrative decisions based on a 
technical rule which has the direct or indirect effect of: 
 the prohibition of placing a product on the market, 
 the modification or additional testing of that product before it can be 
placed on the market or 
 the withdrawal of that product. 
Moreover, according to the Regulation, an evaluation of the need to 
apply a technical rule should be based on technical or scientific elements, 
proving the proportionality of the envisaged measure, should be notified to 
the enterprise concerned and can be legally challenged. 
In the harmonised area (20 cases), the problems reported to SOLVIT 
involve mainly situations where the national regulations go beyond the 
relevant directive/regulation, by imposing additional requirements on 
products that had been certified in another member state and that comply 
with the essential requirements imposed by EU legislation. 
Three complaints were also received by the SOLVIT centres related to 
cross-border problems faced by businesses when trying to place on the 
market or obtain the registration of motor vehicles, systems, components 
and separate technical units intended for such vehicles that are subject to 
                                                   
51 See Pelkmans, (2012) for an extensive explanation and analysis. See also 
Dassonville, C-8-74 and Cassis (Rewe), C-120/78. 
52 See Regulation (EC) No 764/2008 of the European Parliament and of the Council 
of 9 July 2008, laying down procedures relating to the application of certain 
national technical rules to products lawfully marketed in another member state 
and repealing decision No 3052/95/EC. 
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step-by-step type approval, according to Directive 2007/46/EC,53 in 
another member state (see Table 1). 
The sectors most affected are food (eight cases), motor vehicles (eight 
cases), fertilisers (four cases), construction products (three cases) and 
medicinal products (three cases) (see Table 1). 
Free movement of services is also one of the main areas in which 
SOLVIT business cases occurred. In 2011, 25 were closed by the SOLVIT 
centres in this area, 20 were closed as solved, four as unresolved and one 
case was rejected (Figure 11). 
Figure 11. Solution rate of SOLVIT business cases in the area of freedom to 
provide services, 2011 
 
Source: Data made available to the authors by the European Commission. 
The freedom to provide services comprises the elimination of all 
kinds of discrimination based on nationality as well as the prohibition of 
the obligation on the provider to have residence or an establishment in the 
territory of the member states where the service is provided. The member 
state in which the service is provided can only enforce its own 
requirements inasmuch as these are non-discriminatory, proportional and 
justified for reasons of public order, public safety, public health or 
environmental protection.  
                                                   
53 Directive 2007/46/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 5 
September 2007, establishing the framework for the approval of motor vehicles and 
their trailers, and of system, components and separate technical units intended for 
such vehicles. 
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In order to facilitate the freedom of establishment for providers in 
other member states and the freedom of provision of services between 
member states, two directives were enacted: the services Directive 
2006/123/EC and the recognition of professional qualifications Directive 
2005/36/EC. 
The main problems presented by business in this area are precisely 
related to requirements conflicting with the services Directive 
2006/123/EC,54 mainly with Arts 15 and 16, and requirements conflicting 
with Directive 2005/36/EC55 on the recognition of professional 
qualifications (Table 2). 
Table 2. Number of business SOLVIT cases by sector (2011) – Free movement of 
services 
Sectors Number 
of cases 
by sector 
Problem  
Directive 
2006/123/EC 
 
Recognition of 
professional 
qualifications 
(Directive 
2005/36/CE or 
other) 
Other 
Engineering 1 X X  
Electricity, gas 4 X X Arts 56 and 57 
TFEU 
ISO 9001/2008 
Other  
Transportation and 
storage 
1   Euro-license 
Tourism  2 X  X  Other 
Telecommunications 2   Directive 
2002/20/ECa 
Other 
Food services activities 1 X    
                                                   
54 Directive 2006/123/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 12 
December 2006 on Services in the internal market. 
55 Directive 2005/36/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 7 
September 2005 on the recognition of professional qualifications. 
42  PRE-INFRINGEMENT INITIATIVES 
Human health services 1   Action was 
brought before the 
national 
Constitutional 
Court  
Construction 1   Directive 
85/337/EEC of 27 
June 2005b 
Scientific research and 
development 
1   Other 
Financial and insurance 
activity 
2   Directive 
2009/103/ECc 
Arts 56, 57, 59 and 
60 TFEU 
Aviation  1   Regulation 
1008/2008/ECd 
IT and other 
communication services 
2   Unresolved casese 
Others 1   Other (EN 60335-
2-27; chapter IV of 
Directive 
2001/95/EC)f 
Agriculture, forestry 
and fishing 
1   Other 
Accounting, 
consultancy 
2 X X  
Temporary work 1   Directive 
2008/104/ECg 
Total 24h    
a Directive 2002/20/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 7 March 2002, on the 
authorisation of electronic communications networks and services. 
b Directive 85/337/EEC of 27 June 2005 on the assessment of the effects of certain public and 
private projects on the environment. 
c Directive 2009/103/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 16 September 2009, 
relating to insurance against civil liability in respect of the use of motor vehicles, and enforcement 
of the obligation to insure against such liability. 
d Regulation (EC) No 1008/2008 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 24 September 
2008 on common rules for the operation of air services in the Community (Recast). 
e It is not clear from a reading of the Solvit cases what the problems are in these two cases. 
f Directive 2001/95/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 3 December 2001 on 
general product safety. 
g Directive 2008/104/EC of 19 November 2008 on temporary agency work. 
h Rejected case not included. 
Source: Data made available to the authors by the European Commission. 
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5.1.4 SOLVIT-Plus cases and Art. 258 TFEU  
SOLVIT was set up to deal with ‘individual’ problems caused by the 
misapplication of internal market rules by a public administration. A 
typical SOLVIT case involves the misconduct by an administration when 
the national regulatory framework conforms to EU law. SOLVIT centres are 
required in principle to dismiss cases where the individual administrative 
problem results from the fact that the national regulatory structure does not 
conform to EU law. Nevertheless, some SOLVIT centres have developed a 
different practice, by dealing with cases where the internal market problem 
was, on the contrary, caused by a national barrier raised either by a specific 
regulation or by an unlawful administrative practice. 
In such cases (referred to as ‘SOLVIT-Plus’ cases), SOLVIT centres 
resolved the individual problem by convincing the public administration 
not to apply the unlawful regulation or to move away from the unlawful 
practice. Moreover, the centre reports the case to the relevant national 
authorities in order to have the specific regulation amended or to have 
practices changed.  
With SOLVIT-Plus cases, the SOLVIT centres have been playing a 
role that is complementary to the enforcement activities of the Commission 
under Art. 258 TFEU, by helping to resolve structural problems and to 
remove illicit regulatory barriers.56 
5.1.5 SOLVIT and EU Pilot 
In 2008, the Commission launched the Pilot project,57 aimed at fostering a 
more efficient and effective dialogue between member states and the 
Commission when dealing with inquiries and complaints about national 
breaches of EU law. In others words, the idea is to improve the 
collaboration between the Commission and member states at the pre-
                                                   
56 The importance of this role played by SOLVIT has been acknowledged by the 
Commission in its 2007 Communication, “A Europe of results – Applying 
Community Law”, where the Commission stresses the importance to reduce the 
recourse to infringement proceedings by fostering the use of alternative problem-
solving mechanisms and preventive measures.  
57 EU Pilot was launched in April 2008, following the Commission Communication, 
“A Europe of results – Applying Community Law”, COM(2007)502 final. See 
section 6.2.2.2 in chapter 6. 
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infringement stage, to act like a sort of pre-infringement information-
gathering tool, facilitating the Commission’s work.58 
However, EU Pilot has become in fact a replacement for the informal 
phase of the infringement procedures and its scope is different from that of 
SOLVIT. It is not always easy for Commission services to decide which 
system should be used.59 Indeed, Pilot, like SOLVIT, aims at providing an 
informal, rapid and effective solution to problems arising from the 
misapplication of EU law. To help the Commission services in this task, 
some criteria have been developed to decide whether the case should be 
referred by the Commission services to EU Pilot or to SOLVIT (see Table 3).  
From our analysis of Table 3, we can conclude that the scope of 
SOLVIT is restricted to issues with a cross-border dimension that are 
related to the bad application of the internal market law and are not related 
to late or bad transposition of EU law or non-conformity with EU law. EU 
Pilot, by contrast, covers all areas of EU law, except specific problems 
raised in a cross-border context in the internal market, the intervention of 
EU Pilot in issues with a cross-border dimension related to internal market 
law is restricted to cases of non-conformity with EU law.  
The involvement of the Commission also remains much larger in EU 
Pilot than in the case of SOLVIT, since the Commission is always involved 
at every step of the EU Pilot procedure and a copy of the member state 
response is sent to the Commission. By contrast, in the case of SOLVIT, all 
contacts always directly involve the complainant.  
Although the criteria provide general guidance on whether a case 
should be referred to EU Pilot or SOLVIT, in practice it may be difficult to 
decide the best route for an individual case. This could be achieved through 
better cooperation between the two systems at Commission level. 
However, according to the SOLVIT evaluation report from November 2011, 
Commission officials and those responsible for the national SOLVIT centres 
suggest that at the moment there is not a particularly strong link between 
EU Pilot and SOLVIT at EU level. Moreover, SOLVIT centres stress the 
importance of submitting their unresolved cases to the Commission for 
consideration in EU Pilot. At present, when an unresolved SOLVIT case is 
                                                   
58 We explore EU Pilot in more detail in sub-section 6.2.2.2, ‘EU Pilot’ in chapter 6. 
59 It should be noted that citizens and businesses do not submit cases directly to EU 
Pilot. The complaints are submitted to the Commission and then the Commission 
decides which system should be used. 
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sent to EU Pilot, often the legal analysis and evidence already collected by 
SOLVIT are ignored. However, one should avoid a duplication of efforts.60 
Table 3. Criteria for deciding whether to submit cases to SOLVIT or EU Pilot  
SOLVIT EU PILOT 
General coverage General coverage 
Specific problems raised in a cross-
border context in the internal market 
All areas of EU law except specific or 
general problems arising from cross-
border issues in the internal market 
More specific aspects of coverage More specific aspects of coverage 
Involves specific problems 
encountered by an individual or a 
business 
Involves specific or general problems 
reported by individuals, commercial 
operators or interested organisations 
Due to incorrect application of EU 
rules governing the functioning of the 
internal market within the meaning of 
Art. 26 (2) TFEU 
Due to the incorrect application of EC 
rules outside the functioning of the 
internal market within the meaning of 
Art. 26 (2) TFEU or, exceptionally, that 
might merit further pursuit through 
EU Pilot having had some initial 
treatment in SOLVIT  
By a member state public authority By a member state public authority 
Raises a cross-border issue Does not raise a cross-border issue, 
except where it is clear from the start 
that it involves an issue of non-
conformity of national law 
Is not already subject to national legal 
proceedings 
May already be subject to legal 
proceedings 
Is not due to late or bad transposition 
of EU law or other non-conformity of 
member states law with the European 
law 
May be due to non-conformity of 
national legislation with Community 
law, including such issues arising in 
the context of the internal market 
within the meaning of Art. 26 (2) TFEU 
Source: European Commission, Evaluation of SOLVIT, Final Report, November 2011.  
                                                   
60 Evaluation of SOLVIT, Final Report, November 2011. 
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There is a clear necessity to promote better links between EU Pilot 
and SOLVIT in terms of coordination, communication, filtering the cases 
and the creation of mechanisms to allocate transfer cases from one system 
to another. In order to do so, the Commission intends to promote the use of 
SOLVIT as the first instance to deal with individual cross-border problems 
resulting from a potential misapplication of EU law (subject to the 
complainants’ previous approval) and establish a better information 
exchange between the SOLVIT, CHAP (a complaints handling system that 
registers complaints and inquiries on the application of EU law by a 
member state, set up by the European Commission in 2009) and EU Pilot.61 
5.2 The European Consumer Centres Network 
The European Consumer Centres Network (ECC-Net), an EU-wide 
network created in 2005,62 focuses on cross-border business-to-consumers 
issues (B2C) (either in person or via distance purchase, mainly e-
commerce).63 It provides information to consumers, ensures that they are 
aware of their rights and gives support to consumers in the event of a 
complaint. The network comprises 29 centres (one in each of the 27 EU 
member states plus Iceland and Norway), under the supervision of the 
Directorate-General for Health and Consumers (DG SANCO) and financial 
management of the Executive Agency for Health and Consumers.  
The main goal of the ECC-Net is to promote consumer confidence in 
the internal market. The full potential of the EU B2C internal market is still 
far from realised. In 2009, B2C markets in the EU represent 57% of the EU’s 
GDP, but cross-border shopping only accounts for approximately 1.2% of 
the entire B2C market.64 One of the main reasons preventing consumers 
from engaging in cross-border shopping is the difficulty to obtain effective 
redress in the event of a problem and the lack of information about the 
                                                   
61 European Commission Working Document, “Reinforcing effective problem-
solving in the Single Market: Unlocking SOLVIT’s full potential at the occasion of 
its 10th anniversary”. 
62 The ECC-Net results from the merger of the Euroguichets and the European 
Extra-Judicial Network (EEJ-Net). 
63 Business-to-Business issues and pure national cases fall outside the scope of the 
ECCs as well as cases involved in a governmental structure. 
64 Special Eurobarometer 298, “Consumer protection in the Internal Market”, 
October 2008. 
ENFORCEMENT IN THE EU SINGLE MARKET  47 
advantages/disadvantages and their rights when buying in other 
countries. In this context, the ECC-Net plays an important role by: 
- providing information and advice to consumers on their rights, 
- giving assistance to consumers in the resolution of their individual 
cross-border complaints and 
- helping consumers whose complaints are not solved amicably to 
reach an agreement via an out-of-court alternative dispute resolution 
(ADR) mechanism. 
ECCs do not have enforcement powers, which means that they can 
neither sanction the trader nor represent consumers in court or in an ADR 
scheme. However, in the cases where it is not possible to obtain an 
amicable solution with the trader, ECCs advise consumers on the 
appropriate ADR bodies, leading consumers to other more appropriate EU-
wide networks (such as FIN-Net, SOLVIT and the European Judicial 
Network-EJN) in civil and commercial matters or proposing other ways to 
solve their problems (such as the European small claims procedure),65 so as 
to try to avoid a lengthy and costly normal court procedure. By doing so, 
ECCs not only help consumers to solve their individual cross-border 
shopping problems, but also to ensure the observance of consumer rights 
granted by EU law. 
Moreover, the ECC-Net also provides a valuable input for the 
European Commission on consumer policy issues, since it is in a unique 
position to know what are the main problems faced by consumers when 
shopping cross-border. 
The evidence points to a growing demand for the services offered by 
the Network. Over the period 2005 to 2009, the number of cases handled by 
the ECCs rose by 25%.66 In 2010, ECC-Net received 71,292 cases (15% more 
than in 2009), of which 41.6% of the cases were closed after an amicable 
settlement was obtained.67 
However, each year a significant number of cases handled by the 
ECCs are closed without reaching any solution (39% in 2009 and 42.6% in 
2010) or are transferred to other organisations (13% in 2009 and 15.5% in 
                                                   
65 Regulation (EC) No 861/2007 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 
11 July 2007 establishing an European small claims procedure. 
66 The European Consumer Centres Network, Fifth Anniversary Report 2005-2009. 
67 The European Consumer Centres Network 2010 Annual Report, 2011. 
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2010). In 2010, 58.5% (900) of the transferred cases were remitted to out-of-
court settlement bodies. This means that the ECC-Net’s capacity to facilitate 
redress is constrained not only by the willingness of the traders to engage 
with the ECCs in the resolution of consumer complaints, but also by 
external factors such as the efficiency of ADR systems across the Europe.  
The ECCs deal with an extensive range of cross-border consumer 
issues such as transport, package holidays, timeshare, e-commerce, non-
delivered or defective goods and unfair commercial practices, among 
others. In more than half of the cases (56.2%) handled by the ECC centres in 
2010, the product or service was purchased on-line. Transport remains the 
sector with more complaints dealt with by the ECC-Net (33.2%), and 57% of 
them were related to air passengers’ rights. The other sectors with a large 
number of complaints were recreation and cultural services (23.7%) and 
restaurants, hotel and accommodation (11.5%). A large part of the 
consumers’ problems concerned the quality of the product or the service 
(29.5%), the delivery (23.7%), the contract terms (12.2%) and the price and 
payment (10.5%). 
5.3 Commission Scoreboards 
The Commission has maintained the Internal Market Scoreboard for 15 
years now, publishing the results twice a year. Although a range of issues 
concerning the internal market has been dealt with in the Scoreboard over 
the years, the permanent feature is the regular reporting on transposition 
and application of EU (internal market) law, including infringement 
records. It is therefore a crucial source for any insight in the proper 
functioning of the single market. But its significance goes much further. 
With the careful and regular monitoring of implementation and application 
by the member states, strategies to improve the initially poor records of 
many EU countries have been based on the indicators of the Scoreboard 
and are receiving targeted publicity with the help of the Scoreboard. The 
status of each member state is easy to discern from the Scoreboard and 
there is no way ‘to hide’. Poor records of certain member states lead to 
criticism inside these countries and attract the attention of investors and 
business more generally. The Scoreboard is therefore more than just a tool – 
it positively helps to improve transposition and enforcement.  
ENFORCEMENT IN THE EU SINGLE MARKET  49 
The latest Scoreboard is from September 2011 (No. 23),68 not counting 
the February 2012 Single Market Governance paper69 of the Commission (in 
which the Scoreboard of spring 2012 is incorporated). The standard for 
proper implementation by member states has become stricter over time and 
the target of the ‘transposition deficit’ of all 27 member states has been 1% 
for a number of years. A new proposal from the Commission is to lower the 
transposition deficit to 0.5%. In the Stockholm European Council of 2001, 
the target transposition deficit was set at 1.5%, which was seen as tough at 
the time. The transposition deficit is defined as the percentage share of 
internal market directives not yet notified or implemented by member 
states of the total number of directives which should have been notified by 
the deadline. On 30 April 2011, the latter total amounted to 1,525 
directives.70 Figure 12 shows the deficit over the last four years, which has 
been below 1% for three years, yet is creeping upwards again in 2011. 
The Scoreboard rightly points at individual member states and shows 
whether they do well or fail. This is good for bringing pressure on EU 
countries to make greater efforts. For the present report, it seems less useful 
to focus on individual member states as, over time, there is quite some 
fluctuation in these figures. In May 2011, there were no less than 16 
member states above the 1% target transposition deficit, with Austria, 
Poland and the Czech Republic showing transposition delays for 26–31 
directives, which is worrying. Given these delays, the European Council 
                                                   
68 See European Commission, Internal Market Scoreboard No. 23, “Together for 
new growth”, September 2011. 
69 European Commission, “Making the Single Market deliver – Annual Governance 
check-up 2011”, Working Document, 2012. 
70 Note that, in addition, 1,347 EU (Council/EP) regulations govern the internal 
market. The transposition deficit does not apply to these regulations, of course (as 
they have direct legal effect on all economic agents). However, by focusing solely 
on the directives (and their transposition deficit), one ignores a significant change 
over time in the weight of directives versus regulations. Thus, in Scoreboard No. 10 
(May 2002), it appears that the internal market at the time was governed by 1,497 
directives and only 299 regulations. So, nine years later another 1,000 regulations 
have been added, whereas the total number of directives has barely increased 
(mainly because many families of directives have been consolidated and some 
have been deleted; others have been replaced by regulations). Therefore, a given 
transposition deficit is relatively less problematic in 2012 than it was 10 years ago. 
For more details, see section 8.7 in chapter 8. (Selective shift from internal market 
directives to EU regulations). 
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has set a ‘zero tolerance’ for transposition overdue by more than two years. 
Over 2009-11, the number of ‘overdue’ directives not yet transposed (in all 
EU countries) fell from 22 to only three and this refers to four EU countries.  
Figure 12. Average transposition deficit from November 2007 to November 2011 
 
Source: European Commission, “Making the Single Market deliver – Annual 
Governance check-up 2011”, Working Document, 2012. 
The ‘compliance’ deficit is about incorrect transposition: the 
percentage share of incorrectly transposed directives from the total number 
of transposed directives, per member state. The average compliance deficit 
stands at 0.8%. Also for this indicator, the Commission proposes to have a 
0.5% target. What is surely worrying is the combination of a high 
transposition and a high compliance deficit. This is the case for Belgium 
(together, 3.1% of the total of directives), Italy (idem, 3.2%) and Poland 
(idem, 3.3%). If one also knows that Belgium and Italy are no. 1 and no. 3 in 
the hit list of pending infringement cases, with 101 and 79 cases, 
respectively, the overall picture of internal market enforcement in these 
countries is outright poor. For Belgium, the comparison with (say) 
November 2007 is painful because its number of pending infringement 
cases increased by no less than 53% (!), whereas in Italy the number 
decreased by 41%. Indeed, all other member states have reduced their 
number of pending cases in this period.  
Finally, the Internal Market Scoreboard publishes the ‘fragmentation 
factor’, an overall indicator of ‘legal gaps’. This factor is defined as the 
percentage share of the directives not (yet) transposed in one or more EU 
member states of the total number of directives that should have been 
transposed by that date. This is quite different from the ‘transposition 
deficit’, because the latter is averaged between member states – i.e. in 2011 
(May and November), it stood at 1.2%, as shown in Figure 12 – whereas the 
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former results from adding up all directives that, somewhere in the internal 
market, are not yet transposed. The fragmentation factor fell from 
November 2007 (8%) to 6% in May 2011. In the second half of 2011, member 
states reduced the number of directives remaining to be transposed and 
have improved their enforcement performance with respect to long-
overdue directives. However, the transposition target of 1% was missed for 
the second time since May 2008, and the average delay for transposition 
has increased to almost eight months.71 
For business, especially for European-wide business strategy, the 
fragmentation factor needs to be as low as possible. Nevertheless, the 
Commission employs an exaggerated interpretation in the Scoreboard, 
making the internal market look more fragmented than it really is. “Instead 
of the Internal Market covering all Member States, it remains much smaller and 
fragmented. Consequently, the economic interests of all Member States already 
suffer if one Member State does not deliver” (p. 18, underlining in original). The 
Commission adds: “In other words, the Internal Market is operating at only 94% 
of its potential” and …” (T)his penalises all Member States, their citizens and 
businesses.”  
But, of course, the internal market is not “much smaller and 
fragmented” in each and every case, and it is far from obvious that ‘all’ 
member states and businesses are penalised. If one country A has not yet 
transposed, there are still 26 other EU countries, and a ‘European-wide’ 
strategy can surely be employed quite successfully. With two or three 
countries, this may well be true, too. Few companies operate literally in all 
27 member states, knowing that the EU comprises many small economies. 
Also, there are many other reasons why operating in all 27 countries may 
be less straightforward than implicitly suggested by the Commission, such 
as fixed entry costs in terms of marketing and after-sale services, local 
languages, (costly) regulatory heterogeneity between EU countries in issues 
under national legislative powers, patents (which are national in the EU), 
currencies other than the euro,72 etc. Therefore, to hold that the internal 
market is operating at only 94% of its capacity is an artificial approach not 
                                                   
71 European Commission, “Making the Single Market deliver – Annual Governance 
check-up 2011”, Working Document, 2012. 
72 See Richard E. Baldwin (2006). In this work on the economic impact of the euro, 
the author found that the euro made it possible for European business to enter 
smaller country markets that otherwise would have remained too marginal for 
them. See also Ottaviano & Ireo (2007). 
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reflecting economic reality for business. This is not to say that the 
fragmentation factor is irrelevant; rather, that it better be moderated to 
what it should mean.73 
The Consumer Scoreboard exists since 2008 and is published twice a 
year: the Consumer Conditions Scoreboard in the spring and the Consumer 
Markets Scoreboard in the autumn. The triple purpose of the Consumer 
Scoreboard is to identify whether consumer markets are working for the 
consumer, tracking the integration of the retail single market and 
monitoring national consumer conditions. The latter two objectives are 
related to the ‘Conditions’ Scoreboard; the former to the ‘Markets’ 
Scoreboard. Malfunctioning markets frustrate the working of the single 
market, too, including – in the final analysis – the growth and productivity 
function of the EU internal market. Such malfunctioning can have many 
reasons, but one amongst many can be improper enforcement. The 
Conditions Scoreboard is particularly geared to indicators tracing possible 
enforcement issues, amongst other factors.  
The Consumer Scoreboard deals with cross-border issues, e.g. cross-
border on-line purchases and the reticence of European consumers to make 
such purchases in view of the widespread perception that redress options 
are weak or even failing. For the purposes of the present report, it is not 
always clear whether such difficulties are due to internal market 
enforcement failures or to other ‘barriers’ such as fear among retailers 
about credit cards or national bank cards or other market issues related to 
guarantees or transport.  
The Market Monitoring in the Consumer Market Scoreboard, based 
on the Market Performance Indicator (MPI), differs from the exercise 
conducted by DG ECFIN of the Commission on ‘malfunctioning markets’ 
in the single market. The MPI is entirely based on how consumers 
experience the market working for them, including transparency (ease of 
comparing goods/services), trust in consumer protection, experience with 
problems and complaints and reporting of consumer satisfaction. These 
                                                   
73 Thus, one might just as well suggest the opposite extreme for the ‘fragmentation 
factor’. If in May 2011 there are 1,525 directives, then full transposition must imply 
1,525 x 27 = 41,175 transpositions in member states. The 90 directives (Scoreboard, 
no. 23, p. 18) not yet transposed in at least one member state should be multiplied 
by the number of ‘late’ EU countries, for each case separately, and then added; the 
fragmentation factor is then the percentage share of that sum over 41,175. It is 
unlikely that this factor would reach even 2%.  
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aspects are broken down further (e.g. ease of switching, choice, etc.). Also, 
price divergences between national markets are studied with the support of 
national statistical offices and a considerable number of significant price 
disparities (especially for services, but not only) are found, which points to 
fragmentation which seems sustainable. However, whether that is due to 
enforcement questions, is anything but clear from this Scoreboard. In 
contrast, the DG ECFIN Market Monitoring seeks to identify 
‘malfunctioning markets’ on the basis of indicators about regulation, 
‘integration’ (vs. fragmentation) of that market (in the EU), competition and 
innovation and these are inspected (with economic indicators) in 
considerable depth (Ilzkovitz et al., 2007). But again, rather than inspecting 
enforcement issues in (EU and national implementation of EU) regulation, 
the indicators and analysis are entirely economic.  
In the Consumer Conditions Scoreboard, the Commission makes use 
of a Consumer Conditions Index, made up of 12 indicators, five of them 
about enforcement. However, these ‘national enforcement indicators’ are 
not clearly referring to EU-wide or cross-border issues of enforcement and 
are therefore difficult to interpret for the purpose of the present report. 
They typically measure e.g. the number of inspections and laboratory tests, 
the number of compliance checks and notifications of a ‘serious risk’ (for 
the EU alert system) of goods and measures of the corrective remedies by 
authorities (like product withdrawal or injunctions, etc.). Undoubtedly, a 
good deal of these inspections or compliance indicators is relevant as they 
are often likely to be based on EU legislation, but there is no way of 
establishing the EU-wide significance of these enforcement efforts or 
possible weaknesses in them.  
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6. FORMAL INFRINGEMENT PROCEDURES 
6.1 The ‘classical’ EU administrative procedure for enforcing EU 
law 
The member states of the European Union are obliged to take measures 
ensuring that EU legal rules can be applied in domestic law (Art. 4(3) 
TEU).74 Thus, one of the most important obligations of the Member States 
in the context of EU accession is to integrate in their own legal order the 
legal rules of the EU. This obligation explicitly includes the duty to ensure 
compliance of domestic rules with EU legal rules and also to apply the 
latter correctly.75 
The Treaty on the Functioning of the EU (TFEU) provides various 
mechanisms for ensuring compliance with EU law. Of these, the procedure 
for infringement by member states of their obligations under EU law, 
which is regulated in Art. 258 TFEU (ex Art. 226 EC), is probably the most 
important contribution that EU law has made to the construction of a legal 
model of regional integration. Art. 258 TFEU grants the European 
Commission, as “guardian of the treaties”,76 the right to initiate 
infringement proceedings against member states that have failed to fulfil a 
                                                   
74 Article 4 (3) TEU provides: “The member states shall take any appropriate 
measure, general or particular, to ensure fulfilment of the obligations arising out of 
the Treaties or resulting from the acts of the institutions of the European Union.” 
75 The necessity for EU law to be obeyed was expressed by the CJEU more than 40 
years ago in Case 6/6, Costa v. ENEL.  
76 As ‘guardian of treaties’, the European Commission shall ensure the 
implementation and correct application of EU law into the internal law of the 
member states, and, under, certain circumstances, it can bring to the Court of 
Justice, an action against a member state, if it finds that the state has not fulfilled its 
obligations under the treaties (Art. 17 (1) TEU).  
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treaty obligation. Through this mechanism for finding infringements of 
member states obligations under the treaties, the Commission ascertains 
that member states do not exercise powers that they have voluntarily 
delegated to the EU. The competence of introducing an appeal to involve 
state liability when they do not fulfil one or more of their obligations is 
reserved to the European Commission, according to Art. 258 TFEU.77 
Art. 258 TFEU states: “if the Commission considers that a member 
state failed to fulfil any of its obligations, under this Treaty, the 
Commission issues a reasoned notification on the matter, after giving that 
state the opportunity to comment. If the state in question does not comply 
with the notification within the deadline set by the Commission, then the 
Commission may go to the Court of Justice.” 
Although, the Treaty speaks “of infringement of an obligation under 
this Treaty” (Art. 258 TFEU), these concepts are not defined in the Treaty. 
In the absence of a definition in the Treaty, the CJEU has established that a 
breach of the obligations is any infringement, by any state authority, of 
mandatory rules and principles of EU law. Whether it involves the 
provisions of constituent or modifying treaties, international agreements 
binding the EU, or general principles of law guaranteed by EU law, is not 
important.78 The court also stated that the inconsistent behaviour of a 
member state may consist in an action, inaction or omission.79  
                                                   
77 The principal enforcement actions before the CJEU are actions brought either by 
the Commission on behalf of the EU or by another member state than that which 
has failed to fulfil its Treaty obligations (Arts 258 and 259 TFEU, respectively). 
Under these enforcement provisions, neither natural nor legal persons can bring 
actions against member states. In fact, the TFEU does not provide for natural or 
legal persons to take direct action against member states before the CJEU. By 
contrast, member states can be made responsible for actions of its citizens (see C-
265/95, Commission v France). Furthermore, it should be noted that, under the 
doctrine of ‘direct effect’, a member state may be liable to an individual (see the 
Cases Francoviche C-6/90 and Factortame, C-213/89). 
78 The breach of European law must be in respect of “a pre-existing, specific and 
precise obligation”. In essence, it will refer to a breach of a Treaty provision, 
binding secondary legislation or a general principle of EU law. See Case 7/71, 
Commission v. France. 
79 Ibid. 
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The literature distinguishes five types of infringement, which can 
occur in the implementation of the EU law and against which the 
Commission may take action (see Figure 13): 
a. Violations of treaty provisions, regulations and decisions. The 
provisions of treaties, Regulations80 and Decisions81 are directly applicable 
and, therefore, do not have to be incorporated into national law. In this 
case, non-compliance may take the form of not or incorrect applying and 
enforcing of the European obligations. 
b. Non-transposition of directives. Directives are not directly 
applicable; they need to be incorporated into national law. The member 
states have discretionary power to choose the most effective means (form 
and methods) of implementation of EU Directives;82 83 
c. Incorrect legal implementation84 of directives. The transposition 
of the directives may be incorrect. The Member States’ transposition of EU 
legislation should be in absolute compliance with the requirements of those 
acts in the field. In this case, non-compliance with EU law takes the form of 
either incomplete or incorrect incorporation of directives into national law. 
d. Improper application of directives. In this case the legal 
implementation of the directive is correct and complete, but it is not 
applied in actual practice. Non-compliance in this case involves the active 
violation of taking conflicting national measures or the passive failure to 
                                                   
80 Treaty provisions and regulations are generally binding and directly applicable. 
81 Decisions are administrative acts aimed at specific individuals, companies or 
governments for which they are binding. 
82 According to the doctrine of the ‘effect utile’, the member states have to choose 
the most effective means for the transposition of the directives in their national 
legal system. 
83 Apart from the obligation of the member states to transpose EU directives in 
their own national law in absolute accordance with the requirements of these acts, 
member states also have the obligation to notify the Commission of national 
regulations transposing EU acts. This obligation is mentioned in most cases, in the 
final provisions of EU directives. 
84 Implementation refers to “what happens after a bill becomes a law” (Bardach, 
1977) or, in the words of Barret (Barret, 2004), to the process of “translating policy 
into action”. A similar, but slightly different concept is that of “compliance”. 
Compliance refers to “a state of conformity or identity between an actor’s 
behaviour and a specified rule” (Raustiala & Slaughter, 2002). It thus focuses less 
on the process than on the outcome of implementation. 
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invoke the obligations of the directive. The latter also includes failures to 
effectively enforce EU law, by taking positive actions against the violators, 
as well as failure to ensure adequate remedies/redress vis-à-vis the 
individuals for the infringement of their rights. The member states are 
obliged to ensure the exact enforcement of the transposing provisions.85 
e. Non-compliance with CJEU judgments. Non-compliance in this 
case refers to the failure of member states to execute court judgments by 
remedying the issue, as determined by the CJEU in a previous judgment. 
Figure 13. Infringements in the implementation process of the EU law 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                   
85 From the analysis of the jurisprudence of the CJEU, we could conclude that the 
reason for the Commission complaints often is the inadequate implementation of 
EU legislation, and not the incomplete transposition or its non-transposition (see 
Table 4 below).  
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It should also be noted that the Commission has broad discretionary 
power to decide which infringements to pursue under Art. 258 TFEU. The 
CJEU has recognised that it is for the Commission to decide whether to 
bring proceedings concerning the application of EU law.86 Recently, 
however, the Commission established criteria reflecting the seriousness of 
the alleged breach of EU law by setting three priorities: 
- Infringements undermining the foundations of the rule of law; 
- Infringements undermining the smooth functioning of the 
Community’s legal system; and 
- Infringements consisting in the failure to transpose or correctly 
transpose directives, which can deprive large segments of the public 
access to EU law. 87 
6.2 Stages of the infringement procedure of EU law (Art. 258 
TFEU) 
There is no consensus in the specialised literature about the stages/phases 
of the procedure for finding the infringements by member states of the 
obligations assumed under the treaties, regulated in Arts 258 and 260 
TFEU.88 
We distinguish three main stages, which in turn comprise several 
sub-actions, namely an administrative stage, a pre-litigation stage and a 
judicial stage, the latter of which is of a more contentious nature. The broad 
picture of Figure 14 should help the reader to appreciate the entire 
procedure. Note that average durations of the various stages (together) are 
indicated in the figure as well as the percentage share of cases resolved in 
the respective stages.  
                                                   
86 See case C-422/92, Commission v. Germany, 1995 E.C.R.I – 1097. 
87 See Commission Communication “Better Monitoring the Application of 
Community Law”, Brussels 11.12.2002, COM (2002) 725 final. 
88 E.g. see Graig & de Burca, (2009). According to them, “the procedure of finding 
the infringement by the member states of obligations assumed, under the EC 
Treaty, can be divided into four distinct phases: the negotiation from the initial 
pre-contentious stage, the official notification on that alleged violation, via a letter 
from the Commission, the issuance of a reasoned notice from the Commission, sent 
to the State in question and the final stage referral to the Court of Justice, by the 
Commission.” 
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Figure 14. Formal enforcement in case of infringement 
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The administrative and the pre-litigation stages must be completed 
before proceedings in the CJEU are undertaken. In effect, the 
administrative and pre-litigation stages: 
- enable the Commission to ascertain the precise nature and extent of 
the infringement alleged, 
- provide the Member State concerned with an essential guarantee 
with respect to its rights of defence and 
- give both parties the opportunity of clarifying in cooperation with 
one another sometimes complex legal analysis, thus reaching an 
amicable solution. 
The procedure under Art. 258 TFEU is initiated by the Commission in 
response to a complaint of a member state, a national or on its own 
initiative. Initially, the Commission investigates the possibility of a breach 
by a member state of its duty to comply with its obligations.89 Such 
suspicions can be triggered by different sources: complaints presented by 
legal90 or natural persons,91 by own initiatives of the Commission,92 from 
petitions93 and questions94 by the European Parliament and from the non-
communication of the transposition of directives by the member states.  
                                                   
89 These obligations, as mentioned above, may arise under the treaties, under 
secondary legislation or via agreements made by the EU with third countries 
under Art. 218 (1) TFEU. 
90 For example, companies, corporations and non-governmental organisations. 
91 The complaint can be drawn up in any official language of the European Union, 
is exempt from taxes and can be formulated by letter or using the standard form 
made available by the Commission. 
92 For example, based on evidence resulting from the annual reports on the 
situation of compliance with EU legal rules that member states are obliged to 
prepare. 
93 The European Parliament has a Committee on Petitions, which serves to receive 
such complaints from European citizens and from companies, organisations or 
associations with headquarters in the European Union (Art. 227 TFEU). Some of 
these petitions are submitted to the Commission for resolution and after analyzing 
them, the Commission may conclude that a member state has not complied with 
obligations under EU legal rules. 
94 The European Parliament, in exercising its control competences, may address 
questions to the Commission. Based on these questions, the Commission can take 
notice that a possible breach of EU law by a member state had occurred and can 
decide to open an infringement procedure under Art. 258 TFEU. 
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Any natural or legal person, who wants to complain about the 
violation of an EU legal rule by a member state could do so. Such person 
doesn’t need to have any interest in that action or been directly injured. The 
only condition for admitting the complaint is that it relates to the violation 
of an EU legal rule by a member state. However, the procedure is not 
intended to offer people a way to appeal, but is designed as an objective 
mechanism to ensure compliance by the member state with EU law. Once 
the complaint is presented, it is recorded in a register kept by the General 
Secretariat of the Commission and the complainant receives a notification 
with the number of the complaint. Within a year, the Commission has to 
close the case or respond positively to the request by initiating the next 
stage. The complainant is then informed by the competent Directorate 
General in the field, on the action taken by the Commission, in response to 
his complaint. 
If the Commission has reasons to believe that there is a case to 
answer, then the Directorate General responsible for the Union policy in 
question will write a letter to the member state suspected of violating its 
obligations under EU law. 
6.2.1.2 The formal letter of notice (Art. 258 TFEU) 
The administrative stage consists of a mutual exchange of views between 
the Commission and the member state, and also allows the delimitation of 
the scope of the future action brought before the CJEU. This phase aims to 
allow the member state concerned to justify its position or to persuade it to 
comply with the treaty requirements.  
Whilst this is an informal stage, member states are under a duty to 
cooperate with the Commission.95  
From the data available on member states’ non-compliance with EU 
law, provided by the annual reports of the Commission on the monitoring 
of the application of EU law (see Table 4 and Figures 14 and 15), we 
conclude that most infringement proceedings are closed at this early stage 
of the procedure.96 That could be explained, among other reasons, by a) the 
fact that member states usually try to avoid costly and lengthy judicial 
proceedings in the CJEU, b) the great number of infringement cases 
                                                   
95 See Case 375/92, Commission v. Spain. 
96 See Figure 14 above. For a comparative picture over 2006–10, see Figure 16 
below. 
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characterised by “non-communication” of the transposition of the 
directives into domestic law (see Figure 12) as well as c) the success of the 
negotiations between the Commission and the member states during the 
administrative stage, e.g. eliminating eventual problems of 
misinterpretation of EU law by member states. 
Table 4. Closure decisions adopted in 2010 by stage 
  Character of infringement 
Stage of the procedure Number 
of closures 
Non-
communication 
Other than non-
communication 
Before sending formal 
notice (Art. 258 TFEU) 431 0 431 
Before sending reasoned 
opinion (Art. 258 TFEU) 870 558 312 
Before referral to Court 
of Justice (Art. 258 
TFEU) 
269 139 130 
Before lodging the 
application before the 
Court (Art. 258 TFEU) 
27 9 18 
Withdrawal 45 28 17 
Before sending of formal 
notice (Art. 260 TFEU) 77 30 47 
Before sending of 
reasoned opinion ex. Art. 
228 TEC 
44 23 21 
Before second referral to 
Court of Justice (Art. 260 
TFEU) 
11 4 7 
Before lodging the 
application before the 
Court of Justice (Art. 260 
TFEU) 
3 1 2 
After judgement of the 
Court of Justice 2 0 2 
TOTAL 1,779 792 987 
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Figure 15. Closure decisions adopted in 2010 by stage (in percentage) 
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97 “In practice, it frequently happens that in many cases the alleged infringement of 
EU law was due to shortcomings in translating national acts or to their 
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what the EU law infringement is, contains a summary of the objections of 
the Commission and also sets a time limit during which the member state 
has the opportunity to make its observations.98  
It should be noted that the formal letters, contrary to what the name 
suggests, are not part of the official proceedings. They are considered a 
preliminary stage, which gives the member state the opportunity to 
regularise its position and allows the Commission to collect information. 
For this reason, the formal letters are only made official if they refer to cases 
where member states have not accomplished their obligation of 
communicating the transposition of directives within the given time-limit.99 
The member state concerned, normally, has between one and two months 
in which to respond to the formal letter and can indicate, through 
observations, the measures it has taken to comply with EU law.  
6.2.2 Pre-litigation stage 
6.2.2.1 The reasoned opinion by the Commission (Art. 258 TFEU) 
The ‘reasoned opinion’ is the first official stage in the infringements 
proceeding.  
If the Commission, after receiving the response from the member 
state, considers that the state continues to be in a situation of infringement 
of EU law or, in case there is no response from the member state, it may 
proceed with the formal pre-litigation procedure by delivering a reasoned 
opinion.  
The reasoned opinion delivered to the member state is confidential, 
not legally binding,100 and cannot be challenged.101 The notification must 
set out the reasons of fact and law which, in the opinion of the 
Commission, have led the member state to fail to fulfil its obligations (and 
must contain only those objections of the Commission presented in the 
                                                   
98 The opportunity offered to the state to make comments, is considered by the 
Court as an essential guarantee, without which the infringement procedure, by 
States, of their assumed obligations, would be unfounded (illegal). See Commission 
des Communautés Européennes c / République italienne, C-274/83. 
99 In those cases, the Commission automatically opens a procedure. 
100 The notification does not bind the member state concerned, and its legal effect is 
possible only in connection with an eventual notice of the CJEU. 
101 See Case 48/65, Lutticke. 
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formal letter), the measures that the Commission considers necessary to 
bring the failure to an end and a time-limit, within which it expects the 
matter to be rectified. In the absence of a Treaty provision about the time 
within which the member state must submit comments, the Court has 
noted that “the Commission shall give a reasonable time, ordinarily two 
months, but the time limit may vary depending on the complexity of the 
case, urgency, whether the state was already informed before the initiation 
of the procedure”.  
The member state is not held to answer the notification letter sent by 
the Commission. However, if the member state decides to answer the 
European Commission, it must include measures taken in order to comply 
with EU law. The deadline for the implementation of measures and for 
response to the Commission’s requirements is two months, but it may be 
extended at the request of the member state concerned, by a maximum of 
three months, if legislative measures must be adopted to comply with the 
reasoned opinion. In case the member state does not conform to the 
notification, the Commission may take the case before the CJEU.102 
The delivery of the reasoned opinion exhausts the administrative or 
pre-litigation stage. The Commission may then exercise its discretion in 
deciding whether to take proceedings before the CJEU. The discretion of 
the Commission to pursue an Art. 258 TFEU action before the CJEU must 
be taken in the context of its Art. 17 (1) TEU duty to take appropriate action 
to ensure that every breach is rectified.  
The reasons for not proceeding with an Art. 258 TFEU action were 
expressed by Advocate General Roemer in Case 7/71, Commission v. France. 
These reasons include: 
- the possibility of reaching an amicable settlement if formal 
proceedings are delayed; 
- the effects of the violation of the State’s obligations are relatively 
minor; and 
- the probability of the Union provision in question being amended in 
the near future. 
                                                   
102 It should be noted that, the Commission could decide to proceed with the case 
and notify the Court even if in the case that the member state implements the 
necessary measures to comply with the EU law after the deadline established by 
the European Commission.  
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Moreover, if a member state, which has agreed to rectify a breach of 
its obligations, has been given insufficient time to comply with the 
Commission’s reasoned opinion, the CJEU may dismiss an Art. 258 TFEU 
action on the grounds of inadequate time limits.  
The statistics appear to indicate the success of the administrative and 
pre-litigation stages, especially since 2006. Indeed, between 2006 and 2010, 
a total of 7,024 formal notices were delivered by the Commission. The total 
number of reasoned opinions during this period amounted to 2,622 of 
which “only” 863 cases were referred to the CJEU (see Figure 16).103 
Figure 16. Number of steps taken in infringement proceedings in each year 
(2006 and 2010) 
 
                                                   
103 There seems to be no rigorous empirical literature on the determinants of such 
infringements. That is, what fundamental factors or characteristics render it more 
likely that infringements occur? However, Guimaraes et al. (2010) have used a 
sample of 368 CJEU infringements cases on the free movement of goods in the 
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6.2.2.2 EU Pilot  
EU Pilot was launched in April 2008, following the European Commission 
adopted a Communication on “A Europe of Results – Applying 
Community Law”.104 The idea of the system is to provide quicker and 
better solutions to problems arising in the application of EU laws and 
quicker and better responses to inquiries for information, as well as to 
promote a less formal cooperation between the Commission and the 
member states. This method would help correct infringements of EU law at 
an early stage wherever possible, without the need for recourse to 
infringement proceedings. Indeed, since March 2010, the scope of EU Pilot 
has been expanded to cover all cases concerning the correct application and 
implementation of EU law and the conformity of the national law with EU 
law at an early stage before any possible recourse to an infringement 
procedure under Art. 258 TFEU.105  
The EU Pilot project started operating with 15 member states 
participating on a voluntary basis, namely, Austria, Czech Republic, 
Denmark, Finland, Hungary, Ireland, Lithuania, the Netherlands, Portugal, 
Slovenia, Sweden, Spain and the United Kingdom. This first phase of the 
project is known as Pilot I.106 Following the overall positive evaluation of 
first phase of the EU Pilot project (first evaluation report),107 the 
Commission decided to continue to improve the project and the remaining 
12 member states were invited to join. However, until today only ten 
additional member states have joined EU Pilot.108 During this second phase 
of the EU Pilot project (Pilot II), which ran from April 2010 until September 
2011, some improvements of the system have been introduced in order to 
                                                   
104 See Communication from the Commission, “A Europe of Results – Applying 
Community Law”, COM (2007) 502 final, Brussels, 5 September 2007. 
105 See Report from the Commission, “Second Evaluation Report on EU Pilot”, SEC 
(2011) 1629/2, Brussels 21 December 2011. 
106 This initial phase of the EU Pilot project was evaluated by the Commission in its 
first EU Pilot Evaluation Report published in March 2010, which cover the period 
of the start-up of the project in April 2008 until March 2010. See Report from the 
Commission, “EU Pilot Evaluation Report”, COM(2010) 70 final, Brussels, 3 March 
2010. 
107 Ibid. 
108 Estonia and Slovakia (14.09.201), Bulgaria (14.10.2010), Belgium, Latvia, Poland 
and Romania (03.01.2011), Cyprus (07.03.2011), France and Greece (05.09.2011). 
Malta and Luxembourg have not yet joined EU Pilot. 
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promote its efficacy and efficiency. In effect, since 2010, EU Pilot has 
become a replacement of the informal phase of the infringement 
procedures whereby the Commission sent administrative letters to national 
administrations. It is a first step to infringement procedures.109 However, 
where urgency or another overriding interest requires, the Commission can 
still immediately respond to an alleged infringement by a member state, 
without previous contacts through EU Pilot.110 Taking into account the 
success of the system in increasing compliance with EU law and reducing 
the number of the infringement procedures, the Commission is now 
considering the possibility of extending EU Pilot as an instrument for 
problem-solving and prevention to all member states.111  
Indeed, since the system was launched in April 2008 until September 
2011, a total of 2,121 files were submitted to EU Pilot.112 Of these, 1,410 files 
completed the process in EU Pilot. Furthermore, of the 4,035 cases entered 
into CHAP (the Commission’s complaints handling system) in 2010, 686 
complaints were sent for further attention to EU Pilot. However, it should 
be noted that the volume is not spread equally across all member states (as 
shown in Figure 17 below). Usually, there is a correlation between the 
population of the member states and the number of files received in EU 
Pilot. Moreover, there is a difference between the volume of files of those 
member states using the system since the start in 2008, and the others that 
joined the system later. Out of 2,121 files, 15.5% of them were submitted for 
Italy and Spain, 8% to the UK, 7.7% for Germany and 6.5% for Portugal. 
                                                   
109 EU Pilot does not work as a mere alternative to the infringement proceedings, 
but rather as a complementary system, whilst still leaving room for infringement 
proceedings if unsuccessful.  
110 It should be noted, however, that the EU Pilot is an informal system and has no 
binding effect. This means that if a member state is unwilling to cooperate in this 
informal network, they have the right to do so. Furthermore, since it is an informal 
procedure, it should not be used while formal proceedings are already underway. 
Nevertheless, according to the principle of sincere cooperation, as laid down in 
Art. 4(3) TEU, the member states have to take any appropriate measure to fulfil the 
obligations arising out of the treaties or resulting from acts of the Union 
institutions. Cooperation in mechanisms such as EU Pilot can been seen as one 
such appropriate measure. 
111 Ibid. 
112 All the statistics on EU Pilot cited in this book cover the period 14 April 2008, 
when the system was launched, to 9 September 2011. 
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Figure 17. Volume of files – Breakdown by member state, 14 April 2008 to 
9 September 2011 
 
Source: Staff Working Paper, “Functioning of the system”, accompanying the 
document Report from the Commission Second Evaluation Report on EU 
Pilot [SEC(2011) 1629/2), Brussels, 21 December 2011.  
Member states refused to process only 2% of all submitted files in EU 
Pilot, the main reason being insufficient information transmitted by a 
complainant. With regard to the origin of files submitted to EU Pilot, 44% 
of the files are opened at the own initiative of the Commission, while 49% 
of the files are complaints and 7% of the files are requests for information 
sent by citizens or businesses. The files relate to a broad range issues: 33% 
concern environmental issues, 15% internal market, 10.5% taxation, 8% 
mobility and transport and 6% health and consumer protection (Figure 18). 
Figure 18. Volume of files – Breakdown by Commission services, April 2008 to 
September 2011 (total files = 2121) 
 
Source: Staff Working Paper, “Functioning of the system”, accompanying the 
document Report from the Commission Second Evaluation Report on EU 
Pilot, [SEC(2011) 1629/2), Brussels 21 December 2011.  
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The system works as follows. After receiving a complaint from a 
citizen or a business or by its own initiative,113 the Commission will 
examine the complaint or enquiry, enter the issue and all the information 
received in the Pilot database and, subsequently, forward it to the EU Pilot 
Central Contact Point of the member state concerned.114 The complaint will 
be accompanied by questions identified by the Commission.115 Once 
entered into the EU Pilot database, the member state has 10 weeks in which 
to send a reply,116 preferably providing a solution to identified problems.117 
From the start of EU Pilot in April 2008 and until 9 September 2011, the 
average time taken by member states for proposing a response to the 
Commission is 67 days, which is in line with the 10 weeks fixed for member 
states’ responses (see Figure 19 below). 
Having received the proposed solution by the member state, the 
Commission has 10 weeks118 to evaluate whether the proposed solution is 
in conformity with EU law and the assessment of the member state’s 
response is uploaded into the EU Pilot database. Since March 2008, the 
average time taken by the Commission services to assess the replies 
proposed by the member states’ authorities and to decide on a follow-up of 
                                                   
113 These include issues raised with the Commission in the European Parliament 
Petitions’ Committee or via a letter from a Member of the European Parliament.  
114 The member state’s EU Pilot Central Contact Point is usually part of the State’s 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs, or another government office that occupies itself with 
European affairs. 
115 The issue, especially when based upon a complaint received from an individual 
or business, often needs to be rephrased to clearly identify the problem. To clarify 
the issue or to receive a satisfactory answer or solution, the Commission will ask 
for more information or even more directly for a proposed solution to the 
identified problem. 
116 This period of 10 weeks could be extended by the Commission at the request of 
the member state wherever justified. The decision is taken on a case-by case basis. 
Moreover, in exceptional cases, the Commission could decide to shorten the 
timeframe. However, in those cases, the Commission must explain to the member 
state the reason for its decision.  
117 That is much faster than the traditional procedure. 
118 It is important to note that the benchmark for the Commission has only been 
introduced with the adoption by the Commission of its first evaluation report on 
EU Pilot [COM (2010)70 final] on 3 March 2010. 
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the file is 102 days, which exceeds the general benchmark.119 It should be 
noted that the credibility of the EU Pilot project depends on the speed of 
the whole process. Indeed, EU Pilot will be a credible pre-infringement 
procedure only if it will be able to solve the problems faced by citizens and 
business concerning the conformity of national law with EU law or the 
correct application of EU law, in an effective, efficient and rapid way. 
Figure 19. The standard 10-week benchmark for member states (14 April 2008 to 
9 September 2011) 
 
Source: Staff Working Paper, “Functioning of the system”, accompanying the 
document Report from the Commission Second Evaluation Report on EU 
Pilot, [SEC(2011) 1629/2), Brussels 21 December 2011.  
If the Commission decides to accept the position expressed by the 
member state, then the complainant is informed by the Commission of the 
action taken, and if the complainant does not object or complain in a period 
of four weeks, the case will be closed. In the event that the Commission is 
not satisfied with the solution provided by the member state, it can ask for 
more information, inform the member state that further action needs to be 
taken or, if an infringement is detected, the Commission may decide to 
launch an infringement procedure.120 Of the 1,410 files processed in the 
                                                   
119 It is to be noted that cases that exceed the benchmark are, for the most part, 
those where Commission services require additional information from national 
authorities, especially in the case of more complex files and those where 
translations are needed. 
120 If urgency is required, the Commission may decide to launch an infringement 
procedure right away, without going through the steps in EU Pilot. 
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system, nearly 80% (1,107 files) of the responses provided by the member 
states were assessed as acceptable, enabling the file to be closed without the 
need to launch an infringement procedure. The remaining 20% of the files 
(303) in which no acceptable solution in line with EU law could be found, 
went on to the infringement phase (see Table 5 below). Compared with the 
first evaluation report on EU Pilot, there was a decrease in the success rate 
(85% in 2010), mainly due to the increasing number of files opened after the 
new member states started to use EU Pilot.  
Table 5. Success rate: Number of responses provided by member states assessed by 
the Commission services - Breakdown by DG - 14/04/2008 - 09/09/2011 
DG No. of 
responses 
Opening 
infringement 
file 
Accepted/rejected Percentage of files 
with no need to 
open a formal 
infringement 
procedure = 
success rate 
ENV 443 57 386 87.1% 
SANCO 91 18 73 80.2% 
TAXUD 147 55 92 62.6% 
ENTR 55 13 42 76.4% 
EMPL 73 26 47 64.4% 
MARKT 247 62 185 74.9% 
AGRI 43 0 43 100% 
INFSO 47 7 40 85.1% 
JUST 61 14 47 77% 
REGIO 20 0 20 100% 
ENER 41 4 37 90.2% 
EAC 11 2 9 81.8% 
HOME 14 4 10 71.4% 
MOVE 113 41 72 63.7% 
MARE 3 0 3 100% 
COMP 1 0 1 100% 
TOTAL 1,410 303 1,107 78.5% 
Source: Staff Working Paper, “Functioning of the system”, accompanying the document 
Report from the Commission Second Evaluation Report on EU Pilot, [SEC(2011) 
1629/2], Brussels, 21 December 2011. 
ENFORCEMENT IN THE EU SINGLE MARKET  73 
Since 2010, the Commission has observed a reduction in the volume 
of new infringement proceedings (adoption of a letter of formal notice 
under Art. 258 TFEU) (see Table 5). This reduction was greater in the 
original 15 member states that volunteered to join the EU Pilot project 
(Table 5). Furthermore, it should be noted that, since the adoption of the 
first report, EU Pilot must be used in all cases where additional factual or 
legal information is required for a full understanding of an issue at stake 
concerning the correct application, implementation of EU law or the 
conformity of the national law with EU law. Previously, the recourse to EU 
Pilot before initiating an infringement procedure was optional. This could 
explain why the reduction of infringement procedures is even more 
pronounced when comparing the data of 2009 with the data of 2011 (see 
Table 6 below).  
Table 6. Evolution in the number of infringement procedures launched, 2009, 2010 
and 2011 (reference year = 2009) 
 2009 2010 2011* 
Number of procedures launched 536 296 206 
Change in number from 2009 – -240 -330 
Change in % from 2009 – 45% 42% 
* Data for first nine months only. 
Source: Staff Working Paper, “Functioning of the system”, accompanying the document 
Report from the Commission Second Evaluation Report on EU Pilot, [SEC(2011) 
1629/2], Brussels, 21 December 2011. 
Even if it is not possible to identify all the reasons for this trend, one 
possible explanation is that EU Pilot helps to clarify and satisfactorily solve 
some issues regarding the application of EU law, without the need for 
recourse to infringement procedures and providing more rapid results for 
citizens and businesses. However, we should note that the increase in the 
number of cases submitted to EU Pilot has not yet led to a parallel decrease 
in the number of infringement procedures. Since its beginning until 
September 2011, 1,410 cases have been entered into the system. Although 
over 2009-11, the number of infringement procedures declined by only 330 
files. This could mean that EU Pilot has contributed to a higher detection 
rate of non-compliance with EU law, by bringing to the system’s attention 
cases that would not often lead to infringement procedures. 
In sum, during the three-and-a-half-year period since EU Pilot was 
launched until September 2011, we conclude that the system has 
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contributed to increased compliance with EU law, namely by solving 
different types of cases before they could turn into infringement cases and 
also by reducing the number of the infringement procedures.  
6.2.3 Judicial stage 
6.2.3.1 The referral to the Court of Justice of the EU (Art. 258 TFEU) 
Referral to the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU) is the last 
means by which the Commission can pursue cases of persistent non-
compliance of EU law. The appeal for finding the infringement of 
obligations assumed must be introduced, at the latest, within one month 
after the Commission decides to refer the case to the CJEU. However, 
before bringing the case, the Commission usually attempts to find some 
last-minute solution in bilateral negotiations with the member state.  
Once the case is referred to the CJEU, the Commission is not able to 
add any other claims than those contained in the reasoned notification, but 
it can withdraw some of them. This means that new violations cannot be 
raised by the Commission in the proceedings before the CJEU.  
The CJEU verifies whether the member state actually violated 
European law, as claimed by the Commission, and whether the measures 
demanded by the Commission are appropriate. Finally, the Court takes a 
decision. 
The decision of the CJEU for failure to fulfil obligations assumed by 
member states is just a declaration. It establishes only the fact of an 
infringement and national authorities must then take measures in order to 
enforce the decision. The Court has no power to suspend or annul the state 
actions contested by the finding of EU law infringement or to execute 
concrete measures that the respondent State ought to take. The Court 
decision requires the State concerned to amend the legislation, adjusting it 
properly and, without delay, to adopt the measures ordered.  
Although the Court decision only has effect between the parties, 
individuals can invoke the EU regulation, whose purpose and scope have 
been defined by the Court. 
Within one month after the decision of the Court, the Commission 
sends a letter to the member state reminding it of the obligation to take 
necessary measures ensuring compliance with the EU law and to report, 
within three months, the measures taken or to be taken. The member state 
is expected to transmit a response to the Commission on the measures it 
has taken to comply with the decision of the Court. 
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If, following the transmission of observations by the member state 
concerned, the Commission still considers that the former has not taken the 
necessary measures to comply with the decision of the Court, it will issue a 
reasoned notification specifying the aspects on which the State has not 
complied with the decision of the Court.  
6.2.3.2 Post-litigation infringement proceedings (Art. 260 TFEU) 
If the member state refuses to comply with the CJEU judgment, the 
Commission may open new proceedings for post-litigation non-
compliance, according to Art. 260 TFEU.  
Prior to amendments made in the Maastricht Treaty, the only remedy 
under Art. 260 TFEU was a declaration by the CJEU that the member state 
had violated its obligations and that it should take the necessary steps to 
comply with the judgments of the Court. Nowadays, however, where the 
CJEU has found that the member state has failed to fulfil its obligations 
under the treaties, the member state is required to take the necessary 
measures to comply with the judgment of the CJEU. In short, it means that 
the Commission is empowered to specify the amount of the lump sum or 
penalty payment to be paid by the member state concerned, which it 
considers appropriate in the circumstances (Art. 260 (2) TFEU). In other 
words, if the concerned member state does not abide by the first decision of 
the CJEU (the first action establishes liability), the Commission can bring a 
new action to the CJEU (second action), requiring the CJEU to impose 
financial penalties, either in the form of a lump sum or a daily fine, 
calculated by taking into account the scope and duration of the 
infringement as well as the capabilities of the member state concerned, the 
effect of the infringement on the public and private interest and the 
urgency of the matter.121 The fines, which are imposed by the CJEU, result 
from this second action brought before the CJEU by the Commission and 
                                                   
121 Art. 260 TFEU contains no guidance on the limits of the fines or penalties nor on 
how they are to be enforced. However, according to the case law of the CJEU (see 
Cases C-387/97, Commission v. Greece and C-304/02, Commission v. France), the 
criteria to be taken into account to ensure that the penalty payments have coercive 
force and that European law would be applied uniformly and effectively are: 
- the duration of the infringement, 
- its degree of seriousness and 
- the ability of the member state to pay the penalty. 
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not from the first one, which only establishes the liability of the member 
state. 
Indeed, according to Art. 260, section 2, paragraph 3 of the TFEU, the 
infringement by the member state of the Court decision constitutes a new 
violation of the Treaty provisions which may be sanctioned again with an 
action of obligations infringement. 
Moreover, there is no requirement for a reasoned opinion to be 
delivered prior to a second court case being brought by the Commission. 
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7. ENFORCEMENT BARRIERS IN INTRA-EU 
CROSS-BORDER PUBLIC PROCUREMENT 
7.1 Factors influencing cross-border procurement tenders and 
awards 
The market value of public procurement in the EU-27 is enormous, 
representing some 16% of GDP. However, when focusing on intra-EU 
cross-border procurement, it is far less, although still impressive: some €420 
billion (about 3.6% of EU GDP) in 2009 was published in the EU’s Tender 
Electronic Daily (TED), as required when the purchase is above the relevant 
threshold value. Not all of these contracts relate to goods (supplies): they 
also include services as well as public (infrastructural) works as such. 
Companies are typically reluctant to tender cross-border, even inside the 
EU (or EEA). There are many reasons for this reluctance and it is therefore 
inappropriate to blame protectionism or (illicit) barriers thrown up by other 
member states or their regions or other procuring authorities. Such 
attitudes may well linger and some such ‘barriers’ might still escape 
scrutiny despite extensive EU legislation as well as national and EU appeal 
procedures, but there are many other reasons that should be kept in mind. 
Figure 20 gives eight reasons from a recent survey.  
Reasons such as “no experience doing business abroad”, “too much 
local competition” and “language barriers” all score high and have, of 
course, nothing to do with (enforcement or internal market) barriers. Of the 
other motives, “legal barriers” might well rest on perceptions because EU 
rules have existed for a long time now and numerous cases as well as often-
used complaint procedures (nowadays in EU Pilot, and nationally, see 
below) surely have reduced such “legal barriers” significantly. Unless 
companies mean something else, namely, that the considerable leeway for 
member states to build on the minimum common provisions of the basic 
procurement directives with a range of procedural and substantive details, 
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which is allowed by these ‘coordination’ directives, as we shall explain. 
This national discretion may cause procedures, requirements and substance 
to differ more than desirable between the 27 EU countries, resulting in 
(costly) regulatory heterogeneity. Such regulatory heterogeneity is 
regarded by companies interested in EU-wide (or, at least, intra-EU cross-
border) business as a ‘barrier’, a cost-increasing feature of cross-border 
procurement tenders. Thus, this aspect may well overlap with another 
motive given, “higher costs”, as well as with “more resources to tender” 
and possibly with “administrative requirements” (larger than at home).  
Figure 20. Reasons for not bidding cross-border 
 
Source: European Commission, “EU public procurement legislation: delivering 
results, summary of evaluation report”, 2011. 
There is a host of other factors influencing the propensity to bid and 
difficulties to overcome before being successful in obtaining awards. One is 
that member states exhibit a great variation in the degree of 
(de)centralisation in procurement, with an estimated total of some 250,000 
contracting authorities in the EU. In France alone, there are several tens of 
thousands of purchasing authorities (with some 300,000 public officials 
working on bids and awards). Whereas (in 2006-09) Finland procures some 
50% of contract value locally, Portugal, Estonia, Slovakia, Bulgaria and 
Cyprus have local shares of 10% or less, that is, they mainly purchase 
centrally. Contracts from utilities assume a very small share in Slovenia 
and the Netherlands, whereas they make up one-third or more in e.g. 
Austria, Belgium, Greece and Hungary. A second factor is the sectoral 
composition: in the one-fifth of total public procurement in the EU that is 
published in the TED, there is almost no tender for supply of goods and 
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services to health, education and social services, which are typically local 
and these sectors are not covered – despite the fact that they form roughly 
6% of the 16% of GDP. A third reason is the relative difficulty for SMEs to 
obtain contracts. Between 2006 and 2008, SMEs took 60% of the contracts 
directly making up 34% of the total value; another 8% were obtained 
indirectly via subcontracting. Still, the 66% remaining of direct contract 
value was acquired by a relatively few large firms.  
All these aspects are possible factors other than ‘barriers’ that might 
hinder the acquisition of cross-border contracts for certain firms. Against 
this backdrop, implementation and enforcement ‘barriers’ in cross-border 
public procurement can be analysed. Before doing so, a brief summary of 
EU public procurement legislation is provided.  
7.2 How the EU disciplines national and regional public 
procurement 
In the EU internal market, national, regional and local public procurement 
as well as procurement of state-owned enterprises not subject to 
competitive markets should be open, transparent, non-discriminatory and 
competitive. These are the aims of EU public procurement legislation ever 
since the 1970s. But this is easier said than done. If one wishes to beat the 
ingenuity of protectionist officials, or the politicians ‘behind’ them, one 
quickly finds that numerous details have to be regulated or restricted and 
extensive reporting requirements are needed. The upshot is an enormous 
bureaucracy for public bodies and a lot of red tape for business. A loose 
regime, on the other hand, is likely to be misused, even though competitive 
procurement is cutting costs and promoting quality for national and sub-
national governments.  
Moreover, with too many detailed rules and easy litigation or 
appeals, national officials also become overly prudent, that is, in order to be 
‘safe’, public procurement deteriorates into ‘ticking off items’ on a long list 
of bureaucratic requirements instead of focusing on obtaining ‘value for 
money’. Value-for-money refers to an appropriate combination of quality 
of the goods or services and low costs. At times, this may also refer to a 
wider, public-policy driven perspective of ‘quality’ in pursuing some other 
objectives like promoting innovation, stimulating SMEs, promoting social 
inclusion, environmental protection (via ‘green’ procurement) and 
promoting ‘fair’ trade (e.g. for farmers in developing countries). EU public 
procurement law finds itself in a permanent struggle to address this trade-
off between less red tape and ‘better’ public procurement, on the one hand, 
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and the pursuit of an open, competitive internal public procurement 
market, on the other. Recent proposals by the Commission represent a new 
attempt to address these challenges.  
The first procurement directives were adopted in the 1970s to 
regulate bids and contracts for works and supplies for public bodies. Since 
then they have been extended and amended many times. At present, the 
rules on contract award procedures are, mainly, contained in two directives 
adopted in 2004: 
- Directive 2004/18/EC122 (the so-called public sector Directive or 
classic Directive). This regulates tender bids and contracts 
awarded by public bodies, in particular of supplies of goods 
and services and some public works; and 
- Directive 2004/17/EC123 (the so-called utilities Directive), 
which regulates procurement in four specific areas of activity, 
namely water, energy, transport and postal service.124 
The directives are only concerned with the creation of an internal 
market in public procurement. They are not intended to provide a general 
system for pursuing objectives found in national procurement systems, 
such as ensuring best value for taxpayers’ money. Moreover, they only 
apply to contracts above a certain financial value (thresholds). The 
justification of thresholds consists of two basic arguments: i) only a 
minimum value of turnover will be able to attract suppliers from other 
                                                   
122 Directive 2004/18/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 31 
March 2004 on the coordination of procedures for the award of public works 
contracts, public supply contracts and public services contracts. 
123 Directive 2004/17/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 31 
March 2004 coordinating the procurement procedures of entities operating in the 
water, energy, transport and postal services sectors. 
124 Apart from those two main directives, there are two directives concerning the 
legal protection of bidders participating in public procurement procedures 
(Directives 89/665/EEC and 92/13/EEC, modified by Directive 2007/66/EC of the 
European Parliament and of the Council of 11 December 2007 amending Council 
Directives 89/665/EEC and 92/13/EEC with regard to improving the effectiveness 
of review procedures concerning the award of public contracts) and a special 
Directive for defence and sensitive procurement (Directive 2009/81/EC on the 
coordination of procedures for the award of certain works contracts, supply 
contracts and service contracts by contracting authorities or entities in the fields of 
defence and security, and amending Directives 2004/17/EC and 2004/18/EC). 
ENFORCEMENT IN THE EU SINGLE MARKET  81 
member states, given the expected efforts to submit a competitive tender 
bid; and ii) the red tape for EU-wide competitive procurement is costly, 
both for governments and for companies and it makes sense to operate 
within a reasonable cost-benefit framework.125 The current thresholds are 
nevertheless often criticised as being too low, certainly in the case of 
supplies. The problem here is that, apart from cost-benefit considerations, 
the chances for SMEs to compete decline with the increasing size of 
contracts.  
The directives do not lay down an exhaustive set of procurement 
rules; they leave room for member states’ own rules, provided that these 
rules are consistent with the directives. This means, for example, that 
member states may adopt stricter rules than those in the directives. 
The public sector Directive applies to all types of procurement 
contracts (works contracts, supply contracts and services contracts). 
However, the Directive does not apply fully to all services contracts. These 
are divided into priority services, which are subject to the Directive’s full 
rules, and non-priority services, which are subject only to the Directive’s 
rules on technical specifications, award notices and statistics (also called A-
services and B-services, respectively). The priority services are listed in 
Annex IIA (e.g. IT services, consultancy and accountancy), and they have 
been selected on the basis of their potential scope for cross-border trade, 
potential savings and the availability of information on the services. 
                                                   
125 A Europe Economics (2006) study estimated enforcement and compliance costs 
for authorities at some 0.7% of contract value on average. In European Commission 
(2011, ch. 8), the overall figure is around 1.3% of value, covering all costs during 
the entire process, including litigation if any. The reader should note that the 
average conceals a huge variety in contract values. This amounts to an average of 
€28,000 procedure costs for all involved, one-fifth for the authorities (€5,500 per call 
for tender) and €3,800 per tendering firm, times the average number of firms 
putting in a bid, which is 5.9. The estimated savings on average for above-
threshold contracts is about 5%, to be set against 1.3% average costs. However, the 
lower the contract value, the higher the share of costs: at the lowest threshold 
(€125,000), such costs for all involved may add up to between 18% and 29% (again, 
to be divided between authorities and the number of bidders). This underpins the 
often-heard insistence to increase the thresholds for simple supply contracts. The 
reader is reminded that most of such costs would be incurred anyway, also 
without EU rules. In European Commission, 2011, the additional costs of 
compliance with EU directives as compared to below-threshold contracts is found 
to be about 0.2% for authorities and another 0.2% for suppliers.  
82  ENFORCEMENT BARRIERS IN INTRA-EU CROSS-BORDER PUBLIC PROCUREMENT 
Although coverage is broad, some contracts are excluded from the scope of 
the Directive.126 However, some member states have opted for extending 
the Directive to areas not covered or only partially covered by the 
directives. For example, some member states have extended the Directive 
to concessions, to annex B services, to social services or to contracts below 
the thresholds of the Directive. Indeed, many of the annual 150,000 
notifications in TED are below-threshold contracts. 
The public sector Directive, as mentioned above, only applies to 
contracts above certain thresholds (Arts 7 to 9) (these values are indicated 
in Table 7 below). In order to prevent purchasers from splitting contracts 
into smaller amounts, so as to bring them below the regulatory thresholds 
and, consequently, fall outside the scope of the Directive, it includes two 
sets of provisions. First, such practices are forbidden (Art. 9 (3)) and, 
second, a purchaser is held to add together the value of purchases made 
under similar contracts (aggregation rule) and the Directive will apply if 
the total value of those contracts exceeds the threshold. The aggregation 
rule helps to prevent purchasers from evading the rules and provides an 
incentive for authorities to award a single contract that might attract cross-
border competition, although it risks making it more difficult for SMEs to 
participate. 
 
 
                                                   
126 The main exclusions are the services concession contracts, certain contracts 
awarded to another contracting authority, some contracts for hard defence 
equipment and other contracts affected by various concerns relating to secrecy and 
security, contracts governed by different procedural rules connected with joint 
projects with non-member states, those by international bodies (e.g. the United 
Nations or the World Bank) and those made pursuant to international agreements 
on the stationing of troops. Contracts on arbitration or conciliation services, certain 
financial services contracts, some research contracts and development services 
contracts, the utility contracts regulated in the utilities Directive and contracts in 
the sector of telecommunications activities, which were previously regulated by 
the utilities Directive (but now excluded from its scope, given the liberalisation of 
telecommunications) are excluded as well from the scope of the public sector 
Directive (Arts 12 to 17 of the Directive). The authorities can also dispense from 
some of the usual rules, where necessary and to the extent necessary, award 
contracts for the design and construction of public housing schemes (Art. 34). 
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Table 7. Thresholds specified in Directive 2004/18/EC from 1 January 2012 
Central  
government 
authorities 
Works contracts, works concessions contracts, 
subsidised works contracts 
€5 million 
All contracts concerning services listed in Annex 
II B, certain telecommunication services and R&D 
services; all design contests concerning these 
services and all subsidised services 
€200,000 
All contracts and design contests concerning 
services listed in Annex II A except contracts and 
design contests concerning certain 
telecommunication services and R&D services 
€130,000 
A supplies contracts awarded by contracting 
authorities not operating in the field of defence  
€130,000 
Supplies contracts 
awarded by contracting 
authorities operating in 
the field of defence 
Concerning products 
listed in Annex V 
€130,000 
Concerning other 
products 
€200,000 
Sub-central 
contracting 
authorities 
Works contracts, works concessions contracts, 
subsidised works contracts  
€5 million 
All service contracts, all design contests, 
subsidised service contracts, all supplies contracts 
€200,000 
 
The utilities Directive regulates procurement by entities operating in 
four sectors: water, energy, transport and postal services.127 Art. 30 of the 
Directive provides that it does not apply to an activity “directly exposed to 
competition on markets to which access is not restricted”. The exemption 
only applies when the Commission takes a positive formal decision that the 
conditions for an exemption exist.128 This possibility has been provided for 
in the implementing legislation of the majority of member states, except 
Belgium, Denmark, Estonia, France, Latvia and Poland. By June 2011, 25 
applications had been received by the Commission for 10 member states, 
concerning the postal and energy sectors. Three of these requests were 
withdrawn and 18 decisions were adopted. The 18 decisions relate to nine 
                                                   
127 Previously, the Directive regulated telecommunication services, but this sector 
was omitted from the 2004 Directive as a result of the liberalisation of the sector.  
128 The detailed procedures for making exemption decisions are set out in 
Commission Decision 2005/15/EC of 7 January 2005. 
84  ENFORCEMENT BARRIERS IN INTRA-EU CROSS-BORDER PUBLIC PROCUREMENT 
different member states and 11 of these decisions were positive, four mixed 
and three negative. 
The rules on contracts covered by the utilities Directive are similar to 
those of the public sector Directive. The most important differences are 
higher threshold values for supply and services contracts (works contracts: 
€5 million; all supplies and services, all design contests: €400,000)129 and a 
number of additional exemptions. 
Under the public sector Directive, contracting authorities must use 
one of five types of award procedures: open procedure, restricted 
procedure, competitive dialogue, negotiated procedure with a contract 
notice and negotiated procedure without notice. As a general rule, 
authorities must use either the open procedure or the restricted procedure 
(Art. 28); the other ones, which are considered less transparent, are 
available only in special cases. The contracts, with limited exceptions (e.g. 
negotiated procedure without a notice)130 must be advertised in the TED 
series of the EU’s Official Journal (a contract notice). The key information 
from the notice is published in all EU languages. The Commission has 
developed search tools that are available on the Commission’s SIMAP 
website, which also include links to national websites offering 
advertisements for contracts below the thresholds. 
The utilities Directive provides more flexible procedural rules than 
the public sector Directive. This is explained by the complexity of such 
contracts and the duration and management of infrastructural works. 
Under the utilities Directive, authorities may choose the negotiated 
procedure with a notice, as well as the open or restricted procedure, for any 
contract. Moreover, the utilities Directive, in addition to the advertisement 
of the contract through a contract notice, requires the following: 
- Advertisement through a periodic indicative notice (PIN). This is an 
advance notice of general requirements for the year and can be used 
to advertise specific contracts as long as such specific contracts are 
referred to in the PIN. 
- Advertising a qualification system, in fact, a list on which firms 
interested in particular types of contracts can be registered (if they 
qualify). Individual contracts can be awarded simply by inviting 
firms on the list, without further advertisement. 
                                                   
129 Values from 1 January 2012 onwards. 
130 This procedure is only available for cases specified in Art. 31 of the Directive. 
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7.3 Implementation and application of EU public procurement 
law 
When it comes to implementation and application problems in public 
procurement (that is, what one may call ‘enforcement barriers’ in the 
internal market), the picture is not so encouraging. Having said this, it is 
also true that correction mechanisms are built into the system, both at 
national and EU level and they do help, if only after considerable delays. 
Moreover, one should not forget that no less than 150,000 notifications of 
(TED) tenders are made annually, a huge number, so that the frictions and 
problems in the system have to be seen in this light. In the following 
section, we shall first deal briefly with implementation problems between 
2005 and 2010, subsequently with EU enforcement efforts following 
complaints to the Commission and finally with the considerable national 
review and remedies systems (operating under Directive 2007/66/EC).  
The implementation process of the utilities Directive and the public 
sector Directive, adopted 31 March 2004, with a deadline for transposition 
into the national legislation of 31 January 2006 for all member states,131 was 
problematic, to say the least. Only seven member states implemented the 
public sector Directive on time. Thus, in March 2006, the European 
Commission opened 18 infringement procedures for non-transposition of 
the public sector Directive. The last country to transpose the Directive was 
Belgium in 2010 (Table 8 below). 
Six infringement procedures concerning non-conformity of national 
rules implementing the Directive with certain of its provisions were not yet 
closed in April 2011.132 
The transposition of the utilities Directive was also delayed in 16 
member states, which resulted in the launch of 16 infringement procedures 
for non-transposition. Today the Directive has been fully transposed by all 
the member states (see Table 9). Several infringement procedures were also 
open for non-conformity of national rules with specific provisions of the 
Directive. Two of these cases were still pending in April 2011.133 
                                                   
131 Romania and Bulgaria were required to implement the directives by the date of 
their accession to the European Union, 1 January 2007. 
132 According to the Commission Evaluation Report on the Impact and 
Effectiveness of EU Public Procurement Legislation, published in 27.06.2011, 
SEC(2011) 853 final. 
133 Ibid. 
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Table 8. Overview of national implementation of Directive 2004/18/EC 
2004/18/EC 
Member 
state 
Procedure 
opened 
Closed Comments Implemented 
by 
BE 03.2006 03.2010 Judgment 09.2009 
BG - 01.2007 
CZ 03.2006 10.2006  07.2006 
DK  01.2005 
DE 03.2006 12.2006  11.2006 
EE 03.2006 03.2007  05.2007 
IE 03.2006 10.2006  06.2006 
EL 03.2006 06.2007 Referral decided 03.2007 
ES 03.2006 12.2007 Referral executed 10.2007 
FR 03.2006 10.2006  08.2006 
IT 03.2006 10.2006  07.2006 
CY  02.2006 
LV 03.2006 12.2006  05.2006 
LT 03.2006 10.2006  07.2006 
LU 03.2006 10.2009 Judgment 08.2009 
HU 03.2006 12.2006  10.2006 
MT _ 06.2006 
NL _ 01.2006 
AT _ 01.2007 
PL 03.2006 10.2006  05.2006 
PT 03.2006 09.2008 Referral decided 07.2008 
RO _ 02.2007 
SL 03.2006 06.2007  03.2007 
SK _ 02.2006 
FI 03.2006 06.2007 Referral decided 06.2007 
SE 03.2006 04.2008 Judgment 01.2008 
UK _ 01.2006 
Source: European Commission, “Evaluation Report on the Impact and Effectiveness of 
EU Public Procurement Legislation”, SEC (2011) 853, of 27.06.2011. 
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Table 9. Overview of national implementation of the Directive 2004/17/EC 
2004/17/EC 
Member 
State 
Procedure 
opened 
Closed Comments Implemented 
by 
BE 03.2006 03.2010 Judgment 02.2010 
BG  01.2007 
CZ 03.2006 10.2006  07.2006 
DK  01.2005 
DE 03.2006 12.2006  11.2006 
EE 03.2006 03.2007  05.2007 
IE 03.2006 03.2007  03.2007 
EL 03.2006 06.2007 Referral decided 03.2007 
ES 03.2006 12.2007 Referral executed 10.2007 
FR 03.2006 12.2006  08.2006 
IT 03.2006 10.2006  07.2006 
CY _ 02.2006 
LV _ 12.2004 
LT 03.2006 10.2006  07.2006 
LU 03.2006 10.2009 Judgment 08.2009 
HU _ 05.2004 
MT _ 06.2005 
NL _ 01.2006 
AT _ 02.2006 
PL 03.2006 10.2006  05.2006 
PT 03.2006 09.2008 Judgment 07.2008 
RO _ 02.2007 
SL 03.2006 06.2007  03.2007 
SK _ 02.2006 
FI 03.2006 06.2007 Referral decided 06.2007 
SE 03.2006 04.2008 Judgment 01.2008 
UK _ 01-2006 
Source: European Commission, “Evaluation Report on the Impact and Effectiveness of 
EU Public Procurement Legislation”, SEC (2011) 853, of 27.06.2011. 
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EU enforcement of public procurement at national level concerns, in 
the final analysis, the infringement of EU law. It should be realised that the 
national review and remedies procedures, to be discussed later, have a 
different purpose: of course, compliance with EU law may be an issue but 
the aim of review and remedies in member states is to respect the proper 
treatment and individual rights of bidders in any specific national contract 
award. In other words, it is protecting bidders from mistakes and possible 
tricks by correcting such improper conduct via national bodies specially 
established for this purpose.  
EU enforcement of public procurement, already difficult because of 
the sheer magnitude of the market, is made more cumbersome by the 
nature of the EU directives. The public sector Directive and the utilities 
Directive are ‘coordination’ directives, which do not harmonise public 
procurement rules in detail. This means that the member states are allowed 
to go beyond the minimum requirements set in the directives. Many 
member states have used this possibility to supplement the minimum 
requirements of the procurement Directive in national legislation. The 
result is a fragmentation in national legislation on public procurement, 
according to sectors, levels of governance and the number of different acts 
applicable to public procurement. This may create difficulties for both 
contracting authorities and bidders in identifying the applicable rules. 
Furthermore, many member states have introduced additional provisions 
clarifying EU provisions, in an attempt to reduce legal uncertainty and 
encourage non-discriminatory competition, by means of transparency 
requirements, more legal protection of third parties, additional obligations 
for publicity or conditions that the tender participants have to meet. Such 
regulatory heterogeneity, with respect to national regulatory autonomy, 
can be costly from a business point of view. 
In 2010, the European Commission received 226 new complaints in 
the area of public procurement. The countries most concerned were 
Germany, Italy, Greece, the UK and Bulgaria.  
Enquiries and complaints in the field of public procurement have 
been increasingly treated within the new EU Pilot system since its 
introduction in April 2008. Indeed, there is a significantly higher use of EU 
Pilot in procurement than in other areas. Public procurement EU Pilot cases 
accounted for around 50% of all cases in the internal market and services 
from 2008 until 2010 (50% in 2010, 43% in 2009 and 50% in 2008), and the 
system has been used in a very proactive way, resulting in 90% of the EU 
Pilot cases being closed in 2009.  
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Figure 21. Number of files handled by the European Commission in the field of 
public procurement, 2007-10 
 
Source: European Commission, Annual Reports on Monitoring the Application of 
EU Law. 
As shown in Figure 21, the number of public procurement 
infringement files handled by the European Commission each year has 
progressively decreased in the period 2007-10 (155 in 2010, 258 in 2009, 333 
in 2008 and 344 in 2007). Most of the files opened by the Commission were 
closed during the pre-administrative/administrative phase of the 
infringement procedure (76, 127, 163 and 142, respectively). However, in 
comparative terms, the number of cases referred to the Court of Justice of 
the European Union increased slightly in 2010 (7.5% of the cases in 2010 
had been reported to the CJEU, compared with 2.3% of the cases in 2009, 
2.4% in 2008 and 3.5% in 2007).  
Even if the number of infringement procedures opened by the 
Commission in the reported period had decreased in relation to previous 
years, the case load of public procurement infringement complaints still 
remains high and indicates that compliance levels should be improved in a 
number of member states. 
The European Commission’s “Evaluation Report on the Impact and 
Effectiveness of EU Public Procurement Legislation”,134 based on a sample 
of 78 infringement procedures opened by the European Commission since 
                                                   
134 SEC(2011) 853 final. 
Public procurement 
infringement files 
handled by COM
Closed cases Cases referred to the CJEU 
2010 155 76 12
2009 258 127 6
2008 333 163 8
2007 344 142 12
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2005 and issued with a reasoned opinion and were not related to late 
transposition of the Directives, finds that the majority of the cases 
concerned the public sector Directive. Only nine cases were concerned with 
the utilities Directive and six other cases were concerned with both 
directives.  
As expected, in a large majority of the cases (48 cases), a contract had 
been awarded without a previous award procedure with prior publication 
at EU level or, in some cases, at least without adequate publicity with 
respect to contracts not or not fully subjected to the detailed provisions of 
the directives. Four cases were related to problems in the negotiations, 
namely the choice of a negotiated procedure. The distinction between 
selection and award criteria posed problems in seven cases. Problems 
relating to regional and/or national preferences arose in seven cases. Other 
issues concerning the incorrect follow-up of CJEU judgements were raised 
in seven cases involving four member states whilst undue limitations for 
subcontracting and/or otherwise relying on the capacities of other 
economic operators were found in two cases. 
7.4 The remedies Directive (2007/66/EC) - National review and 
the possibility of remedies for improper treatment of bidders 
Procedures providing effective mechanisms to seek redress in cases where 
suppliers/bidders deem that the contract has been unfairly awarded are 
essential to establish trust and ensure the appropriate functioning of a 
procurement system. Indeed, when economic operators, for whatever 
reason, do not agree with decisions taken by public authorities in relation 
to a public procurement procedure, they can challenge those decisions by 
initiating a domestic review procedure that should comply with certain 
minimum requirements. Moreover, a public complaints review and 
remedies system serves as a deterrent to breaking the law and helps to 
correct violations of the law. Therefore, an effective functioning public 
procurement review and remedies system at the member state level may 
ultimately contribute to the achievement of the objectives of the substantive 
procurement rules, such as transparency, non-discrimination and equal 
treatment as well as ‘value for money’.  
The legal framework with regard to judicial protection in the area of 
public procurement consists of Directives 89/665/EEC (remedies Directive 
for public sector) and 92/13/EEC4 (remedies Directive for the utilities 
sector). The first directive coordinates the review procedures of the 
member states in connection with public sector contracts, while the second 
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relates specifically to utility contracts. These two directives were 
substantially amended by Directive 2007/66/EC, which should have been 
transposed by the member states into national law by 20 December 2009. 
The main objective of the public complaints review and remedies 
system is to enforce the correct practical application of public procurement 
legislation.  
The remedies Directives stipulate that member states must take the 
necessary measures to ensure that decisions taken by contracting 
authorities may be reviewed effectively and, in particular, as rapidly as 
possible. They also refer to the principle of equivalence: there may be no 
discrimination between undertakings as a result of the distinction between 
national rules implementing EU law and other national rules. Review 
procedures should be available to any person having or having had an 
interest in obtaining a public contract. The member states are required to 
ensure that the authorities responsible for reviewing allegedly unlawful 
decisions have the power to take interim measures as soon as possible and 
in summary proceedings. In addition, they must have the power to set 
aside or ensure the setting aside of decisions taken unlawfully and to 
award damages. 
First, the existing legal framework in the area of public procurement 
at the EU level will be set out, focusing on the two most important 
problems Directive 2007/66 is intended to solve: the race to contract 
signature and the illegal direct award of contracts. 
With the new Directive 2007/66/EC, the Commission’s aim is to 
resolve two main problems. The first one is that it should become easier in 
practice to ensure that the signing of a disputed contract could be 
prevented in time (this problem occurs in the pre-contractual phase).135 This 
problem occurs when there is a desire on the part of a contracting authority 
to conclude the awarded contract very quickly after the award decision has 
been taken in order to make the consequences of that decision irreversible. 
This conduct makes it impossible for rejected competitors of the successful 
tender to start a review procedure in time to challenge an allegedly 
unlawful award decision, since once the contract has been concluded, 
                                                   
135 Case C-81/89, Alcatel Austria. In its judgment, the CJEU clarified that review 
should be made possible by allowing for a reasonable period between the award 
decision and the conclusion of the contract. The possibility of obtaining damages 
alone was deemed insufficient by the Court. 
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rejected tenders only have the possibility to claim damages. However, 
obviously, an unsuccessful tender is not primarily interested in financial 
compensation, but in a challenge of the award decision so that in the end he 
can conclude and perform the contract himself instead of a competitor.  
The second problem is related to illegal direct awards (i.e. contracts 
awarded without prior notification and competition in breach of the public 
procurement Directives).136 
In order to prevent this from happening, Directive 2007/66/EC 
introduces two main features: 
- A standstill period. Contracting authorities need to wait for at least 
10 days after deciding who has won the public contract before the 
contract can actually be signed. This period gives bidders time to 
examine the decision and decide whether to initiate a review 
procedure. If they decide to do so within the standstill period, this 
results in the automatic suspension of the procurement process until 
the review body takes its decision. If it is proved that the rules had 
not been respected, the national bodies must render the signed 
contract ineffective. 
- More stringent rules against illegal direct awards of public 
contracts. National courts are now able to render these contracts 
ineffective in the event that they have been illegally awarded without 
transparency and prior competitive tendering. 
Moreover, for contracts based on framework agreements and a 
dynamic purchasing system, where speed and efficiency may be 
particularly relevant, the Directive provides for a specific review 
mechanism. In these types of contracts, member states may choose to 
replace the standstill obligation by a post-contractual review procedure.  
Table 10 below summarises the available data on the number of 
review remedies in 22 member states. However, it should be noted that it is 
not possible to directly compare the numbers, since they refer to different 
years or refer to the cumulative number of both procedures above and 
below the EU threshold (e.g. Sweden) or to all cases submitted to the 
administrative courts (e.g. Luxembourg). 
                                                   
136 Case C-26/03, Stadt Halle. The illegal direct award of public contracts has been 
classified by the CJEU as the case with “the most serious breach of Community law 
in the field of public procurement”. 
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Table 10. Summary of review remedies in selected member states 
Member state No. of complaints Comments 
Bulgaria 1,103 complaints before the 
court; 799 rulings (2009) 
Total number of public 
procurement contracts in 
2009: 16,071 
Czech Republic 459 complaints; 391 first 
instance ruling; 89 
preliminary rulings (2009) 
High deposits, loser-pays 
principle and reputational 
risks prevent the tenderers 
from filing complaints 
Denmark 75 (2009); 181 (2010) Risk to reputation prevents 
the tenderers from filing 
complaints 
Germany 1,158 (court of first 
instance); 227 (court of 
second instance) 
 
Ireland No numbers available Clear preference for the 
dialogue method; bringing 
an action before the court 
viewed as last resort 
Greece No numbers available Parties often challenge 
award decisions 
France 5,000 before the court 
(2004) 
 
Italy  Around 40% of the case law 
in the Administrative 
Courts 
Cyprus No numbers available Parties often challenge 
award decisions 
Latvia 200 per year High deposits and loser 
pays principle prevent the 
tenderers from filing 
complaints 
Luxembourg 53 (2009)  
Hungary 636 (2008) No. of procedures have 
decreased since 2005 
Malta No numbers available High court and lawyer fees 
discourage complaints 
Austria 106 review applications; 90 
petitions; 8 declaratory 
procedures (2010) 
High court fees discourage 
complaints 
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Poland 1,537 Appeals court; 227 
second instance (2008) 
Short period of review 
procedure 
Portugal No numbers available High court and lawyer fees 
and lengthy procedures 
discourage complaints 
Romania 6,607 (2008 and 2009) Only one-third of 
complaints are admitted 
Slovenia No numbers available High court fees discourage 
complaints 
Slovakia  1,089 (2005) High court and lawyer fees, 
lengthy procedures and risk 
to reputation discourage 
complaints 
Finland 600 (2009)  
Sweden 3,154 (2010) The figures are for both 
above and below threshold 
United Kingdom No numbers available High lawyer fees and risk to 
reputation discourage 
complaints 
Source: European Commission, “Evaluation Report, Impact and Effectiveness of EU 
Public Procurement Legislation”, Staff Working Paper, Part 1, SEC(2011) 853 
final. 
From the table above, we can conclude that the legal costs associated 
with the action (court and lawyers fees) are the main reason inhibiting the 
filing of complaints by tenderers in many member states. This is true even 
for countries that are very active and innovative in the promotion of public 
procurement legislation (e.g. the UK). Lengthy legal procedures also 
discourage complaints. In small member states, the reputational risk plays 
also an important role as a disincentive to complain. By contrast in those 
countries where the associated cost of the legal proceeding is relatively low, 
we can observe an extensive recourse to the review procedures (e.g. 
Romania). Nevertheless, there is ample evidence of the significance of 
national review and remedies, with numerous bidders seeking review in 
many EU countries. These reviews may eventually help to reduce mistrust 
and remove more of the inhibitions to cross-border public procurement 
bids as well. 
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7.5 The European Commission’s new legislative proposals 
In December 2011, the European Commission – after an in-depth 
evaluation, an intensive process of consultation aimed at assessing the 
application and effects of EU public procurement in the past and the 
completion of several studies137 – proposed three draft directives on public 
procurement.138 These proposals are part of an overall programme aiming 
at an in-depth modernisation and simplification of public procurement in 
the European Union.  
The proposed reform aims to simplify and make more flexible the 
existing rules and procedures, encourage access to public procurement for 
SMEs, facilitate a qualitative improvement in the use of public procurement 
and complete the legal European public procurement framework. 
The main changes introduced by the new legislative proposals are the 
following: 
- Extension of the regime to all services. The new proposals abolish 
the previous distinction between A services and B services. The new 
rules will apply to all services, with the exception of ‘social services’. 
Member states will be free to determine which procedural rules will 
be applicable to the procurement of social services. The only 
compulsory requirement is to publish the contract notice and the 
contract award notice in the Official Journal of the EU. 
- Extension of the exclusion in the utilities Directive. The European 
Commission is proposing to add the exploration of oil and gas to the 
existing exclusions under the utilities regime. 
                                                   
137 http://ec.europa.eu/internal_market/publicprocurement/modernising_rules/ 
consultations/index_en.htm.  
138 Proposal for a Directive of the European Parliament and of the Council on 
public procurement replacing Directive 2004/18/EC, COM(2011)0896 final, 
Proposal for a Directive of the European Parliament and of the Council on 
Procurement by entities operating in the water, energy, transport and postal 
services sectors replacing Directive 2004/17/EC, COM(2011)0895 final and 
Proposal for a Directive of the European Parliament and of the Council on the 
award of concession contracts, COM(2011)897 final. 
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- In-house exemptions. The revised rules set out the conditions under 
which procurement may benefit from the so-called ‘Teckal in house 
exemption’.139 
- Introduction of new award procedure. The ‘competitive dialogue’ 
procedure will no longer be restricted to complex cases. Moreover, 
two new procedures are introduced: the ‘competitive procedure with 
negotiation’ and the ‘innovative partnership’, given that the open and 
the restricted procedures are inappropriate for long-term, complex 
and high-value procurement contracts. The first procedure is similar 
to the existing negotiated procedure. The contracting entities could 
negotiate directly with the tenderers with the aim to improve the 
content of their offers. However, the description of the procurement, 
the minimum requirements defined in the technical specifications 
and the award criteria could not be changed in the course of the 
negotiations. The second new procedure is aimed at establishing a 
structured partnership for the development of an innovative product, 
service or works. 
- Simplification of the framework agreements, dynamic purchasing 
system, electronic auctions and electronic catalogues. The objective 
is to support the use of electronic procurement procedures. 
- Simplification of the procurement regime for all sub-central 
contracting authorities. In the public sector, when contracting with 
sub-central contracting authorities such as local authorities, it will be 
possible to use an OJEU prior information notice (PIN), in the case of 
restricted and competitive procedures with negotiation, instead of 
requiring an OJEU contract notice. 
- New rules for joint procurements by contracting entities. The 
proposals introduce new rules on occasional joint procurement by 
contracting entities from the same or different member states. 
- Inclusion of the service concession contracts. Presently the service 
concession contracts are the only concession not regulated at EU 
level. The proposed new rules are intended to apply to both public 
                                                   
139 Laid down by the CJEU in July 1999 in Teckal (C-107/98), the case established the 
rule that where a public body enters into a service contract with a body over which 
it exercises decisive control and which provides the essential part of its services 
back to the parent body, this contract is not subject to the procurement rules. This 
has been expanded in subsequent case law to cover services provided by ‘shared 
service’ bodies controlled collectively by public bodies. 
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sector and utilities concessions with a value equal to or greater than 
€5 million and are based upon the same rules that apply to public 
sector and utility procurement. 
- Award criteria. Both proposals allow contracting authorities to award 
a contract based only on the “most economically advantageous 
tender” (MEAT) or the “lowest cost”. 
- Modification of contracts. Both proposals introduce new rules 
regulating the modification of contracts during their term and 
specifying when modifications are acceptable without a new tender 
procedure. 
- New rules allow procuring entities to include in the contract 
conditions linked with the contract performance, such as the 
reduction of unemployment or the protection of the environment. 
- Improvements to the existing guarantees aimed at combating 
conflicts of interest, favouritism and corruption. 
- Creation of a single national oversight body. The member states will 
have to designate a single national authority to be in charge of 
monitoring, implementing and controlling public procurement. It will 
also be responsible for examining complaints from consumers and 
business, and transmitting their analysis to the relevant contracting 
entity. 
The adoption of the new proposal should take place before the end of 
2012.  
The future impact of these proposals in the public procurement 
internal market – mainly by improving the cost-efficiency of EU public 
procurement, taking full advantage of all opportunities to deliver the best 
possible outcomes for the society and creating a real EU public 
procurement market (rather than the existing 27 national markets) – 
depends critically on effective implementation. 
The above-mentioned new rules proposed by the European 
Commission have a great potential to eliminate regulatory and natural 
market barriers (e.g. by harmonising standards/labels, making access to 
information easier for SMEs and the procedures more proportionate and 
flexible and helping to eliminate the current regulatory heterogeneity 
between member states) that presently prevent the public procurement 
internal market from achieving its full potential. However, the proposed 
measures will only accomplish these main goals if the member states 
correctly transpose, implement and enforce the new rules, despite their 
different administrative capacities. 
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8. PREVENTIVE APPROACHES 
nother class of enforcement methods is ‘preventive’ in nature. The 
philosophy here is to develop methods that reduce the likelihood 
that infringement might occur later. The short verdict on this 
approach is that it is highly beneficial, and in comparison with 
infringement procedures, less costly, much faster and probably more 
effective. These statements would have to be underpinned with hard 
evidence, of course, even though it is unlikely that one can ‘prove’ the point 
empirically. This preventive way of approaching ‘barriers’ due to bad 
enforcement, late implementation or wrong interpretation has gradually 
become far more important over time. As is increasingly the case with the 
‘pre-infringement’ approaches, the member states have become central to 
greater effectiveness in this respect. Hence, both the ‘pre-infringement’ and 
the ‘preventive’ approaches rely more and more, although not only, on the 
active cooperation of member states, as a group, or between the member 
states and the Commission, in sharp contrast to formal infringement 
procedures where “the” EU (via the Commission) opposes a member state in 
a legal proceeding.  
Ten examples of ‘preventive’ initiatives or those with a preventive 
effect (even though the motive for the initiative might be found elsewhere) 
include: 
 Regulatory impact assessments (RIAs) 
 Training member states’ officials and judges in EU law 
 Regular consultation between member state officials negotiating a 
directive and those (later) responsible for implementation and 
enforcement 
 Disciplining member states in respecting ‘mutual recognition’ 
 Joint (Commission/member states) ‘ownership’ in implementation 
(services Directive) 
A
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 Inter-member states’ cooperation via the IMI system on daily 
implementation issues 
 Council recommendations on member states’ implementation and 
enforcement 
 Selective shift in internal market from directives to (EU) regulations  
 Directive 98/34 on the prevention of new technical barriers in the 
internal goods market 
 The ‘rapid alert’ mechanism of Regulation 2679/98, regarding the 
free movement of goods in case of blockages 
This chapter discusses eight of these ten examples, some of them at 
length (given their importance) and some very briefly.  
8.1 Regulatory impact assessment 
Regulatory impact assessment (RIA) is the centrepiece of ‘Better 
Regulation’ strategies. The European Commission has conducted RIAs 
since mid-2003, and altogether over 550 had been completed by early 2012. 
Every piece of draft legislation proposed by the Commission to the EU 
legislator, such as directives and (EU) regulations, has to be presented 
together with a RIA, published by the Commission on the same date. The 
purpose of an RIA is to provide evidence-based and systematic analysis of 
the European public interest rationale of the proposal, alternative options 
to accomplish the identified objectives via (a combination of) instruments, 
an analysis of the economic, environmental and social impacts, including 
societal benefits and costs, and, where possible, a ranking of the options as 
well as an explicit treatment of the trade-offs between options. The ultimate 
aim is to make ‘better’ EU laws, by avoiding ideological or vested-interest 
biases and imposing rigorous logic and analysis, to bring in as much 
empirical evidence as possible (on all options, not just a ‘preferred’ one), to 
help MEPs and the Council to think in terms of alternative options (with 
their expected consequences) and to support public debate in the EU on the 
basis of solid analysis, data and several alternatives. An RIA does not and 
should not substitute for decision-making by elected politicians (that is, 
Council ministers and MEPs). Only the latter are accountable to voters. The 
idea behind RIAs is not only that the Commission is forced to work within 
the rigorous and detailed RIA logic, followed by far-reaching transparency, 
but also that EU-level decision-makers can be held accountable by a much 
better informed public.  
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Why do RIAs at EU level form part and parcel of the ‘preventive’ 
approaches of better enforcement? There are three reasons. First, RIA 
procedures140 impose a duty of consultation with e.g. business and indeed 
all stakeholders and imply a spirit of openness to comments and 
suggestions at all stages of the RIA writing (which on average takes some 
15 months). Consultations are, more often than not, open and all the 
internet calls are reported in summary papers by the Commission (all the 
submissions are on the website as well). It is the combination of open 
consultation and RIA rigour that tends to result in ‘better regulation’ – at 
least, as proposed by the Commission – than before by e.g. blocking 
exemptions or inconsistencies driven by vested interests or unjustified 
traditions – and by paying careful attention to solid reasons “why regulate” 
(the benefits for the EU) and the costs and on whom these fall. This point 
extends to the instruments and their ‘enforceability’ in actual practice. 
Other things being equal, better regulation tends to be more easily 
enforceable. Of course, this argument may sometimes be undermined by 
the actual EU laws enacted finally by the Council and the EP together, for 
whatever political reasons. However, the EP has recently announced that it 
has established a new unit in its services checking the impact of (non-
trivial) amendments to Commission proposals.  
Moreover, Malcolm Harbour, Chair of the EP Internal Market and 
Consumers Affairs Committee, has initiated a policy of first discussing the 
RIA from the Commission before beginning the debates on the political 
merits of Commission proposals. Second, the much greater care taken in 
formulating Commission proposals based on RIAs often has the effect of 
removing or pre-empting all kinds of technical or legal ‘bugs’ in legislation 
that, later, lead to difficulties in implementation and enforcement by 
member states. Third, every RIA has six stages, the sixth one being 
monitoring and evaluation of a directive once it is in force. In case 
implementation or enforcement difficulties can be attributed to a bad, 
inconsistent or excessively complex directive, the often incorporated review 
after (say) five years can prompt redrafting, reducing such problems.  
                                                   
140 Over the years since 2002, the Commission’s Guidelines for RIAs have 
improved enormously. For the January 2009 version, see 
http://ec.europa.eu/governance/impact/docs/key_docs/iag_2009_en.pdf, plus 
many annexes and several handbooks. For literature, see e.g. Renda (2011) and EU 
Court of Auditors (2010). For quality assessment of EU RIAs over the last few 
years, see Fritsch et al. (2012). 
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8.2 Training member states’ officials and judges in EU law 
Judges and prosecutors are the main actors in the application of EU law. In 
that sense, a permanent training of judges and prosecutors is crucial and 
helps to insure that these actors have a sound understanding of EU law and 
its mechanisms. According to a recent study commissioned by the 
European Parliament,141 there is a high degree of awareness of the 
relevance of EU law across all member states and an overall impression 
that the number of cases involving EU law is rising. However, a 
considerable percentage of the judges interviewed (three-fifths) across the 
EU said that they don’t know how to refer a question to the CJEU at all or 
that they only know to a minor extent how to do so. Moreover, judges, 
prosecutors and court staff are more likely to receive continuous training in 
other subjects than EU law. Just over one-half of the judges and prosecutors 
who responded to the survey (53%) had received continuous training in EU 
or another member state’s law, but only one-third had done so in the last 
three years. Only 14% of the judges and prosecutors surveyed said that 
they had attended a European judicial training programme and 22% had 
participated in judicial exchanges. No less than 90% of respondents to the 
survey said they would appreciate measures to promote more contact with 
judges and/or prosecutors from other member states. The main obstacles 
faced by judges, prosecutors and court staff to participating in continuous 
judicial training programmes are: the organisation of the justice system 
itself (judges may not be replaced during their absence); the lack of 
information about the training programmes available; short notice of when 
training programmes will take place; lack of places, particularly for judicial 
exchanges; lack of funding by employers; institutional opposition; 
work/life balance and language barriers. 
8.3 Regular consultation between those member states’ officials 
negotiating a directive and those (later) responsible for 
implementation and enforcement  
In the early phases of an RIA, there should be consultations between those 
who draft a directive/regulation (i.e. Commission officials) and those who 
                                                   
141 See “Judicial training in the European Union”, European Parliament, Directorate 
General for Internal Policies, Legal Affairs Committee 
(http://www.europarl.europa.eu/committees/en/studiesdownload.html?langua
geDocument=EN&file=60091). 
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will later have the responsibility to execute it nationally. Once negotiations 
start in Council committees, it is even more important for every member 
state to consult practitioners or officials in the relevant ministries in order 
to promote a final version of the directive that is relatively easy to 
implement and enforce, and in any event avoids unnecessary complications 
that might cause enforcement issues later on, if not ‘barriers’. In a classic 
study of 17 directives as applied in all 12 member states (at the time) 
(Siedentopf & Ziller, 1988), the lack of contact between negotiators and 
practitioners proved to be a significant cause for differences in enforcement 
between member states (hence, ‘distortions’ in the single market) or 
occasionally for ‘barriers’. 
That this is just as much an issue today is clear from the very detailed 
study made by the Davidson Review (2006, p. 8). Lord Davidson 
recommends that “there should be an effective transfer of knowledge 
between teams negotiating and teams implementing European legislation” 
in order to minimise implementation problems. Admittedly, this is not 
always easy since, with truly new legislation, there may be few, if any, 
practitioners available yet. This ‘time inconsistency’ can be reduced if after 
the negotiations the negotiating experts are not immediately shifted around 
to other functions elsewhere inside the public administration. This can 
avoid the loss of institutional memory and tacit information.  
8.4 Disciplining member states in respecting mutual recognition 
Mutual recognition in goods markets applies to roughly 21-22% of intra-EU 
goods trade where EU member states have retained their regulatory 
autonomy. The remainder is either unregulated (say, the market for 
teaspoons) or under EU regulation of one kind or another. When EU 
regulated (to some degree), it is also possible that mutual recognition 
applies to aspects of such goods that do not fall under EU specifications, 
hence, where member states retain some discretion. However, when goods 
are EU regulated (to some degree), one should normally find that the EU 
legislator has established common objectives. In other words, the thrust of 
national regulation (under EU directives) is on ‘equivalent’ (same) 
objectives and the specifications – when they differ between EU countries – 
have to be mutually recognised.142 
                                                   
142 For details, see Pelkmans (2007 and 2012). 
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It is extremely hard to ‘guesstimate’ how much of intra-EU trade in 
goods enjoys this combination of EU regulation and some national 
regulatory discretion. In most instances, there will be references to 
European standards, based on official EU mandates, and this will greatly 
reduce the possible discrepancies in actual practice as European industry 
typically produces many goods with explicit consideration of European 
standards. In some instances, however, the common objectives are not so 
specific that ‘equivalence’ between member states is guaranteed. For 
example, some directives allow member states to add additional 
requirements that are not subject to mutual recognition – such 
differentiation beyond EU harmonisation usually indicates that (a few) 
member states are highly sensitive to particular aspects of (say) food or 
environmental legislation or details of consumer protection. Such gold 
plating creates barriers or leaves existing barriers untouched despite 
harmonisation. This is to be distinguished from gold plating where 
additional requirements are subject to mutual recognition but might still be 
confusing for cross-border business (when companies do not realise the 
benefits and rights of mutual recognition). 
There are two distinct approaches to mutual recognition. One is the 
mutual recognition of existing provisions in national laws; the other is 
about pre-empting a lack of national respect for mutual recognition in new 
national legislation at the early drafting stage. Both approaches reduce or 
prevent what otherwise would be barriers to cross-border business in the 
internal market. Below we report on the recent, more effective discipline 
imposed on member states to respect mutual recognition. In section 7.9, the 
discipline about new draft legislation of member states exercised in the 
98/34 Committee is set out in some detail, including extensive empirical 
evidence. 
Mutual recognition of existing provisions in national (usually 
technical) laws that are not based on EU regulation (in EU jargon, the so-
called ‘non-harmonised’ field) has been regulated procedurally in 
Regulation 764/2008, in force since May 2009. The reason was a simple but 
important one: European business had lost faith in the proper application 
of mutual recognition – outside the CJEU court room – by officials from 
member states who would frequently refer to the specifications of their 
own domestic laws.143 This factual neglect of mutual recognition led to high 
                                                   
143 This is documented in Pelkmans (2005) and UNICE (2004), for example.  
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transaction and compliance costs for cross-border business, the very 
opposite of what was meant to be stimulated by opportunities inside the 
single market. Instead, Regulation 764/2008 protects bona fide business144 in 
the ‘non-harmonised’ field145 by imposing procedural obligations on 
member states and introducing a reversal of the burden of proof now 
resting on the member state of (intra-EU) importation. Among the several 
benefits is the much greater assurance to European businesses that they can 
enter all EU countries with goods falling (partially or entirely) outside EU 
regulation. This should promote competition in the internal market. 
Furthermore, business can (normally) forego the transaction and 
compliance costs or even the risks of incurring them, which may well 
stimulate Europeanisation strategies on a wider scale. However, this does 
not mean a lower level of health or safety (etc.) because member states can 
of course still intervene if they have a solid case against a particular good – 
the case ought to be evidence-based (e.g. with testing, etc.) and subject to 
appeal in courts. Also, the ‘rapid alert’ mechanisms for (too risky or 
‘unsafe’) food (RASFF) and non-food (RAPEX) goods remain in place, as 
before. The sole but critical difference, now that Regulation 764/2008 
works, is the effective ‘protection’ of mutual recognition at the moment that 
it matters most: the prospective or actual access to national markets. This is 
good news for cross-border business in the EU (or the EEA) and will 
ultimately translate into benefits of greater choice or variety, possibly lower 
prices and/or other gains from intra-EU competition.  
The actual functioning of this new regime for mutual recognition is 
monitored closely by the Commission.146  
                                                   
144 Bona fide here means a company that can prove its adherence to European 
standards (including voluntary tests and/or certification) or otherwise technically 
document the safety (etc.) features of the good and its access to other EU countries. 
145 A non-exhaustive list of goods in the ‘non-harmonised field’ is available from 
the Commission at http://ec.europa.eu/enterprise/intsub/a12 . 
146 Note that the Commission facilitates the technical application of Reg. 764/2008 
by the provision of ‘indicative, non-binding guides’ on the application of mutual 
recognition to precious metals, food supplements, narcotic drugs, firearms, 
fertilisers and non-CE marked construction products.  
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8.5 Joint EU and member state ownership of implementation 
The 2006/123 horizontal services Directive has been implemented in a 
unique fashion. In a major effort of profound cooperation between the 
member states as well as between the member states and the Commission, 
this complex and ill-drafted Directive147 has been implemented as much as 
possible in similar ways, notwithstanding the wide and disruptive 
encountered variety between EU countries. Such extreme efforts can only 
be expected in special cases: the services Directive surely is a special case as 
its scope is broad (applying to services generating close to 40% of EU GNP) 
and the barriers were numerous and deep-seated, even at several layers of 
government all the way to provincial and local governments.  
The implementation of Directive 2006/123 was guided by four 
committees (chaired by the Commission, with all member states), a detailed 
Guide, an obligatory ‘screening’ of all domestic legislation potentially 
relevant (literally thousands of laws and decrees at more than one 
government level), direct monitoring of and support for each and every 
national implementation by the Commission for years and finally a ‘mutual 
evaluation’ (in 2010) amongst the member states. The result is impressive148 
although the actual working of the Directive still has to be proven of course 
(first report was due in the summer of 2012). There can be no doubt that, 
following such major and cooperative efforts, numerous enforcement 
problems in this area have been prevented.  
This prominent example shows that proper implementation of 
complex EU directives is possible in a two-level government system like 
the EU, only if a) member states are prepared to work together and with 
the Commission and b) there is a political and administrative conviction of 
responsible ‘ownership’ in national capitals. It should be realised that the 
services Directive is largely based on prior CJEU case law and comprises 
                                                   
147 Legally, the Directive is far from satisfactory in a number of ways, the result of 
hectic political debates in the EP and the de facto stalemate in the Council. The 
final text was voted in a marathon session with more than 1,000 amendments 
without much of a filter of proper legal drafting and of inconsistencies and 
mistakes. See Barnard (2008) for a detailed exposition of its flaws and weaknesses, 
and Hatzopoulos (2008) for further analysis.  
148 See COM (2011) 20 of 27 January 2011 on the follow-up of the ‘mutual 
evaluation’ and the Commission Staff Working Document SEC (2011) 102 of the 
same date going into great detail about implementation results.  
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relatively little ‘harmonisation’. Therefore, apart from a number of 
explicitly banned restrictive practices, which represent great progress for 
the services market, the Directive’s impact hinges mainly on effective 
domestic screening, the Points of Single Contact (key for business) and 
effective inter-member states’ cooperation in daily matters of 
administration. In future, some such special cases should utilise similarly 
intrusive methods in order to accomplish proper implementation and 
thereby pre-empt many difficulties of later enforcement. That the lessons of 
the cooperative approach towards the implementation of the services 
Directive have been learned is clear from two recent initiatives, the IMI 
system of inter-member state cooperation (see section 8.6) and the new 
‘partnership’ approach between the Commission and the member states 
with respect to detections of possible misapplication of EU law, signalled 
via enquiries and complaints. 
8.6 Developing the IMI system of inter-member-states’ 
administrative cooperation 
In September 2009, the Commission and the member states agreed to 
establish closer ‘partnerships’ between the member states (and the 
Commission as well), with a view to making the single market work better. 
In many instances this can be important, if not crucial, for business and 
citizens alike. A breakthrough was accomplished with the start of IMI, the 
Internal Market Information mechanism, an IT-based information network 
linking authorities in all 30 EEA countries, with a multilingual search 
function helping competent authorities find their counterpart in other EU 
countries, prepared questions and answers in 23 languages as well as 
automatic translation for other queries. In February 2012, no less than 
11,000 authorities were registered in IMI. Its use is rapidly increasing, 
although currently it is only applied for a) the services Directive and b) the 
2005 Directive on recognition of professional qualifications, whereas it may 
soon be used for public procurement questions (and possibly, posted 
workers). 
For a long time in the EU, inter-member state administrative 
cooperation was a serious weakness: slow, ineffective or even failing 
hopelessly, leading to business frustration and loss of opportunities. IMI is 
very different. In numerous trivial instances, like the verification of 
addresses or registrations or licenses or diplomas, it works rapidly (often 
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requiring only days, 43% processed in a week). It seems promising. The 
Commission proposal for a firm legal basis149 had received strong support 
from the European Parliament. IMI has the additional advantage that it has 
now become routine for national or regional administrations to work 
together with counterparts in other member states. Although it is 
exceedingly difficult to foresee all the benefits flowing from a successful 
and widespread utilisation of IMI in more fields, it is bound to be 
advantageous for cross-border business and has the potential to pre-empt 
high information and transaction costs. In case of administrative issues, the 
key business problem of the past – losing time-to-market – may be 
drastically reduced as well.  
8.7 Selective shift from internal market directives to EU 
regulations 
According to the Internal Market Scoreboard (No. 23, September 2011), on 
30 April 2011, the internal market acquis consisted of 1,525 directives and 
1,347 EU regulations.150 These seemingly plain data mask a silent 
revolution in the EU internal market regulatory regime. Over the last 
decade or so, the total number of internal market directives has hardly 
changed whereas the number of EU regulations has increased enormously, 
indeed, has more than quadrupled! Thus, in Scoreboard No. 10 (May 2002), 
the total number of directives was the same as ten years later (1,497, as 
against 1,525 in the spring of 2011) but the total number of EU regulations 
amounted to no more than 299 (as against 1,347 in 2011).  
For the subject of this study, namely enforcement in the internal 
market, this major shift can be regarded as another instance of a 
‘preventive’ approach. After all, regulations have direct effect and need no 
transposition into member states’ domestic law; there is, by definition, no 
implementation problem. Although the authors have no hard proof, it is 
likely that EU regulations also lead to fewer problems of wrong or 
misguided problems of application of EU law. In other words, enforcement 
in the internal market is expected to improve significantly, if and to the 
extent that regulations rather than directives are employed. And, as noted, 
since 2002, the extent of the shift has been very large indeed. This means 
                                                   
149 COM (2010) 522 of 29 August 2011 on the IMI Regulation. 
150 Not counting decisions, recommendations and other softer EU law, and CJEU 
rulings. 
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that, irrespective of the transposition deficit and also irrespective of the 
compliance deficit (see section 5.3), enforcement in the internal market 
must have improved solely on account of having far more EU regulations. 
Curiously, this shift has remained largely unnoticed and is never explicitly 
related to ‘better enforcement’ efforts.  
The authors have not analysed the roots of this shift. But a few 
suggestions can be made. First, there have been instances of substitution 
between directives and EU regulations, once directives came up for review 
or revision. Examples include the two new proposed regulations on the 
approval and market surveillance of two- or three-wheel vehicles and 
quadric-cycles151 and of tractors and forestry vehicles,152 respectively, and 
the change from Directive 95/46 on personal data protection to Regulation 
1882/2003. Second, new legislative initiatives have, more often than before, 
been proposed and enacted in the form of regulations. A prominent 
example is the mutual recognition Regulation 764/2008. There may be 
other reasons as well.  
At the same time, one wonders why the number of directives has not 
increased over ten years. This is mainly due to a series of consolidation 
initiatives (for example, Directive 2005/36 on professional qualifications 
brings together 15 earlier directives on separate professions) besides ‘better 
regulation’ initiatives, which have led to the removal of entire families of 
directives (such as 30 directives on sizes and shapes of vegetables and 
fruits, and a few so-called ‘recipe’ directives on tea, honey, coffee, etc.). The 
REACH Regulation 1907/2006 forms a combination of the two, substituting 
for one Council directive and four Commission directives. 
The shift to regulations, with the clear and explicit approval of 
member states, can be considered as a highly significant contribution to 
better enforcement in the internal market. 
8.8 EU prevention of new technical barriers (Directive 98/34/EC) 
8.8.1 A credible discipline of national technical regulation 
Under Directive 98/34/EC (revised twice since, and formerly known as 
83/189), the European Commission receives compulsory notifications from 
the member states of all national draft laws containing technical regulations 
                                                   
151 COM(2010) 542 final. 
152 COM(2010) 0395 final. 
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(on goods and, a minor part on information services). The notified national 
draft laws are verified so as to enable the Commission as well as the 
member states to detect potential (new) technical barriers or other (new) 
regulatory barriers to intra-EU cross-border trade. Subsequently, the 
Commission requests the relevant member states to amend the draft in 
such a way as to prevent such (potential) barriers.  
This unique and most remarkable instrument has protected the 
internal goods market from becoming a mockery over time. The Directive 
98/34/EC mechanism is remarkable for at least two reasons. First, member 
states temporarily renounce their sovereign right and freedom to legislate 
as and when they want. A notification automatically postpones the 
conclusion of domestic pre-legislative procedures for three months, i.e. the 
draft cannot be adopted before the end of this standstill period. Depending 
on the situation, however, such standstill period may be prolonged and 
take four to six months. In case of a blockage (i.e. when the Commission 
announces that the proposal concerns a matter that is covered by a 
proposal for a directive, regulation or decision), it may reach 12 months. If 
the Council adopts a common position, the national legislative procedure is 
blocked for 18 months. This is a credible way to prevent new technical 
barriers from arising. Second, notification is not only compulsory but the 
CJEU has explicitly ruled (in CIA Security v Signalson and Securitel, 1996) 
that non-notification renders the national law adopted subsequently 
‘unenforceable’. Again, this ruling provides strong incentives to notify, 
thereby raising credibility of the Directive even further.  
What is typically notified? Basically, all technical regulations together 
with an explanation of the necessity to make such regulations, if this is not 
clear in the draft, unless the regulations are a simple transposition of 
international or European standards. It is hard to ‘guesstimate’ what the 
economic significance of this domain is, but a rough proxy would be at 
least around 20% of intra-EU trade in goods. However, one has to 
appreciate the precise meaning of this. The regular Commission reports on 
Directive 98/34/EC153 speak of goods in the non-harmonised field as well 
as in the harmonised field. The latter refer to secondary national legislation 
which elaborates principles and specifications in EU directives – depending 
on the situation, the member states have considerable discretion here, and 
                                                   
153 Such as the latest ones: COM(2009) 690 of 21 December 2009 (on 2006 – 2008) 
and COM (2011) 853 of 7 December 2011 (on 2009 and 2010), for example. 
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in the 98/34 procedure it is verified whether that discretion is not used in 
ways that create unnecessary divergences or incompatibilities with the 
directive(s). In other words, it disciplines at EU level the national 
regulatory autonomy first received in the Directive, such that no new 
barriers to internal market emerge.  
8.8.2 The amazing record of 98/34: Empirical trends 
Just how critical the 98/34 mechanism is for the protection of the internal 
goods market can be read from Figures 22 and 23 showing the notifications 
over the period 1988-2010. The regulatory activity of member states is 
considerable. In the period of the EU-12 (1988-1994), annual notifications 
hovered between 300 and 400 and many of these prompted observations 
from the Commission and/or member states, suspecting potential barriers. 
During the period of the EU-15 (1995-2003), notifications start rising to 
(sometimes far) beyond 500 a year.154 A further structural increase can be 
observed after the first and second Eastern enlargement (2004-2010), 
approaching an annual average of around 700 a year. 
Figure 22. Total number of notifications of national draft laws under 98/34, 
1988-98 
 
Source: Pelkmans et al. (2000, p. 274), based on Commission reports. 
                                                   
154 The extreme peak in 1997 is due to the Netherlands, suddenly realising the 
consequences of the CIA Security case. It was catching up in 1997 with 400 extra 
notifications that it first felt were unnecessary. For details of this ‘regulatory-crisis’, 
see Box 1 in Pelkmans et al. (2000, pp. 270-271). 
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Figure 23. Total number of notifications of national draft laws under 98/34, 
1999-2010 
 
Notes: 2004: Enlargement from EU-15 to EU-25; 2007: Enlargement from EU-25 to 
EU-27. 
Sources: Pelkmans (2007); SEC (2009) 1704 of 21 December 2009 and SEC(2011) 1509 
of 7 December 2011. 
In short, for already one and a half decades, the number of annual 
notifications exceeded 500, with a recent trend of 700 a year. This amounts 
to unique empirical evidence of the high, if not secularly increasing, 
regulatory activity of member states. In Europe the shift to more and more 
EU regulation, at the expense of national regulation (at least in goods), is 
frequently discussed. This trend is widely accepted as inevitable given the 
ambition of creating and maintaining a deep and smoothly functioning 
internal (here: goods and services) market. One of the repercussions is that 
member states (as well as businesses and even citizens) have (rightly) 
become quite sensitive to the need for EU regulation to be carefully 
justified, least-cost and well-designed based on strict RIAs. 
 What is rarely considered, however, is what member states 
themselves do in the areas remaining under national regulatory autonomy, 
for the simple reason that there is no easy way to ‘observe’ such trends. The 
98/34 mechanism gives analysts unique (although partial, for goods only) 
empirical evidence about how member states use their autonomy in goods 
markets. The inference is clear: member states remain eager regulators. Yet, 
this eagerness creates serious risks of newly emerging technical or other 
regulatory barriers, which might be difficult, slow and costly to remove 
again. Hence, the justification of the intrusive 98/34 mechanism which 
does not reduce national regulatory autonomy but disciplines it for the 
sake of the internal goods market. It is important that the member states 
jointly have assumed ‘ownership’ since they all can (and do) make 
observations on the draft laws of other member states, whilst being 
disciplined themselves as well.  
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The effectiveness of 98/34 in protecting the internal goods market can 
be appreciated once one ‘zooms in’ on the actual working of the 
Commission. No less than some 12,500 notifications have been dealt with 
since 1988. One might assume that once the mechanism is well-known 
inside the national administration (between ministries – which requires 
coordination done in practice by national enquiry points), the mere 
existence of the mechanism should already exercise some disciplinary 
effect. Thus, one should expect the potential barriers detected in 98/34 
procedures to be a good deal fewer (in terms of draft laws)155 than 12,500. 
Even so, thousands of potential barriers have been prevented in these 23 
years for which Figures 22 and 23 show data. The 98/34 procedure allows 
greater precision with respect to the number of prevented barriers. Member 
states and the Commission can make two types of observations on notified 
draft laws: comments, mainly requests for clarification so as to avoid 
interpretations or execution leading to possible barriers; and detailed 
opinions, in case a potential barrier is identified, leading to therefore an 
automatic suspension of the adoption of the draft for another three 
months.156  
Figure 24 provides the evidence for the period 2004-10 inclusively. 
The number of comments over these seven years amount to 1,142 for the 
member states and 1,113 for the Commission. Even if one (rather 
generously) assumes that none of these instances would have given rise to 
later barriers, the procedure undoubtedly increases legal certainty for 
business, which is a much appreciated gain (lowering information costs). 
Were one to assume that some of the draft laws having been ‘commented’ 
on would have given rise to barriers, the beneficial impact of 98/34 would 
be so much bigger. It seems reasonable to presume that the latter 
assumption is probably correct. 
                                                   
155 Of course, a single draft law may well contain more than one or indeed many 
(potential) technical barriers. Here, we simplify by assuming that one law can be 
tantamount to one (potential) barrier. 
156 The Commission can also block a draft law in case relevant harmonisation work 
is already under way or due to be undertaken. This leads to a suspension for 12 
months, giving time for the preparation of a draft directive.  
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Figure 24. Detection under 98/34 of potential regulatory barriers, 2004-10 
 
Sources: SEC(2007)350 of 21 March 2007, SEC(2009)1704 of 21 December 2009 and 
SEC(2011)1509 of 7 December 2011. 
The ‘detailed opinions’ identify potential future barriers. The member 
states identified over the seven years no less than 366 such instances, and 
the Commission 402. One cannot add these totals because many detailed 
opinions of member states may well be on the same draft laws and are 
likely to overlap with detailed opinions from the Commission; usually, the 
Commission’s list is larger than the number of draft laws identified as 
problematic by member states. On this basis, one can conclude that no less 
than 400 national draft laws were temporarily stopped by detailed 
opinions, indicating a serious risk of emerging technical barriers in the 
internal goods market. Moreover, the experience shows that a significant 
chunk of identified potential problems can be solved in a dialogue between 
the notifying member state and the Commission or another member state 
that issued a comment or a detailed opinion. 
This amazing record shows how crucial 98/34 is for keeping the 
internal market from deteriorating by preventing a groundswell of new 
technical barriers. With even more detailed data below, we shall construct 
and calculate an effective prevention indicator showing the proven 
performance of 98/34 in pre-empting what otherwise would have become 
‘new’ barriers in the single goods market. This prevention comes in 
addition to the probably growing awareness and increased discipline 
inside ministries and the deterrence effect of notification and analysis by 
other member states and the Commission. 
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8.8.3 The most recent empirical evidence on 98/34 
We provide empirical evidence for 2011 separately. This is subject to 
caveats. The data shown in this subsection are taken from the TRIS 
database157 as it stood in mid-March 2012. However, because some 
notifications are under periods of commenting or ‘detailed opinions’ longer 
than three months, the data cannot be final until much later into the year 
2012. Therefore, the data can serve as a reasonably good proxy of the trend 
in 2011, but their exact numbers might appear to differ somewhat, later on.  
The number of notifications declined in 2011 to 675, from 817 in 2010. 
The 2011 figure is roughly at the average level since 2005, showing a stable 
trend line. Figure 25 demonstrates that EU member states exhibit 
considerable differences in their propensity to notify in years 2010-11, that 
is, to regulate either in the non-harmonised or harmonised field or in both. 
Whereas 10 EU countries notified 20 draft laws or less over the two years 
together, four member states reach beyond 100, with a peak of 162 
notifications by France.  
Figure 25. Total number of notifications - breakdown by country, 2010-11 
 
Table 11 highlights these disparities between member states’ 
notifications in percentages. No less than 11 member states recorded more 
                                                   
157 TRIS, which stands for Technical Regulations Information System, is a database 
that facilitates the notification system under Directive 98/34/EC. On the publicly 
available website, the public can find all the relevant information on the procedure, 
including notified draft laws and can subscribe to a regular alert system on the 
latest notifications. 
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than 5% of the total 2010 notifications; in 2011 this group shrank to seven 
EU countries, signalling a more evenly spread pattern of notifications. 
Table 11. Percentages of notifications submitted by member state, 2010-11 
Country 2010 2011 
Belgium 3.79% 2.81% 
Bulgaria 0.61% 1.63% 
Czech Republic 3.18% 3.26% 
Denmark 5.51% 5.63% 
Germany 6.85% 9.19% 
Estonia 0.61% 1.33% 
Ireland 1.1% 1.48% 
Greece 0.86% 1.93% 
Spain 5.75% 5.78% 
France  12.12% 9.33% 
Italy 5.02% 4.3% 
Cyprus 0.73% 0.15% 
Latvia 1.47% 0.89% 
Lithuania 0.98% 0.74% 
Luxembourg 7.71% 0.59% 
Hungary 1.22% 4.15% 
Malta 1.47% 0.74% 
Netherlands 6.12% 6.07% 
Austria 5.88% 9.63% 
Poland 5.14% 4.0% 
Portugal 0.86% 0.74% 
Romania 5.75% 3.26% 
Slovenia 0.86% 1.48% 
Slovakia 1.71% 5.19% 
Finland 4.16% 3.4% 
Sweden 4.90% 4.44% 
United Kingdom 6.36% 7.85% 
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In the reactions on notifications, there is a possibly interesting 
discrepancy between the Commission and the member states. Whereas the 
Commission seems to have become more vigilant and/or the projects 
notified were more problematic (comments going up from 108 in 2010 to 
112 in 2011, despite fewer notifications, and detailed opinions going up 
from 48158 to 56), the member states’ responses decreased in number, in line 
with the decline of the total (comments decreasing from 176 in 2010 to 147 
in 2011, and detailed opinions going down as well from 49 in 2010 to 46 in 
2011).  
8.8.4 Proven prevention, empirical evidence for 2010 and 2011 
The effectiveness of 98/34 is exerted in three ways. One is through the very 
existence of the mechanism for more than 25 years now, which is bound to 
have induced some degree of discipline and efforts to ensure EU legal 
compatibility in ministries in all EU member states. The second way is via 
the working of the 98/34 notification procedure, which has gradually 
engendered a greater ‘Europeanisation’ of domestic law-making by the 
permanent machinery to comment on drafts of other EU countries, and to 
identify instances of potential and likely ‘barriers’ springing from draft 
laws which have no mutual recognition clauses or comprise other (too) 
restrictive ways to pursue health, safety or environmental objectives. These 
two beneficial effects of 98/34 cannot be empirically verified in any 
meaningful fashion, although this does not mean that such impacts are not 
real.  
A third effect can be verified empirically with the help of three proxy 
measures. We refer to barriers that were actually prevented via the comments 
and especially the detailed opinions. In the following we assume, for the 
sake of simplicity, that a detailed opinion is tantamount to ‘a barrier 
prevented’ which is in actual practice very often the case. More generally, 
comments may also point to issues or a potential for later problems or 
overly complicated or heavy bureaucracy, etc., but comments may just as 
well provide advice or comparisons with solutions found elsewhere. By 
zooming in on comments and in particular, on detailed opinions, it is 
                                                   
158 Note that there were 48 draft regulations notified to the European Commission 
in 2010 that were issued with a detailed opinion from the European Commission. 
However, of these 48 detailed opinions, only 44 were issued by the Commission in 
2010. Only those 44 detailed opinions issued by the Commission in 2010 are 
analysed in section 8.8.6. 
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possible to calculate the ‘proven prevention’ in the annual functioning of the 
98/34 procedure. The empirical perspective can be provided with the help 
of three indicators. The first one is the gross detection rate (GDR), showing 
the reported activities (though not in substantive detail) of the procedure in 
detecting issues, problems and/or likely barriers. The GDR is the ratio of 
the sum of the comments and detailed opinions of one year, divided by the 
total number of notifications. 
The gross prevention indicator (GPI) focuses on prevention we are 
pretty sure about, that is, the share in percentages of all detailed opinions in 
all notifications in one year. However, the GPI is “gross” because, although 
it is relatively easy to calculate from the TRIS website, it cannot be fully 
precise in identifying how many new barriers have been prevented per 
year (assuming that one draft law is tantamount to one barrier). The reason 
is that more than one member state can have a detailed opinion on the 
same notified draft law and/or that a member state as well as the 
Commission may file a detailed opinion on the same draft law. The 
effective prevention indicator (EPI) filters out such double counting from 
the calculation. The GPI is the share (in %) of the notifications that have 
attracted one or more detailed opinions. In Figure 26 this empirical 
perspective has been brought together for the last few years: the GDR for 
2004-11, the GPI for 2004-11 and the EPI for 2010 and 2011.  
Figure 26. Detection and effective prevention of barriers in 98/34 
 
Legend: GDR = Gross Detection Rate; GPI = Gross Prevention Indicator; and  
EPI = Effective Prevention Indicator. 
Figure 26 shows immediately that, after many years of having the 
Directive 98/34/EC and supporting CJEU case law, such as Unilever and 
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CIA Security, the trend is that still around one-half of the notified draft 
laws lead to an issuance of either comments or detailed opinions or both 
(2004 was the first enlargement year and is an outlier). When it comes to 
identified (likely) barriers in national draft laws, the scores are much lower. 
Nonetheless, the GPI hovers around 15% or so, which is far from trivial. 
After filtering this, the EPI for 2010 and 2011 shows respectively 9.7% and 
11.7% (in absolute numbers, in both years). These are good proxies of 
actually prevented barriers to intra-EU goods trade. Figure 26 offers firm 
evidence of the value of a credible and intrusive mechanism such as 
procedure 98/34 to pre-empt the steady erosion of the internal market for 
goods.  
8.8.5 Sectoral technical barriers, prevented (2010, 2011)159 
Agriculture and foodstuff was the sector that saw the highest number of 
notifications issued with comments and/or detailed opinions (134 notified 
draft regulations) over the period 2010-11 (see Annex I and II). The subjects 
covered included, among others, labelling of foodstuffs, food supplements, 
origin of products, food hygiene, composition of foodstuffs and beverages, 
materials intended to come into contact with foodstuffs, mineral, spring 
and drinking waters for human consumption, equipment for treatment of 
water for human consumption and measures on genetically modified 
organisms (GMOs). EU legislation on GMOs includes, inter alia, the 
Directive 2001/18/EC160 on the deliberate release into the environment of 
genetically modified organisms, Regulation (EC) No 1829/2003161 on 
genetically modified food and feed, Regulation (EC) No 1830/2003162 on the 
traceability of food and feed products produced from genetically modified 
                                                   
159 In this section, we only consider the TRIS notifications issued with a detailed 
opinion and/or a comment, by the Commission or the member states. 
160 Directive 2001/18/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 12 
March 2001 on the deliberate release into the environment of genetically modified 
organisms and repealing Council Directive 90/220/EC. 
161 Regulation (EC) No 1829/2003 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 
22 September 2003 on genetically food and feed. 
162 Regulation (EC) No 1830/2003 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 
22 September 2003, concerning the traceability and labelling of genetically 
modified organisms and the traceability of food and feed products produced from 
genetically modified organisms and amending Directive 2001/18/EC. 
ENFORCEMENT IN THE EU SINGLE MARKET  119 
organisms and the Commission’s Recommendation on co-existence 
measures 2010/C 200/01.163  
A high number of draft technical regulations in the field of building 
and construction, during the reported period, were also issued with 
detailed opinions/comments by the Commission and the member states 
(68 notified draft regulations). A great part of these draft notified 
regulations are related to firefighting equipment, supporting structures 
made from concrete, dangerous substances, their properties and labelling. 
The building and construction sector is regulated at EU level by Directive 
89/106/EEC164 on construction products and Directive 2010/31/EU.165 
Classification, packaging and labelling of dangerous preparations are 
regulated in Regulation (EC) No 1272/2008.166 
The third sector with a higher number of notified draft regulations 
issued with detail opinions and/or comments was telecommunications (47 
notified draft regulations), mainly concerned with radio interfaces. This is a 
sector in which rapid technology developments in recent years have 
resulted in increasingly complex national regulations, which could 
potentially create barriers within the internal market.  
During this period (2010-11), we also observed a great number of 
notified draft regulations issued with comments and/or detailed opinions 
related to transport (45), mechanics (39), environment and packaging (30). 
                                                   
163 Commission Recommendation 2010/C 200/01, of 13 July 2010, on guidelines for 
the development of national co-existence measures to avoid the unintended 
presence of GMOs in conventional and organic crops. 
164 Directive 89/106/EEC Council Directive of 21 December 1988 on the 
approximation of laws, regulations and administrative provisions of the member 
states relating to construction products.  
165 Directive 2010/31/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 19 May 
2010, on the energy performance of buildings. 
166 Regulation (EC) No 1272/2008 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 
16 December 2008, on classification, labelling and packaging of substances and 
mixtures (REACH), amending and repealing Directives 67/548/EEC and 
1999/45/EC, and amending Regulation (EC) No 1907/2006.  
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8.8.6 Further analysis of 2010 TRIS notifications 98/34 issued with 
a detailed opinion by the Commission 
Annex III provides a somewhat greater detail of 43 of the 44 detailed 
opinions issued by the Commission in 2010. This number of detailed 
opinions amounts to less than 6% of the 817 notifications that year. The 
main purpose of Annex III is to find out what kind of potential ‘barriers’ to 
the internal market or infringements the Commission is objecting to within 
the preventive framework of Directive 98/34/EC and to acquire a sense of 
how significant such potential barriers are in the internal market for goods. 
Of course, the table refers only to one single year, which entails some 
limitations for the purposes of this analysis. On the basis of these limited 
data, we draw the conclusions presented below from Annex III.  
a) Detailed opinions are a powerful indicator that barriers might 
arise, if the notified national draft laws subject to such an opinion would 
not be changed. The utility for the single market of the 98/34 procedure 
and follow-up becomes even more clear once one is able to study the 
notifications and detailed opinions in greater detail. The potential 
infringements are found in highly specialised submarkets (which might 
easily go unnoticed without such a notification obligation) as well as in 
more sizeable markets (e.g. gambling, building products, foodstuffs, 
batteries & accumulators, fuels) where the economic impact is of course 
likely to be more important. The analysis indicates also that quite often, the 
absence of a 'mutual recognition' clause is the principal issue that would 
create a barrier to internal market. 
b) Knowing the history of Directive 98/34/EC (see e.g. the survey by 
Pelkmans et al., 2000), it is striking to find that, much like 10 or 20 years 
ago, it seems difficult for national ministries, and for units inside national 
ministries, to master and understand EU law, or at least the basics with 
respect to the free movement of goods and the ‘New Approach’. Many of 
the same types of mistakes or ‘failures to think internal market’ still show 
up today. However, it must be noted that cooperation of national ministries 
with national enquiry points set up to coordinate nationally the procedure 
under Directive 98/34/EC has improved the awareness of the notification 
procedure. Moreover, it may be observed that indeed some learning has 
taken place in the meantime: from 1995-98 (when the EU had only 15 
member states as compared to 27 in 2010), the number of the Commission’s 
detailed opinions amounted to (respectively) 75, 105, 118 and 62, all far 
above the 44 in 2010 for more countries.  
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c) The notion of ‘mutual recognition’ in non-harmonised areas still 
appears to be ‘underused’ by national ministries and regulators, 
demonstrating the utility and preventive effect of Directive 98/34/EC. 
d) Occasionally, national administrations may not appreciate the 
crucial difference between a ‘presumption of compliance’ that an EN 
standard (recognised and published by the Commission) confers on a 
product under the New Approach, from making a (EN or European) 
standard compulsory under national law (thereby, going against the spirit 
of the New Approach and blocking the internal market as well as 
innovation).  
e) Cases in agriculture and food and related (phyto)sanitary issues 
often tend to be regulated in an approach quite distinct from the New 
Approach or mutual recognition; detailed directives nevertheless leave 
some discretion to member states (hence, less than full harmonisation) and 
the inclination to use that discretion is found to be fairly strong. This might 
lead member states to interpret the national discretion more widely than it 
legally is, under such directives, which may, in turn lead to cases about the 
scope of a directive or about details in national (draft) laws which might 
conflict with the harmonised elements. 
f) From an historical point of view, many of the detailed opinions 
used to concern the so-called ‘non-harmonised’ sectors and therefore very 
often requested the insertion of a mutual recognition clause. Although the 
cases of missing mutual recognition clauses are still present, one can 
observe a gradual shift towards problems with directives of total or partial 
harmonisation. This shift signifies that Directive 98/34/EC has additionally 
become, much more than in the past, a special monitor of the 
implementation of EU directives in the range of technical national laws and 
decrees (in addition to mutual recognition issues).  
g) As to the sectoral composition of the Commission’s detailed 
opinions issued in 2010, one might raise a question whether the three most 
important sectors in the notifications issued with comments and/or 
detailed opinions for 2010 and 2011 (agro-food, mechanics and building 
and construction)167 also stand out in the Commission’s written objections. 
This is the case for the agro-food sector, which leads in the Commission’s 
detailed opinions as well (12 objections), and ‘mechanics’ (4), but not the 
case for the building and construction sector. Indeed, the second sector 
issued with more Commission detailed opinions in 2010 is transport (7).  
                                                   
167 See section 7.8.5. 
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9. REDUCING TRANSACTION AND 
INFORMATION COSTS  
 third challenge in enforcing the EU market arises from the need to 
reduce the transaction and information costs of actual or potential 
market access, including legal uncertainty. Whether intentional or 
not, these costs can be regarded as barriers or border effects for business 
and there is every reason to lower them in a single market. Among the 
Commission’s initiatives/mechanisms that could contribute to reducing 
transactions and information costs, we can mention the following: 
 Commission guidelines, interpretative notes, handbooks, etc.; 
 Points of single contact (e.g. services Directive and the new legislative 
framework); 
 Commission information flow (websites, EU Info Centres, etc.); 
 Cheaper/easier cross-border dispute settlements (FIN-NET, ADR) 
and 
 28th regime for contract law. 
Not only has the Commission (helped by the internet) become far 
more active and forthcoming in disseminating detailed information, an 
increasing number of EU laws are explained in plain terms via a range of 
Commission websites (indeed, a consolidation of these might be desirable 
for business) and phone numbers. EU Info Centres have also arisen in all 
member states and e.g. the services Directive requires (free) Points of Single 
Contact, on which business is very keen. The direct effect of these services 
is meant to lower transaction and information costs, but the indirect effect 
of Single Contact Points on member states’ administrations is likely to be a 
far better and directly available EU knowledge, which, in turn, raises the 
quality of local enforcement and reduces the probability of incorrect 
interpretations.  
A
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A new twist to this cost reduction approach (which also has a 
‘preventive’ element to it) are recent attempts to develop EU instruments 
that lower the costs and risks of EU-wide transactions. One set of attempts 
is about cheaper/easier cross-border dispute settlements, e.g. FIN-NET, the 
network for financial services, and the recent Commission proposals on 
Alternative Dispute Resolution (ADR) and online dispute resolution 
(ODR).168 Alternative dispute settlement mechanisms may also complement 
the traditional judicial system by facilitating the resolution of conflicts and 
avoiding costly procedures.  
According to a recent study,169 there are 750 ADR schemes handling 
consumer disputes across the EU. However, geographical and sectoral gaps 
in the coverage were still identified. It clearly leads to disparities in the 
accessibility of effective ADR. Moreover, ADR schemes as a rule do not 
accept complaints against traders in other member states. Recent studies 
also show that the number of disputes submitted to ADR is increasing, but 
is still small. Indeed, only 5% of the EU consumers took their case to an 
ADR entity in 2010, and only 9% of businesses report ever having used 
ADR. In order to promote the use of the ADR and create effective, impartial 
and transparent ADR schemes, the European Commission made a new 
proposal in November 2011 on alternative and online dispute resolution 
(ADR and ODR platform).170 The proposed Directive on consumer ADR 
will cover all kinds of consumer disputes and aims to provide consumers 
and businesses, particular small ones, with a out-of-court, low-cost (ADR 
procedures must be free of charge for consumers or have a cost below €50), 
                                                   
168 Proposal for a Directive of the European Parliament and of the Council on 
alternative dispute resolution for consumer disputes and amending Regulation No 
2006/2004 and Directive 2009/22/EC (Directive on consumer ADR), COM (2011) 
793/2 and proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament and of the 
Council on online dispute resolution for consumer disputes (Regulation on 
consumer ODR), (SEC (2011) 14, both from 29.11.2011. 
169 “Use of Alternative Dispute Resolution in the European Union”, Final Report to 
the European Commission – DG Sanco, 16 October 2009. See also, “Cross-border 
Alternative Dispute Resolution in the European Union”, European Parliament 
Internal Market and Consumer Affairs Committee, 2011 
(http://www.europarl.europa.eu/meetdocs/2009_2014/documents/imco/dv/ad
r_study_/adr_study_en.pdf).  
170 The proposals form part of the 12 key actions of the Single Market Act and the 
“Europe 2020 Strategy”.  
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fast (most disputes submitted to ARD are decided within 90 days) and 
alternative way to improve redress in the internal market. The draft 
proposal covers contractual disputes between consumers and traders of 
services or goods. This only covers business-to-consumer (B2C) disputes. 
Business-to-business (B2B) disputes are excluded from the scope of the 
proposed legislation. Furthermore, to avoid imposing excessive costs and 
burdens on the member states, the Commission proposal will be built on 
the entities already existing in the member states. The proposed regulation 
on consumer ODR aims to cover the existing gap of ADR for shopping 
online and will create an EU-wide online platform, providing consumers 
and businesses with a single point of entry to resolve their disputes 
concerning purchases made online. This single European point of entry will 
automatically send the consumer’s complaint to the national ADR entity. 
It’s also important to develop European networks of ADR entities, in 
order to facilitate the cross-border resolution of disputes, e.g. FIN-NET, the 
network for financial services. 
Another set of attempts seeks to enact at EU level a 28th regime for 
contract law, meant to promote legal certainty for business in the single 
market. A proposal has been made for sales law171 and one is expected for 
insurance. If the 28th regime is attractive enough, it reduces ‘regulatory 
heterogeneity’ among member states. In fact, contracts are essential for 
running a business and the existence of a 28th contract law for cross-border 
transactions might not only promote cross-border trade, but also legal 
certainty and the uniform implementation of EU law. The proposed 
regulation would create a 28th optional European contract law for the sale 
of goods, with contracts for the sale of goods applying both to B2B and B2C 
transactions (previous agreement of both parts is necessary). 
                                                   
171 Proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council on a 
Common European Sales Law, COM (2011) 635 final. 
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10. RECOMMENDATIONS 
here can be no doubt about the firmer resolve, evident for around a 
decade or so, and about the widening and strengthening of efforts 
with respect to implementation and proper application of EU 
internal market law by both the European Commission and the member 
states. While of course retaining the ultimate legal option of going to the 
Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU) for infringement cases, it is – 
rightly – considered to be (much) faster and mostly cheaper to employ a 
range of other approaches in order to avoid the route all the way to the 
Luxembourg court, or, to prevent bad implementation and/or application 
in the first place. The keywords for these newer methods are ‘informal’ 
approaches and ’cooperative’ relations between the member states and the 
Commission, and not litigation emphasising conflicting views. To the 
extent that EU member states assume ‘ownership’ of resolving 
implementation and application issues, the ‘cooperative’ methods of 
working in various ways to prevent or avoid heavy and slow infringement 
procedures or to lower information and transaction costs of effective 
market access for businesses tend to be superior in most instances. 
All this is not just about EU law enforcement but also about the 
confidence European business develops and maintains in the genuine 
opportunities offered by the single market, unhindered by improper 
implementation or application of EU laws, or unnecessarily bureaucratic 
and disproportionate problems of intra-EU market access in numerous 
ways. It is equally crucial for European consumers eager to make use of the 
many opportunities offered in terms of choice, speed and prices of cross-
border exchange of goods or services. As the CJEU has noted many times, 
in the final analysis, the internal EU market is to be considered as a 
‘domestic market’. In other words, except for clearly justified derogations 
allowing discretion and regulatory autonomy of member states, there 
should be no hindrances in ‘doing business cross-border’ (B2B) or indeed 
conducting B2C and C2C exchanges throughout the EU-27 or the EEA.  
T
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However, now that the resolve is greater and several new methods 
have been introduced with some measure of success, the last thing one 
should do is to consider the enforcement in the internal market as a 
problem solved. It is not. As the European Business Test Panel (2009) 
shows, European business is still not convinced that cross-border 
exchanges are easy and well-received by other governments. That mere fact 
alone already throttles entrepreneurial initiatives and the active search for 
opportunities in other national markets. Moreover, as our study has shown 
in detail, there are still lots of enforcement problems, big and small, and 
almost every new method would seem to attract new notifications or 
complaints. Much of that is resolved, which is certainly good news and can 
be expected to stimulate, sooner or later, further business action, whether 
trade or investment. In turn, this is likely to heighten competitive rivalry 
throughout the internal market, which is a source of economic growth. 
Altogether, this blend of good and bad news about enforcement can only 
serve as an encouragement to pursue a path which, apparently, begins to 
pay off in terms of better enforcement. This should increase consumer 
welfare directly or indirectly and usually improve competitive conditions, 
stimulating growth.  
In light of these very real and potential benefits, we suggest the 
following recommendations for the European Commission and the member 
states: 
1. The widening of enforcement from formal infringement procedures 
to a broader spectrum, including different pre-infringement routes, a range 
of preventive initiatives and efforts to reduce transaction and information 
costs about national regulation as well, are strongly encouraged. This is 
best done by pursuing a more general EU enforcement strategy 
encompassing all these elements, with many Commission DGs and the 
member states involved, each with well-defined roles but in a cooperative 
spirit. Such a strategy should be carefully considered and our study cannot 
be the only basis for its formulation. Nevertheless, we suggest that legal 
aspects should not dominate the strategy. A successful enforcement 
strategy hinges at least as much on the right incentives (or the absence of 
disincentives) for complainants, speed (in most cases), resources (e.g. for 
SOLVIT), costs and benefits of detection and of different resolution 
mechanisms. Perfect enforcement is, unfortunately, an illusion. Imperfect 
enforcement implies that, to some extent, choices can be made, for instance, 
making relatively more effort to accomplish a (much) better functioning 
internal market, as this may help to fuel economic growth.  
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2. The idea that the European Commission is the ‘guardian of the 
treaty’ against a flood of cases from unwilling member states has, for much 
too long, been regarded as the foundation of effective enforcement of EU 
(internal market) law. It risks creating a habit of litigation, also in the many 
instances where the cooperative route would express the collective 
character of the European public good, be it the internal market or other 
acquis of the Union. EU countries have every interest in a well-functioning 
internal market and so have their companies and consumers. The notion of 
‘partnership’ between the Commission and the member states naturally fits 
the roles of both in the EU system and can stimulate effective problem-
solving in a variety of ways. Member states should embrace more firmly 
their ‘ownership’ of the EU acquis, and in particular, the single market: the 
positive experiences in SOLVIT, EU Pilot and the 98/34 Committee have 
already helped a lot to improve enforcement. It is far more fruitful to 
consider the ‘guardian’ function first as a duty to monitor, inspect and 
detect, and, second, to set in motion whatever resolution mechanism can be 
effective. It is only when cooperative or ‘informal’ resolution mechanisms 
fail that the ‘guardian’ function ought to be interpreted as litigation. Being 
the ‘guardian’ is thus nothing else than accomplishing the best possible 
enforcement, because that is in the interest of the Union and its economy. 
Infringement procedures cannot bring the best possible enforcement, given 
disincentives like the huge delays as well as the costs per case. Moreover, it 
is a fact, also underlined by the empirical evidence in this study, that 
infringement procedures can never deal with more than a small fraction of 
suspected infringements. Litigation is an ultimate remedy, indispensable 
for credibility, but far from central when trying to improve the functioning 
of the internal market via better enforcement.  
3. SOLVIT is a success story since it has proven to be a resolution 
mechanism with easy access, a high success rate and considerable speed, 
while costing very little. The resources provided by member states are 
unequal, but too many member states still ought to bring their SOLVIT 
budget up to required minima. The investment involved is very small, 
usually a few full-time equivalent (FTE) personnel. Given present austerity, 
it is likely to be inevitable that member states can only be seen to do this if 
minimum staffing is regulated at EU level. 
4. A closer study of business cases in SOLVIT and of business 
attitudes towards this free mechanism with limited and voluntary solutions 
suggests that SOLVIT should focus on SMEs in the first place. The idea of 
making SOLVIT more attractive to business may work for cases like VAT 
disbursement, but would require more e.g. for free movement of goods and 
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of services. Promoting SOLVIT in business circles is useful, yet one has to 
consider this also in the light of what alternatives for rapid enforcement 
business disposes of, in contrast to most problems for citizens. 
5. The Commission’s Scoreboards have proven their utility over the 
last 15 years or so. The average transposition deficit of member states has 
steadily gone down until late 2009 and increased again a little by 
November 2011. What requires more explicit attention is the combination 
of a) a relatively high transposition deficit, b) a relatively high compliance 
deficit and c) a relatively high number of pending infringement cases. One 
option is to single out the worst-performing country at the end of the year 
(late 2011, Belgium), issue a special report and formulate a joint 
Commission/member state path towards better enforcement, for the sake 
of a better functioning internal market.  
6. The partnership approach between the Commission and the 
member states, manifest in the pre-litigation stage (before a formal 
infringement procedure starts), is a success, as shown by EU Pilot. All 
member states should be incorporated in EU Pilot and cases referred from 
SOLVIT could be handled faster if the complementarity between SOLVIT 
and EU Pilot is clarified and if the analysis already made in SOLVIT is used 
in EU Pilot cases.  
7. In the wider landscape of EU enforcement, ‘preventive’ approaches 
aim to reduce the likelihood that infringement might occur later. A 
considerable number of concrete successes in this new landscape 
demonstrate that this route is of great importance, although it seems to fall 
outside ‘classical’ enforcement concepts. We witness the increasingly active 
and positive involvement of member states in such approaches (in eight out 
of ten mechanisms). Major achievements include the mutual recognition 
Regulation 764/2008, the pro-active joint ‘ownership’ of the difficult 
implementation of the 2006/123 services Directive, the rapidly intensified 
and ever-more effective IMI (Internal Market Information) system of day-
to-day inter-member states’ administrative cooperation and the crucial 
cooperation of all member states in the 98/34 Committee preventing new 
technical barriers from arising in the internal market. These impressive 
examples underline, without any doubt, that preventive and cooperative 
approaches can be of great help in preventing enforcement problems. The 
EU should extend this form of cooperation wherever meaningful. 
8. A much less-known preventive feature of (say) the last decade is 
the gradual shift from enacting directives to EU regulations. This trend also 
requires the active support of member states since, in quite a few instances, 
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they voluntarily forego the degrees of regulatory discretion that directives 
might still provide them with. EU regulations have, by definition, no 
implementation problems and application of EU law tends to be less of a 
problem, too. Moreover, EU regulations have the virtue of pre-empting 
regulatory heterogeneity between member states, which can be very costly 
for business operating throughout the single market. Where ‘diversity’, 
based on genuinely distinct preferences, between member states plays a 
role, EU regulations are not a good idea because the uniformity is likely to 
suppress such divergent preferences. However, in numerous more 
technical directives, heterogeneity arises from the fragmented national 
decision-making over 27 member states, which rarely has anything to do 
with distinct preferences, except the desire to make one’s own laws. The 
huge shift in the internal market towards EU regulations over the last 
decade shows that member states have been prepared to dispense with a 
stream of directives (hence, with the transposition into domestic law) and 
enacting regulations instead, as a less cumbersome and clearer resolution of 
overcoming failures of the internal market. Member states are encouraged 
to continue with this trend in all cases where no distinct national 
preferences play a role and, in so doing, contribute directly to a lessening of 
enforcement problems. 
9. In complex directives (such as the horizontal services Directive 
2006/123), the partnership approach has proven to work very well. Rather 
than just waiting until an avalanche of implementation problems was 
bound to emerge, the Commission and member states have closely worked 
together in Brussels and in national capitals, as well as during the ‘mutual 
evaluation’ between EU countries’ implementation, in order to realise a 
timely and reasonably homogeneous implementation, with only some 
exceptions. Of course, there are not many such complex directives. 
However, where they arise or have to be revised thoroughly, a joint 
‘ownership’ of the implementation process should be repeated as this 
prevents many problems later.  
10. The marvel of preventive approaches was and remains the 98/34 
procedure, which aims at pre-empting the emergence of new technical 
barriers caused by new draft laws and decrees in member states. Our study 
provides empirical evidence supporting a slow but steady learning process 
in national administrations prompted by two and a half decades of 
notifications, and further disciplines following critical CJEU rulings. We 
also calculate the ‘effective prevention rate’ (of new technical barriers) for 
2010 and 2011, which hovers around 10% of notifications. It is most likely 
that in the 1980s and 1990s, the prevention of new technical barriers has 
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been even more necessary (and empirical evidence suggests so much). 
Without 98/34, the internal goods market would simply have become a 
mockery: over the many years, probably thousands of new barriers have 
been pre-empted. The mechanism is intrusive if one holds a strict view of 
national parliamentary ‘sovereignty’, but in actual practice parliaments 
barely notice any restriction of their freedom to enact new technical laws 
(which of course cannot go against EU law anyway), yet the result of this 
procedure is very positive. Extending this type of procedure to some areas 
where the danger of undisciplined autonomy is significant is highly 
recommended. One possible example is in services falling under the 
horizontal services Directive 2006/123.  
11. Of all areas where enforcement of EU directives is problematic, 
public procurement is undoubtedly the most difficult one. It is also a huge 
market, even when the thresholds for supplies and works are taken into 
account. In the past the regime suffered from serious implementation 
problems. The design of the EU public procurement regime hinges on the 
trade-off between the far-reaching demands to keep the system open, 
transparent and competitive, which leads to a lot of bureaucracy, and the 
costs and discouragement that such impositions give rise to for European 
business. This trade-off is never going to be resolved in a fully satisfactory 
manner, but there are signals that the preventive system errs by being too 
costly and cumbersome. It is also (too) prone to litigation. The heavy-
handed bureaucracy might also lead public procurement to be ‘static’, 
avoiding innovation. Officials might often merely ‘tick-off’ a list of 
requirements, leading to weak procurement. Precisely, new bidders 
frequently come from across the border and might offer innovative 
variants. Less red tape and greater flexibility would almost certainly induce 
disproportionately higher interest from other EU countries, up from 
today’s far too low cross-border award rates. These points lead us to 
strongly support the three draft Directives proposed in December 2011. 
This market has the potential to a) induce more cross-border competition 
and b) generate much higher ‘welfare ‘gains. 
12. There are still numerous ‘barriers’, real and perceived, in the 
internal public procurement market. Member states have (too) much 
regulatory discretion because the procurement directives are ‘coordination’ 
directives, with insufficient harmonisation. The ‘regulatory heterogeneity’ 
in the area is far too costly for the businesses interested in cross-border or 
even EU-wide operation. More harmonisation and/or disciplines of 
national ‘special or extra’ rules and requirements should urgently be 
pursued. Also, the national review and remedies systems are vastly 
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different in terms of rules, procedures, ease-of-access and effectiveness. 
Such complications go squarely against the justified desire of business to 
have prior confidence in cross-border tenders. Quick access to national 
reviews of public procurement is an asset, but its utility is dramatically 
diminished by the overly fragmented arrangements that confuse business 
and undermine a level playing field. Harmonisation here is tough given the 
incorporation in national legal systems, but EU-wide performance criteria 
might be introduced to enhance confidence for cross-border entrepreneurs.  
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Annex I. Breakdown by sector of the draft regulations notified by the member states of the EU in 2011, issued with a 
comment or a detailed opinion by the Commission or the member states 
Sectors* Countries 
BE BG CZ CY DK DE EE EI GR ES FR IT LV LT LU HU MT NL AT PL PT RO SI SK FI SE UK TOTAL 
Building and 
construction 
0 1 0 0 1 11 0 1 1 3 6 0 0 3 0 0 0 2 6 0 0 2 0 3 2 1 3 46 
Food and agricultural 
produce 
4 0 1 1 5 1 3 1 4 3 7 6 3 0 0 5 0 3 1 1 1 0 2 4 7 0 4 67 
Chemical 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 2 0 1 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 2 0 0 9 
Pharmaceutical 
products 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 4 
Domestic and leisure 
equipment 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 2 
Mechanics 0 1 5 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 2 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 2 0 13 
Energy, minerals, wood 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 3 
Environment, 
packaging 
2 0 1 0 1 2 0 0 1 0 2 4 1 0 0 1 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 3 19 
Health, medical 
equipment 
0 1 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 3 
Transports 1 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 1 2 1 0 0 0 0 0 3 1 1 0 1 1 0 1 4 6 24 
Telecommunications 0 0 0 0 0 4 1 2 0 8 2 0 0 0 3 0 0 1 1 0 0 1 0 1 1 0 2 27 
Gambling, games of 
chance 
0 1 1 0 0 2 1 0 1 5 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 12 
Other products 0 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 2 0 0 1 0 1 0 0 1 2 1 2 13 
Information society 
services 
0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 1 0 3 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 7 
Total by member state  9 6 10 1 8 22 5 4 9 22 25 15 5 3 3 10 1 12 11 6 2 4 3 9 15 9 20 249 
* For convenience, we have adopted the same categories of sectors used by the European Commission in its annual reports. 
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Annex II. Breakdown by sector of the draft regulations notified by the member states of the EU in 2010, issued with a 
comment or a detailed opinion by the Commission or the member states 
Sectors Countries 
BE BG CZ CY DK DE EE EI GR ES FR IT LV LT LU HU MT NL AT PL PT RO SI SK FI SE UK TOTAL 
Building and 
construction 
1 0 0 0 0 7 0 0 0 1 1 1 0 2 1 0 0 0 3 2 0 0 0 0 2 0 1 22 
Food and agricultural 
produce 
3 2 2 2 5 3 1 1 0 12 7 4 6 1 0 1 1 2 0 2 1 1 1 3 0 6 0 67 
Chemical 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 2 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 4 0 0 0 1 0 10 
Pharmaceutical 
products 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 2 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 2 2 1 8 
Domestic and leisure 
equipment 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 2 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 5 
Mechanics 2 1 8 0 0 0 0 0 0 2 2 2 0 0 0 0 1 2 2 1 0 1 1 0 1 0 0 26 
Energy, minerals, 
wood 
0 0 2 0 0 1 1 0 2 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 1 0 2 1 0 0 0 0 11 
Environment, 
packaging 
1 0 1 0 0 0 1 3 0 1 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 11 
Health, medical 
equipment 
0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 5 
Transports 0 0 0 0 0 2 0 0 0 1 1 1 0 0 0 2 0 2 0 4 0 0 0 0 1 2 5 21 
Telecommunications 0 0 0 0 2 0 1 0 0 0 3 1 1 2 1 0 0 0 0 1 1 4 0 0 1 0 2 20 
Gambling, Games of 
chance 
1 0 0 1 3 0 0 0 0 2 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 2 0 2 0 0 0 0 0 12 
Other products 1 1 1 0 0 0 1 1 0 1 0 5 0 0 0 2 0 2 1 3 0 0 0 0 0 3 4 26 
Information society 
services 
0 0 0 1 0 1 0 0 0 0 5 3 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 12 
Total by member 
state  
9 4 14 4 10 16 5 6 2 20 24 18 8 5 2 5 5 9 8 18 2 14 3 3 9 15 14 256 
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Annex III. Detailed opinions issued by the Commission in 2010, following the notifications under Directive 98/34/EC * 
No Subject / Area Sector Comments Problem type Remedy 
1 Honey & additives Food and agricultural 
produce 
No Wrong implementation Comply with Dir. & 
Regulation 
2 Non-harmonised 
vessels 
Transport No No mutual recognition clause Insert mutual recognition 
clause 
3 Tyre bales; end of 
the waste 
Environment, 
packaging 
No Wrong implementation of the Directive; 
criteria lacking enforceability 
Comply with the 
applicable 
concept/criteria laid 
down in the EU 
legislation 
4 Labelling of 
construction 
products 
Environment, 
packaging 
Also Additional requirements with the same 
effect as a quantitative restriction, 
without any justification 
Remove the additional 
requirements 
5 Marketing of very 
toxic, toxic or 
corrosive 
substances 
Chemicals Also Non-compliance with the REACH 
Regulation and other directives; No 
notification of the dossier to the 
European Chemicals Agency 
Comply with the REACH 
Regulation and remove 
restrictions not 
compatible with the 
relevant Directive 
6 Ski helmets Domestic and leisure 
equipments 
No EN standard mandatory Insert equivalence clause 
7 Pyrotechnical 
articles 
Other products Also Infringement of the relevant EU 
Directive 
Remove and adapt the 
provisions according to 
relevant EU Directive 
8 Labelling of energy 
drinks with caffeine 
Food and agricultural 
produce 
No Additional health warnings on energy 
drinks contain caffeine not in 
compliance with the Directive. 
Elimination of the 
labelling requirement in 
order to comply with the 
relevant Directive 
9 Medical devices, 
thermometers 
Health , Medical 
equipment 
Also Making voluntary standards 
mandatory 
Keep EN / other equiv. 
standards voluntary 
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10 Registration of food 
companies and 
foodstuffs 
Food and agricultural 
products 
Also Non- compliance with the EU 
information and notification 
requirements established in the EU 
Regulation 
Adapt the 
provisions/comply with 
the EU Regulation 
11 Moist snuff and 
chewing tobacco 
Other products No Improper implementation of the 
Directive(s) 
Invitation to clarify 
certain points of the draft 
regulation and to  abstain 
from adopting any 
measures that could 
jeopardise the objectives 
of the applicable Directive 
as well as those of food 
law 
12 Wheelchair-
accessible taxis 
Transport No No mutual recognition clause Insert a mutual 
recognition clause 
13 Batteries and 
accumulators and 
related waste 
Environment, 
packaging 
No Additional labelling requirements to 
those in the Directive, which fully 
harmonised the labelling, without 
recourse to the Art. 114 procedure 
Elimination of the 
additional labelling 
requirements 
14 Lifts Mechanics No Additional requirements; making 
voluntary standards mandatory 
Comply with new 
approach and this 
Directive 
15 Driver location 
signs 
Transport No No mutual recognition clause Insert a mutual 
recognition clause 
16 Portable traffic 
signal control 
equipment 
Transport Also Proposed to allow for recognition of an 
equivalent standard where there is no 
adopted European standard; possible 
infringement Art. 34 and 36 TFEU 
Take into consideration 
mutual recognition 
principle 
17 Registration of 
poultry and ratities 
Food and agricultural 
produce 
Also Requirements for the maintenance 
records for keepers of poultry are not in 
compliance with EU Directive 
Adapt the provisions 
according to the EU 
Directive 
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18 Gambling games on 
the internet 
Gambling, Games 
and related 
 
Also Restrictions that could infringe the 
freedom to provide services – Art. 56 
TFEU 
Adapt or remove 
provisions in conflict with 
the EU law 
19 Mineral water Food and agricultural 
produce 
Also Left out allowed additives; labelling too 
strict 
Comply with  2 directives 
20 Hot-water boilers, 
energy efficiency 
Energy, minerals, 
woods 
Also The scope of the notified rules exceeds 
the scope of the relevant Directive 
Reduce the scope of the 
draft regulation to align it 
with the relevant EU 
Directive 
21 Food of animal 
origin, bee honey 
Food and agricultural 
produce 
Also Scope/ details draft not in compliance 
with a Regulation 
Reduce scope, alter 
specifics 
22 Electronic cash 
registers 
Mechanics No Additional requirements to those fixed 
in the EU Directives 
Align the draft with the 
EU law, by guarantee that 
products bearing the CE 
marking will not be 
subject to additional 
requirements 
23 Genetically 
modified organisms 
Food and agricultural 
production 
Also Infringement of the EU Regulation; no 
compliance with the procedure laid 
down in the Regulation 
Adapt the 
provisions/comply with 
the EU Regulation 
24 Building products Building and 
construction 
No Additional requirements for goods 
with CE mark without justification 
Provision of reasons in 
public interest or removal 
of the additional 
requirements 
25 Preparations 
classified as 
dangerous – 
toxicovigilance 
 
 
Chemicals Also Draft not in compliance with the 
Directive 
Align the draft with the 
EU law 
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26 Tourist railway 
vehicles 
Transport No No evidence is given that the proposed 
measures are justified according to Art. 
36 TFEU; No mutual recognition clause 
Insert a mutual 
recognition clause 
27 Devices for 
compliance with 
tyres 
Mechanics No No mutual recognition clause Insert mutual recognition 
clause 
28 Road signalling 
panels, approvals 
Transport No Additional requirements for goods 
with CE mark without justification 
Provision of reasons in 
public interest or removal 
of the additional 
requirements 
29 Products of animal 
origin 
Food and agricultural 
produce 
Also The scope of the notified draft 
regulation goes beyond the scope of the 
applicable EU Regulation. 
Reduce scope, remove 
conflicts with Regulation 
/Directive 
30 Self-defence aerosol 
sprayers 
Other products No Origin marking is forbidden Replace origin marking 
by traceability 
requirements 
31 Construction 
products 
Building and 
construction products 
No No equivalence in several cases Insert mutual recognition 
clause in several cases 
32 Plastic films, on 
glazing 
Building and 
construction 
No Mutual recognition clause drafted in 
very vague terms; double tests 
Use standard mutual 
recognition; remove 
additional obligatory test 
33 Marking on eggs Food and agricultural 
produce 
No Wrong implementation of 2 
Regulations 
Adapt specifics of draft in 
order to comply with the 
EU Regulations 
34 Devices measuring 
blood pressures 
Health and medical 
equipment 
Also Making standards mandatory Insert a mutual 
recognition clause 
35 Fuels Energy, minerals, 
wood 
No Restrictions to the free movement of 
goods without explaining why these 
measures are necessary and 
proportional – Arts 34 and 36 
Elimination or 
justification of those 
measures 
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36 Pig carcasses Food and agricultural 
produce 
No No compliance with the procedure and 
quantities lay down in the Regulation 
Notify the Commission of 
maximum permitted 
number of slaughters, 
exempt from application 
of the Community scale 
37 Genetically 
modified organisms 
Food and agricultural 
production 
Also Infringement of the EU Regulation; no 
compliance with the procedure lay 
down in the Regulation 
Adapt the 
provisions/comply with 
EU Regulation 
38 Foodstuff, labelling, 
presentation and 
advertising 
Food and agricultural 
products 
Also Non- compliance with labelling 
Directive and other Regulation 
Remove and/or adapt the 
provisions in accordance 
with the EU Directive and 
Regs 
39 Fixed storage tanks Mechanics Also No mutual recognition clause Insert a mutual 
recognition clause 
40 Digital books Information Society 
Services 
No Possible Restriction of the freedom of 
establishment (Art. 49 TFEU) and 
freedom to provide services + plus non-
compliance with EU Directive 
Adapt the 
provisions/comply with 
the EU Law 
41 Breeding dogs Other products Also No compliance with the EU regulation; 
extra-territorial application of national 
rules 
Remove and adapt the 
provisions according to 
the EU Regulation 
42 Tramways electrical 
systems 
Transport Also No mutual recognition clause Insert a mutual 
recognition clause 
43 LED tube lights Domestic and leisure 
equipments 
No Additional mandatory requirements, 
on the basis of their technical 
standards, contrary to the relevant 
Directive 
Remove provisions 
conflicting with the 
relevant EU Directive 
* In 2010, the European Commission issued a total of 44 detailed opinions, one of which was omitted in this table, because the case was 
reported to the Court of Justice of the European Union. 
